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Ugolino (c. 1380-1457) wrote one of the largest treatises on music theory in the first half 
of the fifteenth century. This work, the Declaratio musicae disciplinae, is comprised of five 
books that cover everything a musician of the era would need to know, from plainchant to 
harmonic proportions, from musica practica to musica speculativa. However, the treatise has 
received contradictory interpretations by modern scholars, some viewing it as mainly practical, 
others as mainly theoretical. I argue that in Book 2, which deals with counterpoint, Ugolino 
crystallizes the relationship between theory and practice, while offering distinctive contrapuntal 
practices. Ugolino presents a unique view music's place in the structure of knowledge, one which 
is highly dependent on Aristotelian philosophy. He posits that music is a science and that it is a 
branch not of mathematics, as it had traditionally been categorized, but of natural philosophy. 
This viewpoint shapes the entire treatise and is evident in the book on counterpoint. There, he 
presents an Italian tradition of teaching counterpoint known as the "regola del grado." Ugolino is 
the first author to present this tradition entirely in Latin. In addition, he offers an unusual 
description of musica ficta. In it, he presents a diagram, the duplex manus, that mixes together 
both musica recta and musica ficta. Ugolino's work suggests that theory and practice, although 
arranged hierarchically, need not be in conflict, and that a treatise such as his can be both 
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INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
Ugolino of Orvieto (c. 1380-1457) wrote one of the largest treatises on music theory in 
the first half of the fifteenth century. This work, the Declaratio musicae disciplinae, composed 
sometime in the 1430s or 1440s, is comprised of five books, each with its own philosophical 
preface, and covers everything he thought a musician should know, from plainchant to harmonic 
proportions, from musica practica to musica speculativa. It formed the basis of Franchino 
Gafori’s early musical education, and it received attention from the likes of Bartolomé Ramos de 
Pareja, who thought it worthy enough of critique.1 Yet it has received considerably less attention 
than treatises from the end of the fifteenth century, such as those by Johannes Tinctoris or 
Gafori, or ones from the century before, such as those by Jacobus of Liège or Marchetto of 
Padua. Indeed, other treatises from the first half of the fifteenth century also remain relatively 
under-explored. This period, which witnessed great social and cultural changes, lies on an 
uncomfortable boundary between late medieval scholasticism and nascent renaissance 
humanism, between the height of Aristotelian philosophy and the rediscovery of Plato’s works.  
When Ugolino’s treatise undergoes investigation by modern commentators, they tend to 
hold contradictory interpretations, some viewing it as mainly practical, others as mainly 
theoretical. These conflicting views provoke a question: what is the relationship between theory 
and practice as it is set forth by Ugolino? In book 2 of the Declaratio, which deals with 
counterpoint, Ugolino’s views on the relationship between theory and practice are crystallized, 
 
1 Ann E Moyer, Musica Scientia: Musical Scholarship in the Italian Renaissance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1992), 68-69. 
2 
particularly through his distinctive contributions. Therefore, book 2 forms a portrait by which to 
understand his philosophy on the relationship between theory and practice. But this portrait must 
be seen from the frame he sets up in book 1. There, Ugolino presents a unique view on music’s 
place in the structure of knowledge, one that is highly dependent on Aristotelian philosophy. He 
argues that music is a science and that it is a branch not of mathematics, as it had been 
categorized in the past, but of natural philosophy. This viewpoint shapes the rest of the treatise, 
and it is evident in the book on counterpoint. Thus, I present Ugolino’s Aristotelian position 
through in investigation of the distinctive features found in the book on counterpoint. In this 
chapter, I provide a historical background that details key events surrounding Ugolino’s life and 
work, an overview of the structure of the treatise, and a survey of its reception. This survey 
shows some of the problems encountered in modern scholarship on Ugolino that, in part, this 
dissertation seeks to address. It raises some problems that I answer in later chapters. In chapter 2, 
I offer an account of how Ugolino defines music and its relation to Aristotelian philosophy. His 
understanding of Aristotle depends on the developments that took place in the previous century. 
These developments hinge on the way fourteenth century philosophers integrated mathematics 
into natural philosophy without abandoning Aristotle’s philosophical outlook. In chapter 3, I turn 
to the book on counterpoint and describe Ugolino’s classification of intervals, his account of 
perfection (akin to cadence), and the Italian method of counterpoint called the regola del grado. 
In chapter 4, I present Ugolino’s views on musica ficta, since a diagram of altered notes has been 
the subject of debate. This debate centers on the role of the hexachord in the structure of diatonic 
music. Finally, in chapter 5, I offer a brief conclusion. Ugolino’s work suggests that theory and 
practice, although arranged hierarchically, need not be in conflict, and that a treatise such as his 
can be both eminently practical and highly theoretical. Understanding theory and practice in this 
3 
way relies on a close reading of Ugolino’s treatise.    
1.2 Historical Background 
Ugolino lived at a time rife with political upheaval and cultural change. Little is known of 
his early life, but he was born around 1380.2 He probably received a university education, 
because in the Declaratio he often cites the works of Aristotle that were typically studied at 
universities, and his reasoning demonstrates familiarity with the scholastic method. In 1378, just 
about the time Ugolino was born, the Great Schism began, and it continued through 1417.3 With 
several claimants to the papacy, factions arose around each, fracturing the political landscape. In 
an attempt to heal the divisions, clerics called for a special council. The Council of Constance, 
which Ugolino attended, took place between 1414-18.4 It resolved to “heal the schism…extirpate 
heresy, and institute reform.”5 Reform—ecclesiastical, clerical, moral and educational—
permeated nearly all levels of discourse. Early humanist authors responded by writing programs 
for educational reform, which often touch on music. For example, Pier Paolo Vergerio includes 
music as one of the studies worthy of a free person.6 In the preface to book 2 of the Declaratio, 
Ugolino writes about what makes a person free, what makes a person a slave, and the kinds of 
 
2 Albert Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto, Theorist and Composer,” Musica Disciplina 9 (1955), 116. 
3 Gerald Christianson, The Church, the Councils, and Reform: The Legacy of the Fifteenth Century (Dexter, MI: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 4. For a full examination of the council and translations of 
contemporary accounts, see John Hine Mundy and Kennerly M. Woody eds., The Council of Constance: The 
Unification of the Church, trans. Louise Ropes Loomis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).  
4 Lewis Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara 1400-1505: The Creation of a Musical Center in the Fifteenth 
Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 78. 
5 Christianson, The Church, the Councils, and Reform: The Legacy of the Fifteenth Century, 7. For a complete 
treatment of the idea of reform in view of the council, see Phillip H Stump, The Reforms of the Council of Constance 
(1414-1418) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994). 
6 Pier Paolo Vergerio, “The Character and Studies Befitting a Free-Born Youth,” in Humanist Educational Treatises, 
ed. Craig W. Kallendorf (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 53. 
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subjects a free person should study.7 Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, who became Pope Pius II, 
suggests that the seven liberal arts ultimately aim at acquiring philosophy.8 Ugolino adopts a 
similar strategy, using musica practica as an essential step along a path towards a higher 
philosophy—in this case a knowledge of the proportions.9 The impetus to reform likely animated 
Ugolino’s writing and manifests itself in both the practical nature of his work and the ends to 
which he directs that practice.  
The ecclesiastical context in which Ugolino worked gave him the motive and means to 
write such a large and thorough treatise. In 1425 Ugolino became an archdeacon, an important 
senior position in Italian cathedrals at this time.10 Around 1431, he moved from Forlì to the 
cathedral of Ferrara, where he would remain until his death in 1457.11 The Bishop Giovanni 
Tavelli da Tossignano played a central role in the ecclesiastical life in Ferrara, encouraging 
reform and providing strong leadership in his diocese.12 Ugolino worked under him, sometimes 
even representing him outside of the cathedral.13 Indeed, Ugolino attended the Council of 
Ferrara-Florence in 1437, where he could have met Guillaume Dufay.14 In the 1430s or 1440s, 
 
7 Ugolino of Orvieto, Declaratio musicae disciplinae, ed. Albert Seay, 3 vols. (Rome: American Institute of 
Musicology, 1959-62), 2:1-3. 
8 Aeneas Piccolomini, “The Education of Boys,” in Humanist Educational Treatises, ed Craig W. Kallendorf 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 255-57. 
9 Artistotle states that to understand nature, one must understand its sources (or principles). About the way one 
reaches these he writes, “the natural road is from what is more familiar and clearer to us to what is clearer and better 
known by nature; for it is not the same things that are well known to us and well known simply.” Aristotle, Physics 
1.1.184a18-19. For Ugolino’s application of this idea in forming the structure of his treatise, see Ugolino, 
Declaratio, 3:87. 
10 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 116; Denys Hay, The Church in Italy in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 21. 
11 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 117; Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara, 78. 
12 Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara, 77-78. 
13 Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara, 78. 
14 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 117; Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara, 78. 
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he completed the Declaratio.15 Ugolino was known both for his musical skill and for his treatise. 
A contemporary describes Ugolino as “very skilled in singing” (modulandi pertissimus).16 In his 
Italia illustrata, Biondo Flavio, a layman who served in the papal administration, wrote,  
Ugolino by the name of Urbevetano born 
and raised in Forlì without objection 
surpasses all the musicians of our age, and 
the book published by him on music will 
render the labors of all who wrote before 
him of no account.17  
Quid quod Ugolinus cognomine 
urbevetanus forlivii genitus et nutritus 
omnis aetatis nostrae musicos sine 
contradictione superat, aeditusque ab eo 
de musica liber haud secus omnium qui 
ante se scripserunt labores obscurabit. 
 
A richer interpretation of Ugolino’s work results from an investigation not only of its 
social and cultural contexts but also of its intellectual and philosophical environment. 
Aristotelianism was the most prevalent system of thought in the early fifteenth century. Although 
most of Aristotle’s works had been translated into Latin by the late twelfth century, it was not 
until the mid-thirteenth century that the entire corpus became the object of intense study.18 In the 
late thirteenth century, theorists in Paris begin incorporating Aristotelian terms and concepts in 
music theory.19 As the reception of the Aristotelian corpus continued, scholars in the fourteenth 
century increasingly turned their attention to Aristotle’s Physics and began applying mathematics 
to the understanding of physical objects.20 Unlike almost all of his contemporaries, Ugolino, in 
 
15 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 118. 
16 Quoted in Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 117 (translation mine). 
17 For Biondo Flavio’s role in the church see Hay, The Church in Italy, 44-45. The quote comes from Seay, “Ugolino 
of Orvieto,” 118 and Evan A MacCarthy, “The Sources and Early Readers of Ugolino of Orvieto’s Declaratio 
Musice Discipline,” in Beyond 50 Years of Ars Nova Studies at Certaldo 1959-2009, ed. Agostine Ziino Marco 
Gozzi, and Francesco Zimei (Lucca: Libreria Musicale Italiana, 2014), 401-02 (translation mine). 
18 Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the 
Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600, ed. Anthony Kenny Norman Kretzmann, 
and Jan Pinborg 1982), 48, 50. 
19 Jeremy Yudkin, “The Influence of Aristotle on French University Music Texts,” in Music Theory and its Sources: 
Antiquity and the Middle Ages, ed. André Barbera (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 186, 
passim. 
20 For the application of mathematics to physical problems see Edward Grant, A History of Natural Philosophy: 
From the Ancient World to the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 180-90. 
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book 1 of the Declaratio, categorizes music as a part of natural philosophy and not 
mathematics.21 Yet he does not thereby dismiss the application of mathematics to music, because 
the last two books focus on interval proportions. Aristotelian philosophy and music theory are so 
often fused that one cannot understand the theory without understanding the philosophy. In 
describing the anonymous treatise from the Benedictine abbey of St. Emmeram, Jeremy Yudkin 
writes, “It is absolutely saturated with Aristotelian terms and procedures, and neither the 
structure of the treatise nor its content can be fully understood without cognizance being taken of 
this fact.”22 The same holds true for Ugolino’s treatise, and therefore any attempt to understand it 
must also consider it in the light of Aristotelian thought. Combining his distinctive classification 
of music and the concomitant understanding of theory and practice, Ugolino offers a definition 
of the musicus or musician. Previous theorists typically followed Boethius in their understanding 
of what constitutes a true musician. Boethius prioritized reason at the expense of practical skill to 
form a three-step hierarchy of those involved in music. The lowest class consists of those who 
perform. The intermediary class make songs. The highest class, using reason, judges the 
performance and the work of those in the lower classes. The true musician is one who “exhibits 
the faculty of forming judgments according to speculation or reason relative and appropriate to 
music concerning modes and rhythms, the genera of songs, consonances” and so on.23 Ugolino 
 
Aristotle defines nature as “a certain source and cause of being moved and of coming to rest in that to which it 
belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not incidentally.” Aristotle, Physics 2.1.192b21-24. Each object of nature is 
composed of both form and matter or material. Edward Grant notes that Aristotle separated mathematics from 
physics. Grant, A History of Natural Philosophy, 158. Indeed, Aristotle argues that to apply mathematics to physical 
objects one must consider objects not as a whole, comprised of both form and material, but must separate the two in 
some way. He instead prefers to see a natural object as a whole. Aristotle, Physics 2.2.193b-194b18. 
21 Joseph Dyer notes that Ugolino classified music in this way, but he does not fully explain what the significance of 
this might be or its effect on Ugolino’s treatise. Joseph Dyer, “The Place of Musica in Medieval Classifications of 
Knowledge,” The Journal of Musicology 24, no. 1 (2007), 46. I treat this topic at length in chapter 2. 
22 Yudkin, “The Influence of Aristotle on French University Music Texts,” 185. 
23 Ancius Manlius Severinus Boethius, The Fundamentals of Music, trans. Calvin M. Bower (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 50-51. 
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sees knowledge (scientia) as two separate states or conditions (habitus), one directing the mind 
to what is knowable, the other to work. Music, by analogy, also consists of two states, one 
directing a person to speculation or theory, the other to musical performance or practice.24 The 
true musician has both states. Ugolino brings the two together in such a way that the true 
musician can capably perform but also uses this knowledge as a path towards philosophical 
investigation. The musicus, who had philosophical knowledge, was a socially recognized and 
valued identity in the first half of the fifteenth century. For example, the English theorist and 
composer John Hothby, recognized as a musicus, was not praised for his skill in performance but 
for his ability in musica speculativa.25 Rob Wegman has pointed out several composers who 
were given the title musicus, and he notes that this term “denoted social status and public 
respect.”26 Thus, Ugolino’s definition had a meaning immanent in the society of his day. I devote 
the entirety of chapter 2 to understanding Ugolino’s distinctive application of Aristotelian 
philosophy and how this shapes both the relationship between theory and practice as well as the 
entire treatise.  
1.3 Structure and Content of the Declaratio 
Ugolino divides his encyclopedic treatise into five books, and each book begins with a 
philosophical preface. His ordering of topics differs from theorists who write treatises of a 
similar length. Therefore, I summarize the main contents of the books, after which I address the 
prefaces, since their content is only loosely related to that of the main books. Of all the topics 
 
24 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:19. 
25 Benjamin Brand, “A Medieval Scholasticus and Renaissance Choirmaster: A Portrait of John Hothby At Lucca,” 
Renaissance Quarterly 63 (2010), 771. 
26 Rob C Wegman, “From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and Musical Authorship in the Low Countries, 1450-
1500,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 49, no. 3 (1996), 437-38. 
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that concern the “harmonic music…that we use in our times, five necessary ones, worthy of 
consideration, are included” (harmonicae musicae…qua nostris in temporibus usi sumus quinque 
necessaria atque consideratione digne comprehenduntur).27 Book 1 starts with an overview of the 
whole treatise. In the first chapter, Ugolino describes the place of music as a discipline. 
Following Boethius, he separates it into musica mundana, musica humana, and musica 
instrumentalis.28 He also includes a higher-ranking music from which all the others flow: musica 
caelestis. Musica caelestis is the song of the angels surrounding the divine majesty—a reference 
to the liturgical canticle, the Sanctus.29 In chapter 2, he classifies music as a science, but unlike 
any author before him, he says that it belongs not under mathematics, its traditional place, but 
under natural philosophy. He offers several proofs for this claim, and it is a theme running 
throughout his work. Indeed, this is the subject I take up in chapter 2 of this dissertation. In 
chapter 3 of the first book of the Declaratio, Ugolino gives his own summary of the entire 
treatise. In chapter 4, he claims that “consonance is the goal of the whole discipline of music” 
(consonantia totius musicae finis est).30 He treats the idea of consonance as the goal of music 
throughout the entire treatise and in particular in book 5. The rest of book 1 takes up all the 
topics associated with plainchant. He begins with an outline of the four strings of the Greek 
kithara, their names, how they relate to each other, and finally the strings added to them.31 Next, 
 
27 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:20. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Ugolino’s Declaratio are my own, 
28 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:15-18; Boethius, The Fundamentals of Music, 9-10. 
29 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:14; Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 146-47. 
30 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:22. For Ugolino, consonance as the goal (finis) of music indicates that each part of music 
(plainchant, counterpoint, etc.) is aimed at consonance. Consonance is a relationship between two things that finds 
its expression in properly proportioned numbers. To use Aristotelian terms, consonance is the final cause of music. 
However, consonance need not be the subject of every conclusion in syllogistic demonstrations. The goal (finis) is 
therefore not the same as the conclusions within the science of music. For a longer account of consonance as the 
goal of music, see Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:87-102. I discuss this topic in chapter 2.   
31 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:23. He takes this format from Boethius, The Fundamentals of Music, 29-40. 
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he introduces the hexachord and mutation, intervals, then the modes.32 He finishes book 1 by 
examining the modes of various liturgical melodies. The inclusion of liturgical music reinforces 
the fact that Ugolino intended his work to be used by people who would need to sing during the 
liturgy.  
In book 2, Ugolino treats counterpoint or as he calls it, “melodied music” (musica 
melodiata).33 In particular, he deals with two-voiced, note against note counterpoint. The 
foundation for this book is the regola del grado, an Italian method of teaching counterpoint that 
relies on a knowledge of the hexachords.34 Before teaching this method, however, he establishes 
a few fundamentals. After defining counterpoint, he describes the origin of pitches: he sees all 
notes and intervals as originating in the seven notes that form a diatonic scale.35 Consequently, 
the seven-note diatonic scale and octave equivalence are fundamental concepts for Ugolino.36 He 
then classifies intervals as consonant and dissonant, as well as perfect and imperfect. The fact 
that some intervals are imperfect leads him to a discussion of perfection, which is a notion akin 
to cadence. After this, he deals directly with the regola del grado. I consider these topics in 
chapter 3 of this dissertation. Ugolino ends the book with a chapter on musica ficta, which is the 
subject of chapter 4. 
In book 3, Ugolino considers mensuration by offering a long and extensive commentary 
 
32 For an examination of the connection between Ugolino’s description modes and medieval surgery, see Luminita 
Florea, “The Monstrous Musical Body: Mythology and Surgery in Late Medieval Music Theory,” Philobiblon 18, 
no. 1 (2013): 127-60.   
33 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:3. 
34 Since I deal with this topic at length in chapter 3, my summary here is brief. 
35 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:5-8. 
36 This point is particularly important to understand his comments both on the regola del grado, which relies heavily 
on the hexachords, as well as on musica ficta. I consider the former in chapter 3 and the latter in chapter 4. 
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on the De musica mensurata of Johannes de Muris.37 He quotes a small part of the text from 
Johannes and then offers his own thoughts on it, as well as numerous musical examples. Indeed, 
the entire Delcaratio abounds with musical examples and examples of theoretical concepts. 
Albert Seay puts these examples in a separate booklet attached to each volume of his modern 
edition. Following his numbering in these booklets, there are an astounding 1,529 examples 
spread across all five books. Clearly, Ugolino was writing for practicing musicians. But his tone 
changes in book 4, where he turns to the mathematical and considers quantity. After providing 
the basics for the study of quantity, he reviews the quantities that relate to the intervals he first 
introduced in book 1. Whereas in book 1 he speaks of the ditone as a certain distance in sound 
and describes where it can be found on the musical hand together with the necessary solfege 
syllables, in book 4 he gives the mathematical proportion for the ditone and its constituent 
parts.38  
Finally, in book 5, Ugolino reaches fully speculative ground.39 He begins the book with 
several questions, which he answers in scholastic fashion by noting past authors and making 
divisions and distinctions. For example, in chapter 1, he asks what the subject of music is and 
“whether sound is its subject” (an sonus sit subiectum eius). 40 In addition, he gives 
demonstrations why a certain interval is the size that it is. Concerning the purpose of book 5, he 
 
37 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 112. 
38 Cf. Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:51 with 3:55-56. For the topics he covers in Book 4, Ugolino likely drew upon an 
anonymous set of mathematical questions attributed to the Italian philosopher Biagio Pelacani. Evan MacCarthy, 
“Transformations in Music Theory and Music Treatises,” in The Cambridge History of Fifteenth-Century Music, ed. 
Anna Maria Busse Berger and Jesse Rodin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 605. The connection 
between Ugolino’s text and the set of questions has been explored more fully in Cecelia Panti, “Una fonte della 
Declaratio musicae disciplinae di Ugolino da Orvieto: Quattro anonime ‘Questiones’ della tarda Scholastica,” 
Rivista italiana di musicologia 24 (1989): 3-47. 
39 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 150. 
40 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:87. Since several of these questions play a role in understanding the nature of the 
relationship between theory and practice, I discuss aspects of them in chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
11 
states that it  
is a consideration of the whole of musical 
knowledge. To it belongs understanding 
the first causes of everything that was 
previously said, from the first principles all 
the way to the elements, giving the reasons 
for them, comprehending the reason of 
practical music by the speculative intellect, 
and in it examining with the clear mirror of 
understanding.41 
est totius musicae intelligentiae 
speculatio, cuius est omnium 
praedictorum causas primas, principia 
prima usque ad elementa cognoscere, 
eorum rationes reddere, practicae 
musicae intellectu speculativo rationem 
comprehendere, et in ea perspicaci 
intelligentiae speculo speculari. 
 
Therefore, over the course of the entire treatise, Ugolino moves from musical practice to musical 
theory. The movement from practice to theory is a recurring theme in both Ugolino’s treatise and 
this dissertation. 
In addition to the movement of his books from the practical to the theoretical, Ugolino 
also attaches a short philosophical preface or proemium to each book. In the preface to book 1, 
Ugolino sets the tone for the purpose of the whole treatise. He investigates and praises the 
intellectual power or intellect. He describes it as the “noblest powers of the soul” (potentiuarum 
animae nobilissima).42 By its work, it can comprehend God; it can distinguish between species 
and genus; it can put together and divide. But for the intellect to act, it is necessary first to 
apprehend something through the senses. “It belongs to it [the intellect] therefore to know 
material things immaterially.” (Ipsius est ergo materialia immaterialiter noscere.)43 In short, 
Ugolino begins to present a theory of mind in order to point out that human beings differ from 
beasts because of the intellect, and that the intellect needs to receive something from the 
senses.44 Thus, musical practice, sound, and the sensible matter of music contains what is related 
 
41 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:21. 
42 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:13.  
43 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:14.  
44 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:14-15; Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 146. 
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to music theory, to numbers, and to the immaterial matter of theory. And the mind or intellect 
can distinguish in this what is true.45 
In the preface to book 2, Ugolino contemplates the meaning of freedom and servitude and 
the studies which correspond to these.46 It ties in to the first preface by referring to the primary 
status of the intellect. Subjects that teach what is good for the body or some other external good 
belong to the mechanical arts. But subjects which look not to some external good but an internal, 
intellectual one belong to the liberal sciences.47 Ugolino, explicitly following Aristotle in book 8 
of his Politics, numbers music among the liberal sciences, because “it makes people happy 
essentially by the complete work of the intellect both by itself and by the delight [it produces] as 
a consequence” (nam ex perfecta intellectus operatione essentialiter et per se et ex delectatione 
per consequens felicitatur homo).48 In the second preface and the first, Ugolino emphasizes the 
role of the intellect in the pursuit of musical knowledge.  
The preface to book 3 is the longest.49 Ugolino connects the instruction of music with a 
traditional account of Aristotelian virtue ethics.50 Consequently, music is a subject worthy of 
study, because it plays a role in moral education. A virtue lies at a mean between two extremes. 
 
45 I explore this topic extensively in chapter 2. Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:15. 
46 The preface appears in Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:1-3, and my paraphrase in the rest of the paragraph refers to these 
pages. 
47 Whereas most authors often refer to mechanical arts as artes and reserve the term scientia for the higher branches 
of learning or the liberal arts, Ugolino uses the term scientia for both. This implies that both are indeed knowledge, 
the literal meaning of scientia. The liberal arts are knowledge directed toward an internal good. They benefit the 
development of the mind and the virtues. The mechanical arts are knowledge directed toward external goods. They 
benefit individual bodies and communities. In addition, as I show in chapter 2, these two levels of science often 
relate to each other, such that the lower branches provide the bare facts: they explain that something is. But the 
higher branches offer reasons or causes for the facts provided in the lower branches: they explain that something is 
because of something else. The former explanation is referred to as a quia explanation, while the latter is called a 
propter quid explanation. In addition, the former are also called practical sciences and the latter speculative. 
48 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:3; Aristotle, Politics 8.5.1339a11-1340b19. 
49 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:54-59. 
50 Ugolino argues that music is an indispensable subject of study. He once again directly appeals to Aristotle. Indeed, 
Ugolino refers to this passage in Aristotle two times in this preface, as well as once in the preface to book 2. 
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Thus, it can be thought of as lying in a proportion in relation to its contraries. Music and the 
virtues are linked by at least two concepts. First, both are described as a habitus, or a condition 
of the soul. In his preface, Ugolino states that bravery, among others, is a habitus, and in book 1 
he also refers to music as a habitus.51 Second, both music and the virtues involve an appeal to 
proportions. Just as virtues are in a proportion between their contraries, so music is explained by 
proportion, not only in sound but also in time or duration. Music, as well as other sensible 
objects, can affect the soul. In particular, certain modes have certain affects, and Ugolino 
includes a long discussion of which modes have which affects. He says, for instance, that 
All philosophers profess that the Dorian 
melody is the most steadfast, and from this 
fact it agrees most of all with the virtue to 
which constancy of mind is said to be 
especially sought…52 
Universi quidem melodiam Doristam 
stabilissimam esse philosophi profitentur, 
et eam ex hoc cum virtute maxime 
convenire ad quam mentis constantia 
potissime dicitur requisita… 
 
Since music can so affect the soul, and since virtue is a condition of the soul, music can influence 
or even reform moral virtue. It is therefore indispensable for the education of young people. 
Finally, towards the end of the preface, Ugolino explains what he intends to do in book 3 and the 
format he will use.  
The preface to book 4 is the shortest. Ugolino reminds readers of the division of music 
into mundana, humana, and instrumentalis.53 After giving a brief but eloquent summary of each, 
he concludes by noting what binds them together. He writes that they all deal with “proportions, 
and since a knowledge of these proportions is necessary for an understanding of music itself, 
practical and speculative” (proportiones versatur cumque ad ipsius musicae practicae ac 
 
51 Cf. Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:55 with 1:19. I describe habitus in chapter 2. 
52 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:57. 
53 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:1-2. 
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speculativae intellectionem sit ipsarum necessaria proportionum cognitio), he examines the topic 
of proportions in book 4.54  
The preface to book 5 returns to the intellect and defines how it works, what it does, and 
how this shapes learning.55 The preface to book 1 extolls the nobility of the intellect which 
distinguishes humans from other animals. The intellect as the distinguishing mark between 
humans and other animals sets a tone for the entire treatise as one that is aimed at instructing and 
developing the intellect. Indeed, “whatever is good and praiseworthy, of practice and theory” 
(practicae et theoricae quaeque bona et laudabilia) is done through the work of the intellect.56 
The intellect, then, is a power of the soul that both is acted upon and acts. In other words, it both 
perceives and thinks. Before the intellect is acted upon or acts, it is, according to Aristotle, a 
blank slate, ready to receive perceptions from the outside world.57 It is acted upon by the 
external, physical world through the senses. After the intellect has received perceptions through 
the senses, it acts upon them by abstracting species from them. The intellect, as it is acted upon, 
is called the passive intellect. But the intellect also acts upon the objects it perceives. External 
objects are a combination of both matter and form. Since they are sensible in the way they exist, 
they are intelligible only in potency. The intellect acts upon the perceptions of these objects to 
abstract, that is, to distinguish the material from the form and to reach what is intelligible. 
Therefore, the intellect as it acts is called, as Aristotle also described it, the active intellect.58 
Once he summarizes the meaning of the active and passive intellect, he briefly reviews Plato’s 
 
54 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:2. 
55 In the following paragraphs, I summarize and paraphrase Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:85-87. 
56 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:85. 
57 Ugolino appeals to Aristotle, De Anima 3.4429b23-430a9. 
58 To bolster his presentation of the passive and active intellect, Ugolino explicitly cites Aristotle, De Anima 
2.5.416b31-418a9.  
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theory of the forms. But he ultimately rejects it, since “this opinion of Plato’s is not commonly 
held by philosophers” (haec autem opinion Platonis communiter a philosophis non tenetur).59  
Ugolino then divides the activity of the intellect into the speculative and the practical. 
Citing Aristotle, he notes that the goal of the speculative activity of the intellect is to distinguish 
true from false. But the goal of the practical activity of the intellect is to take the distinction 
between true and false and direct it according to right desire.60 Truth is the object of the 
speculative activity of the intellect, while truth directed by right desire is the object of the 
practical activity of the intellect. Even though both depend on the active intellect, Ugolino asserts 
that the former is a higher goal than the latter, since the goal is truth itself. 
Considering these two activities of the intellect leads Ugolino to comment on learning 
and why he has arranged the Declaratio the way he has. Once again, Ugolino directly cites and 
expands Aristotle’s idea: “The natural road is from what is more familiar and clearer to us to 
what is clearer and better known by nature.”61 Likewise, “the natural order of learning,” 
according to Ugolino, “is to proceed from those things that are more known to us to those that 
are less known” (procedere ab his quae sunt nobis magis nota ad ea quae sunt nobis minus nota, 
hic enim discendi naturalis est ordo).62 This order is the driving force behind the structure of 
Ugolino’s entire treatise. He states explicitly,  
We have decided that this work should 
follow this order of Aristotle from things 
more known, namely from the practice of 
plainchant, melodied music, and mensural 
music, as these are most fully established 
in the first three books, the knowledge 
Et ideo hunc Aristotelis ordinem sequentes 
a magis notis cepimus hoc opus, scilicet, a 
practica musicae planae, musicae 
melodiatae, et musicae mensuratae, sicut 
in primis tribus libris plenissime constat, 
cuius practicae notitia magis est nobis 
 
59 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:86.  
60 For both claims, Ugolino cites Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 6.2.1139a26-29.  
61 Aristotle, Physics 1.1.184a18-19. 
62 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:87. 
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whose practice is more known to us than 
the speculative [is]. We are led from its 
knowledge to a complete knowledge of it 
by theory.63 
speculatione nota, ex cuius cognitione in 
eius speculative ducimur perfectam 
notitiam. 
 
With these words, Ugolino ends the fifth and final preface. 
In all five prefaces, Ugolino clearly values the activity of the intellect. Indeed, the order 
of learning both engages and develops the active intellect, and this order is reflected in the 
sequence of books. He arranges the Declaratio so that it begins with three books on practical 
music and ends with two on music theory. Although music theory is the goal towards which he 
moves, his path there is through practical music. But he does not treat the practical as if it were 
worthless. His comments in the preface to book 5, and elsewhere, reveal his epistemological 
outlook. Musical practice, the sensible, is more known to us than the theoretical, the immaterial. 
And “the natural order of learning” is to proceed from what it is more known to us to what is less 
known. Therefore, it is necessary to begin with the practical before considering the theoretical. 
And in fact, the theoretical is abstracted from the practical by the active intellect. Although this 
approach clearly flows from Aristotle, the way it manifests itself in the organization of the 
treatise contrasts with that of Ugolino’s predecessors who wrote treatises of a similar length. 
Older theorists organize their works in the opposite direction, moving from theory to practice 
and often spending more time on the theoretical than the practical. The prime example is Jacobus 
of Liège. Writing in the fourteenth century, he composed his immense treatise, Speculum 
musicae, in seven books. The first five books deal with various theoretical topics, and only in the 
last two does he examine musical practice. Ugolino reverses this model and instead spends three 
 
63 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:87. 
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books on practice and two on theory.64  
As a capstone to his theoretical work, Ugolino wrote a separate treatise on the 
monochord, the Tractatus monochordi. In the modern edition, it is included after the Declaratio 
as an appendix.65 In the Declaratio, the intellect contemplates and explains the data of the 
senses: theory and practice go hand in hand. In the Tractatus, Ugolino makes this connection 
explicit.  
For in the arrangement of the monochord, 
a two-fold operation occurs, namely the 
sense, by which we figuratively understand 
spaces, and the intellect, by which their 
proportions are shown with a cause.66 
In monochordi nameque compositione 
duplex intervenit operatio, sensus, scilicet, 
quo figuraliter comprehendimus spatia, et 
intellectus qua ipsorum proportiones 
ratione monstrantur. 
 
The monochord offers a means of seeing proportions. The short treatise is organized into three 
sections. The first deals with the division of the monochord according to musica recta. This 
division includes all the natural notes plus B-flat within a span of two octaves and a minor third. 
The second section divides the monochord according to musica ficta. In particular, it produces 
what we would call flat notes. Before moving to the third section, he includes a chapter on the 
effects of musica ficta, in which he describes how to perfect (i.e., make major or perfect) thirds, 
sixths, and fifths. The discussion on perfection leads into the third and final section, which 
divides the monochord again for musica ficta. This division produces what we would call sharp 
notes. He concludes by combining both divisions of musica ficta into a single diagram, which 
includes both lowered and raised notes. Although the treatise is worthy of study in its own right, 
it serves as a key to understanding his comments on musica ficta in book 2.67 
 
64 In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I argue from an examination of Ugolino’s comments on music as a part of natural 
philosophy that if there is to be any theoretical speculation, knowledge of the practical is indispensable. 
65 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 111; Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:227-253. 
66 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:227. 
67 Consequently, I discuss it in detail in chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
18 
1.4 The Reception of Ugolino’s Declaratio 
Although Ugolino has received very little attention from scholars, their work falls into 
two broad categories. First there are works that summarize his biography and the contents of his 
treatise, but which do not go into great detail. Second, there are works that, in discussing a single 
topic, either draw upon Ugolino’s treatise to support their own arguments or discuss the way in 
which Ugolino develops a topic. Of these, I focus mostly on the latter, since they give the most 
details on Ugolino’s own theories.  
Albert Seay, who also produced the only modern Latin edition of Ugolino’s work, begins 
his discussion of the contents of Ugolino’s treatise by summarizing Gerhard Pietzsch, who held 
that the work was primarily practical in nature.68 In contrast, Seay highlights the fact that 
Ugolino spends some time showing the superiority of reason over the senses, the placement of 
musica caelestis at the top of a hierarchy including musica mundana, humana, and 
instrumentalis, and that the ultimate aim of music is speculative.69 Summarizing Ugolino, Seay 
states, “Speculative music, the ultimate goal of the true musician, stands far above practical 
music…”70 Seay paints Ugolino as firmly scholastic, as one whose primary interest lies in 
speculation but not so much in practice. He points out that Ugolino is Aristotelian, and that the 
sequence of topics in the Declaratio moves from the practical to the speculative.71 Seay therefore 
disagrees with Pietzsch and relates Ugolino’s approach to Boethius and the quadrivium.72 Seay 
then enumerates the authors Ugolino quotes, most of whom he finds to be philosophers, 
 
68 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 145. 
69 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 146-48. 
70 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 148. 
71 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 148-51. 
72 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 151. 
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mathematicians, and the like. He notes that Ugolino only references two practicing musicians: 
Johannes de Muris and Guillaume de Machaut. For all these reasons, Seay declares,  
His approach is not that of the practicing musician or composer. Unlike any of his 
contemporaries or immediate successors he does not mention even one of the many 
composers or musicians whom he must have met, either in Forlì or in Ferrara. He is 
obviously not concerned with music as an ars solely, but with music as a scientia within 
a larger field.73  
 
I show that Seay is only partly correct: Ugolino does indeed see music as a scientia within a 
larger field, but he also includes an extremely detailed account of counterpoint, drawing not only 
on older theory, but also on the Italian tradition of the regola del grado, elevating it from the 
vernacular in which it is most often found to the wider audience of those who could read Latin. 
Indeed, it is Ugolino’s definition of music and the complex ways in which he constructs this idea 
that I examine in the chapters of this dissertation.  
Evan MacCarthy shows that Ugolino spent part of his early life as a biscantor in 
Florence.74 Many musicians at this time performed administrative or non-musical functions 
while also practicing music in some form, and Ugolino was no different. Besides writing the 
Declaratio, he also composed music. David Fallows even suggests that he was “perhaps one of 
the most senior and eminent composers in the decade after the death of Ciconia.”75 These 
statements should be balanced with those that depict him as merely a philosopher of music. 
MacCarthy goes on to discuss who may have read Ugolino’s treatise. One important 
 
73 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 152 (italics in the original). Bonnie Blackburn makes a similar point and for a similar 
reason: Ugolino makes little mention of specific composers or compositions. Bonnie J Blackburn, “Music Theory 
and Musical Thinking After 1450,” in Music as Concept and Practice in the Late Middle Ages, ed. Reinhard Strohm 
and Bonnie J. Blackburn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 327. Referencing specific composers or 
composition, however, seemed to have developed later in the fifteenth century, see for example Wegman, “From 
Maker to Composer,” 433-36. 
74 MacCarthy, “The Sources and Early Readers of Ugolino,” 403. 
75 David Fallows, “The End of the Ars Subtilior,” Basler Jahrbuch für Historische Musikpraxis 20 (1996), 25. 
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person to read it was Franchino Gafori, who owed a partial copy but must have had access to the 
complete work.76 Another partial copy appears together with some works by John Hothby and 
may have been the possession of one of Hothby’s students.77 The Declaratio continued to be 
read in Ferrara in the 1460s. Robertus de Anglia and Antonius de Janua borrowed Ugolino’s 
treatise from the cathedral.78 MacCarthy has pointed out musicians who read the Declaratio, but 
he also shows that some aristocrats, such as Rinaldo Maria d’Este, may have known the work.79 
Although MacCarthy does not mention it, Bartolomé Ramos de Pareja was familiar with 
Ugolino’s treatise, since he attacks him in his Musica practica.80 This evidence reveals that 
Ugolino’s work was not isolated. Others read it, redacted it, extracted it, and commented on it in 
the century following Ugolino’s death.81  
Lewis Lockwood’s assessment of Ugolino’s Declaratio appears somewhat contradictory. 
At first, he states that the Declaratio is thoroughly practical, but later says that it is removed 
from musical practice. Concerning its practicality, Lockwood writes, “If Ugolino did teach even 
the most basic material of his treatise to the clerics, they received an exceptionally thorough and 
fundamental grounding in the notation, tone-system, typology, and principles of both plainsong 
and mensural polyphony.”82 Only a page later, he refers to the treatise as distant from practice: 
 
76 MacCarthy, “The Sources and Early Readers of Ugolino,” 408-09. Ann Moyer notes that about half of Gafori’s 
Extractus parvis musice comes from Ugolino’s Declaratio. Moyer, Musica Scientia, 68-9. 
77 MacCarthy, “The Sources and Early Readers of Ugolino,” 409-10. David Fallows claims that one of Hothby’s 
works was a digest of Ugolino’s treatise, and that the two may have either known each other, or at least knew of 
each other. Fallows, “The End of the Ars Subtilior,” 26. In chapter 3, I show that one of the manuscripts containing 
the regola del grado is attributed to Hothby and that Ugolino's work may have influenced it. 
78 MacCarthy, “The Sources and Early Readers of Ugolino,” 411-15. 
79 MacCarthy, “The Sources and Early Readers of Ugolino,” 416-22. 
80 Bartolomé Ramos de Pareja, Musica Practica, trans. Clement A. Miller (Neuhausen-Stuttgart: American Institute 
of Musicology, 1993), 95, 107, 124, 152. 
81 MacCarthy, “The Sources and Early Readers of Ugolino,” 423. 
82 Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara, 80. 
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“The systematic teachings of Ugolino’s treatise seem remote from practical musical life and 
from the atmosphere of musical recreation characteristic of the courts.”83 Although this conflict 
may result from Lockwood’s interest in tracing the development of music at the courts as 
opposed to the cathedral, it highlights the tensions between theory and practice inherent in the 
work and its reception, and it reveals the need to examine how Ugolino himself defines the 
relationship between theory and practice. 
Lockwood goes on to summarize the contents of Ugolino’s treatise to understand his 
larger purpose. Lockwood states that Ugolino’s work “delicately modifies traditional concepts 
without substantially altering them.”84 For example, he mentions that Ugolino shifted the 
definition of the true musician from one who only knows music to one who “commands both 
theory and practice.”85 Lockwood finishes his section on Ugolino both by making a connection 
between Ugolino’s reliance on Aristotle’s Politics and its use in the education of the aristocracy 
and by contrasting this connection with humanist views on education.86 These connections and 
allusions point out the fact that Ugolino’s text was situated in a complex historical and social 
context. He lived within a society crowded with adherents to various intellectual ideologies. 
Scholasticism and humanism lived side by side, even though the latter was not fully developed. 
Anna Maria Busse Berger has pointed out that Ugolino adopts the regola del grado 
tradition to teach counterpoint.87 This teaching relies on hexachordal theory and which 
 
83 Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara, 81. 
84 Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara, 82. 
85 Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara, 82. 
86 Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara, 83-85. 
87 Anna Maria Busse Berger, Medieval Music and the Art of Memory (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
2005), 138. She is not concerned with explaining Ugolino’s book on counterpoint per se, but only in so far as it 
supports her central thesis, that many music theory treatises were intended to be memorized. Pier Paolo Scattolin is 
the single most important author to discuss the regola del grado tradition as a whole. Pier Paolo Scattolin, “La 
Regola Del ‘Grado’ Nella Teoria Medieval Del Contrappunto,” Rivista italiana di musicologia 14, no. 1 (1979). 
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hexachord both the tenor and the added counterpoint move in. If both parts are in the same 
hexachord, then the grado or step would be the unison. If the tenor lies within the hard 
hexachord, and the counterpoint moves within the natural one, then the step would be at the 
fourth, and so on.88 The manuscripts that contain this theory are mostly in the vernacular, and the 
one that does contain Latin switches to Italian.89 Ugolino therefore is distinctive for including 
this tradition in his Declaratio. His contemporary Prosdocimo, for example, makes no mention 
of it. The fact that Ugolino includes it has led Busse Berger to characterize him as “a practical 
musician of some influence” and that “the contents of this text [the Declaratio] reflect the 
teachings of a fifteenth-century choirmaster.”90 Ugolino includes chapters on the regola del 
grado along with ones on general contrapuntal rules, as one finds in Prosdocimo. Ugolino’s 
teachings on counterpoint, which I discuss in chatpers 3-4, are practical yet reflect his contention 
that music is part of natural philosophy, which I examine in chapter 2.  
Ugolino relies on hexachordal theory to teach counterpoint. How modern scholars view 
the hexachordal system and how Ugolino deploys it figures prominently in chapter 4. The single 
most important author to treat the role of the hexachord in musical thought is Stefano Mengozzi. 
He views recent scholarship on hexachordal theory as supporting a “foundational” view of the 
hexachord. This idea grants the hexachord a fundamental role in the structure of early music—a 
role that, in a sense, supersedes that of the diatonic scale. In contrast to this “strong” position, 
Mengozzi argues for a “soft” interpretation of the hexachordal system. In this view, the 
hexachordal system served a pedagogical function. Composers could draw on it to order the 
 
88 Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 133-34; Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 14. 
89 Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 15-18. Busse Berger writes “I believe many students, especially in Italy, 
started their counterpoint instruction with this method.” Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 133. 
90 Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 139. 
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material of their compositions, but it was not the means by which to measure diatonic space—a 
role reserved for the diatonic scale.91  
Starting with Guido, Mengozzi surveys the history of the hexachordal system. He devotes 
much of the work to the fifteenth century, because it witnessed numerous attempts to reform 
musical instruction in general and the hexachordal system in particular. Mengozzi includes a 
chapter examining the intellectual perspective of Johannes Ciconia in the Nova musica. He 
shows that in teaching singing Ciconia preferred the monochord over the solmization syllables.92 
By taking this stance, Ciconia downplays the importance of the hexachord. This evidence 
supports Mengozzi’s claim of a “soft” interpretation of the hexachord. In discussing early 
fifteenth century theory, it is surprising that he does not even mention the regola del grado 
tradition or talk at length about Ugolino’s Declaratio, both of which rely on hexachordal theory 
for teaching and practicing counterpoint. Since I focus on these in later chapters, I place 
Ugolino’s understanding of hexachordal theory within Mengozzi’s history to see whether 
Ugolino’s use of the hexachordal system supports Mengozzi’s soft interpretation.  
At the end of the book on counterpoint, Ugolino describes musica ficta. He charts the 
pitches of musica ficta and the presumed hexachords they generate on a double hand (duplex 
manus).93 He includes two diagrams, each with a different double hand. This account has 
inspired three authors—Margaret Bent, Karol Berger, and Andrew Hughes—to comment on it, 
offering competing interpretations. Bent examines what partial signatures may mean with respect 
to the system of musica recta in conjunction with the set of three hexachords. She claims that a 
 
91 Stefano Mengozzi, The Renaissance Reform of Medieval Music Theory: Guido of Arezzo Between Myth and 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8-13. 
92 Mengozzi, The Renaissance Reform of Medieval Music Theory, 129-30. 
93 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:48-50. 
24 
signature with one flat would eliminate the need for the hard hexachord, leaving only two left. If 
any more flats were added, only one recta hexachord would remain.94 This observation leads her 
to suggest that a flat in the signature transposes the system of recta hexachords down a fifth, 
which would make the E-flat a recta note.95 She cites Ugolino’s double hand as support for her 
argument, including a short quote from the Declaratio. However, Bent does not discuss 
Ugolino’s double hand in any detail, making the reference to it somewhat tenuous.     
Karol Berger asserts that Bent’s assumption of a transposed system of musica vera and 
her reliance on Ugolino to prove this is incorrect. He views the first hand as a combination of the 
typical set of seven hexachords plus that same set transposed down a whole step. However, as 
Berger notes, this does not explain why Ugolino includes a hexachord beginning on D. Berger 
then interprets the second hand as the set of seven hexachords plus their transposition down a 
fifth. He argues that because Ugolino refers to these diagrams as containing the steps of both 
musica recta and musica ficta, a transposition of the recta hexachords would not thereby make 
them recta.96  
Andrew Hughes takes a different approach by analyzing the various possibilities for what 
pitches Ugolino may be referring to. He notes the ambiguities inherent in Ugolino’s description: 
for example, in the hexachord starting on B, the mi-fa half step could be interpreted as either D-
sharp-E or as D-E-flat.97 Hughes contends that Ugolino’s purpose is not to show ficta pitches, 
 
94 Margaret Bent, Counterpoint, Composition, and Musica Ficta (New York: Routledge, 2002), 87. 
95 Bent, Counterpoint, Composition, and Musica Ficta, 88. 
96 Karol Berger, Musica Ficta: Theories of Accidental Inflections in Vocal Polyphony From Marchetto Da Padova 
to Gioseffo Zarlino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 64. 
97 Andrew Hughes, Manuscript Accidentals: Ficta in Focus, 1350-1450 (Rome: American Institute of Musicology, 
1972), 38. 
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but to show ficta hexachords and where they may begin.98 He also notes the odd inclusion of a 
hexachord on D and the other problems of interpretation. Ultimately, he concludes, “At the very 
least, it is evident that Ugolino is moving a stage beyond the mere production of ficta notes on 
the monochord and is attempting to organize them rationally in systems paralleling the normal 
one.”99 Although all three authors take different approaches, reaching a final conclusion about 
the meaning of the double hand remains elusive. All of them cite Ugolino without first 
considering the philosophical and textual contexts. Yet only by knowing these can we understand 
Ugolino's double hand. 
Jan Herlinger compares Prosdocimo’s Contrapunctus with Ugolino’s Declaratio. He 
argues that Prosdocimo’s influence on Ugolino was “extensive” and “direct.”100 He even 
concludes his translation of Prosdocimo’s Contrapunctus with a list comparing topics the two 
authors treat in a similar manner.101 For example, Herlinger lists the six syllables as a topic the 
two authors handle alike. However, any treatment of the six solmization syllables will share 
some similarity, since the topic had remained relatively stable since the eleventh century, 
although it would undergo scrutiny at the end of the fifteenth century in the work of Ramos de 
Pereja. Although it is not his intention, Herlinger’s list could make Ugolino's work seem merely 
derivative. But Ugolino includes topics which Prosdocimo does not cover, such as the regola del 
grado. Those distinctive topics define the importance of Ugolino’s work, since they differentiate 
him from other authors. 
 
98 Hughes, Manuscript Accidentals, 38. 
99 Hughes, Manuscript Accidentals, 39. 
100 Prosdocimo de’ Beldomandi, Contrapunctus, trans. and ed. Jan Herlinger (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1984), 5. 
101 In this paragraph, I summarize Prosdocimo, Contrapunctus, 97-8. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
Ugolino and his treatises have not been closely examined. He wrote them at a time of 
cultural and political upheaval. The Council of Constance revealed as many problems as it 
solved. Although it did reduce the number of popes from three back to one, it also both created 
tension between the power of a pope and that of a council of churchmen and exposed a need for 
reform, across many dimensions, throughout the church. The conciliar movement threatened the 
power of the pope and the institutional church, while some reformers, like Jan Hus or John 
Wycliffe, offered new ideas and challenged old ones.102 Ultimately, the conciliar movement and 
these reformers failed, but they planted seeds that would come to fruition in the sixteenth 
century.103 Other reformers, however, like Bishop Giovanni Tavelli da Tossignano, were more 
moderate and wished to promote educational reform while supporting the pope. Ugolino worked 
under him at Ferrara to produce the Declaratio.  
At the same time, other changes were also afoot. Aristotelian philosophy was at its peak 
and had absorbed several important developments over the course of the fourteenth century. 
Although William of Ockham challenged Aristotle’s realist metaphysic without rejecting him 
altogether, others worked within an Aristotelian framework to apply mathematics to objects of 
nature—two subjects which were traditionally separate. While these ideas grew and spread, the 
humanist movement also began to gain momentum. We find Ugolino writing the Declaratio in 
the middle of these changes. After he completed his treatise, humanism became more 
pronounced, especially with the rediscovery and renewed interest in Plato’s works. By the end of 
the fifteenth century, the philosophical context of the Declaratio would seem distant, and I 
 
102 For a contemporary account of Jan Hus, see Petr z Mladenovic, John Hus at the Council of Constance, trans. 
Matthew Spinka (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).   
103 Mundy and Woody, eds., The Council of Constance, 36-49. 
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suspect this is why references to his work disappear around the turn of the sixteenth century. 
Still, Ugolino’s treatise offers a glimpse into a time of almost radical change. Because of 
Ugolino’s historical context and the many distinctive perspectives on musical theory and practice 
at play in his treatise, his work is often misunderstood. In this dissertation, I intend to consider 
some of those distinctives in order to begin to remedy this situation. In particular, I focus on the 
way he relates music theory and practice. To do so, I provide an overview of Ugolino’s 
Aristotelian outlook, since it shapes the entire treatise. This outlook is not the same as the 
Aristotelian view of the thirteenth century. Instead, it is informed by the developments of the 
fourteenth century, but it is not yet influenced by the interest in Plato that took place in the mid 
to late fifteenth century. Finally, I investigate the unique features in his book on counterpoint, 
particularly his definition of perfect and imperfect consonances, the regola del grado, and 
musica ficta. Not only are these topics treated differently by Ugolino than his contemporaries, 




MUSIC AS NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 
2.1 Introduction 
In the Middle Ages, scholars meticulously categorized sciences.104 They created vast 
taxonomies of scientific disciplines, showing how the sciences were related and which roots they 
sprang from. These divisions of knowledge were rooted at once in their own needs and 
discoveries but also in the past, in the philosophical works they poured over, glossed, and 
commented on. These works included Boethius, stoic philosophy, and one philosopher they 
referred to simply as “the philosopher”—Aristotle. The writings of these thinkers served as the 
foundation that they built their own edifices upon, attempting both to compile them into a 
coherent whole and to add to them. As they learned more and more of Aristotle, his philosophy 
in particular served as a philosophical buttress to their own divisions.  
For Aristotle, one science was clearly differentiated from another. He separated them 
based on the objects they studied. Physical objects, the domain of natural philosophy, existed in a 
way different from mathematical objects. Yet, the goal of knowledge was to learn about these 
objects as they existed. For these reasons, each science was separate from another. They did not 
interact. So, for example, mathematics, under which he placed music, was separated from other 
 
104 Science, or scientia in Latin, simply means knowledge or bodies of knowledge. The scientific method, 
experimentation, and a modern understanding of science is absent. I use the word science to avoid cumbersome 
language, but I use it exclusively in this narrow sense, without any implication of the modern notions of science. 
Edward Grant notes that although late medieval thinkers prized empiricism and experience, they did not rely on 
experimentation to prove a hypothesis. Grant, A History of Natural Philosophy, 216-25. For a close look at the 
definition of science in the Middle Ages, see James A. Wiesheipl O.P., “The Nature, Scope, and Classification of the 
Sciences” in Science in the Middle Ages, ed. David C. Lindberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 461-
82. David Lindberg has commented on the difficulty of pinning down the definition of the word “science.” David C. 
Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and 
Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 1-3. For an 
examination of the discipline of music in relation to science, see Moyer, Musica Scientia, 11-104.  
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sciences, and it was not called upon to help explain natural phenomena. Mathematics and natural 
philosophy examined separate things and did not mix.105 
Following Aristotle’s model, music theorists grouped music with mathematics. But 
Ugolino groups music with natural philosophy. In this chapter, I show that this shift in thought, 
although distinctive to Ugolino, came both as the result of a better understanding of Aristotle’s 
philosophy and as the result of historical developments in the fourteenth century. In the 
fourteenth century, philosophers in England, like Thomas Bradwardine and Walter Burley, 
building on the work of their predecessors Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon, began applying 
mathematics to problems in natural philosophy.106 This new method spread quickly throughout 
Europe, but it also contradicted Aristotle’s separation between sciences. Consequently, William 
of Ockham devised a different theory to relate one science to another. Ugolino’s language 
sounds surprisingly similar to Williams’s, and Ugolino has no problem mixing mathematics with 
natural philosophy. Ugolino also grasped Aristotle’s ontological categories more clearly than did 
some of his predecessors, and this, combined with his epistemological outlook, affects both his 
understanding of the objects of music theory and his design for the whole treatise. I begin by 
examining the philosophical foundations. Next, I briefly survey the divisions of knowledge and 
their philosophical support in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, just when Aristotle’s works 
were beginning to be rediscovered in the Latin West. After that, I consider the new developments 
of the fourteenth century. Finally, I devote two sections to Ugolino’s thought, one investigating 
 
105 Although Aristotle speaks about mathematics throughout his oeuvre, he deals with the distinction between 
mathematics and other sciences most clearly in the following: Aristotle, Physics 2.2.193b22-194b18; Metaphysics 
13.1-10.1076a9-1087a29.  
106 Edward Grant, The Nature of Natural Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages (Washington DC: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2014), 134-36; Grant, A History of Natural Philosophy, 189-90, 209, 235. For a full account of 
the application of mathematics to natural philosophy in the Middle Ages, see Edward Grant and John E. Murdoch, 
eds., Mathematics and its Applications to Science and Natural Philosophy in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honor of 
Marshall Clagett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).  
30 
his division of knowledge, and the other looking at how he defines the objects of music, which 
reveals how he thinks one science relates to another. 
2.2 Philosophical Foundations 
The seven liberal arts form the foundation that later philosophers build on. The seven 
liberal arts, or artes liberales, were the studies suitable for a free person who could devote time 
and energy to non-manual pursuits. These seven arts formed two groups—the trivium and the 
quadrivium. The trivium encompassed logic, rhetoric, and dialectic, while the quadrivium 
contained arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. Boethius argued that the quadrivium as a 
whole dealt with number or quantity. Following Pythagoras, Boethius asserts that quantity can be 
divided into two groups: multitude and magnitude. Multitude considers quantity as proceeding 
from finite to infinite. For example, multitude considers numbers beginning at 1 and continuing 
to infinity. Magnitude, on the other hand, looks at a finite quantity as “infinitely divisible.”107 
Since each of the four disciplines of the quadrivium investigates quantity from a different angle, 
each has its own object, or in medieval terms its own subject. Two disciplines deal with 
multitude and two with magnitude. Geometry deals with fixed magnitudes and astronomy with 
magnitudes, in this case the heavenly bodies, in motion. Arithmetic focuses on multitude or 
numbers by themselves, how they are added, subtracted, and so on, without reference to a 
comparison between or among them. “Music,” as Boethius says, “is clearly expert concerning 
quantities related to other quantities.”108 By saying that music concerns “quantities related to 
other quantities,” Boethius defines music as a mathematical discipline, whose objects are 
numbers in certain proportions. These proportions are often related to sound, but they need not 
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be. The mathematical proportions remain primary, because Pythagoras saw them as the truth 
behind the sound.  
Although in his book de Trinitate Boethius had reported Aristotle’s division of the 
sciences, it only became widespread with the rediscovery of Aristotle’s works in the thirteenth 
century. Aristotle moves from the mind or intellect of one who knows, outward to an object that 
can be known. In the mind of the one who knows, there are two states or conditions, in Latin 
habitus (pl. habitūs). He calls one the “knowing part” and the other the “calculating part.”109 The 
former thinks about things that cannot change, while the latter thinks about things that can 
change. The knowledge gained from the knowing part is directed towards the contemplation of 
truth, and the knowledge gained from the calculating part is directed either towards actions, as in 
moral choices, or towards making or producing some object.110 As a result, Aristotle divided all 
knowledge into three broad groups based on their ends or goals: speculative or theoretical, 
practical, and productive. The goal of productive knowledge was making some object, like a 
house. The goal of practical knowledge was right or virtuous actions. The goal of theoretical 
knowledge was the contemplation of the truth, or in other words, knowledge for its own sake.111 
Although Aristotle further divides each of these groups, I focus on theoretical knowledge, since 
that is where he locates mathematics, natural philosophy, and music.  
Aristotle divides theoretical knowledge into three sciences based on the objects they 
 
109 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2.1139a18-1139b13. A key activity of the knowing part is demonstration—
producing a syllogism that uses necessary premises that lead to a necessary conclusion. I discuss the topic of 
demonstration below. 
110 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.1-5.1138b19-1140b30. 
111 Aristotle, Topics 6.6.145a15-16; Metaphysics 6.1.1025b19-1026a30, 11.7.1064a1-b14; Nicomachean Ethics 
6.2.1139a26-28. 
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study: first philosophy or metaphysics, mathematics, and physics or natural philosophy.112 But 
before we can see what objects each of these sciences study, we must examine how Aristotle 
views objects in general, and how one gains knowledge of them. For Aristotle, every object, or 
what he calls an independent thing or substance, is composed of material and form. The material 
is the stuff a thing is made of. Statues are made of bronze, beds of wood, human beings of flesh 
and bones.113 The form is what it is for something to be that thing and not another.114 The statue 
is not merely any lump of bronze, but it is bronze in a definite shape or pattern, perhaps of 
Alexander the Great or of some other famous person. But that same lump of bronze could also be 
made into a ring. The same material could have another form. The bed is not merely any pile of 
wood, but it is wood not only in a definite shape but also for a definite purpose.115 This means 
that an object’s form can sometimes be connected to what the thing is for—its purpose, end, 
goal, or function. In addition, objects do not just appear from nothing. They come into being and 
pass out of being, they grow and decay, they change from one quality to another, or they move 
from one place to another. These actions or motions, according to Aristotle, must have some 
source. The source of motion that brings the statue or the bed into being is an artisan or someone 
skilled at making those sorts of objects. Their source of motion is external to them. But the 
source of motion that causes the flesh and bones of humans to grow is inside them or internal to 
them. Aristotle calls these ways of investigating an object its causes. The material cause is the 
material an object is made of. The formal cause is its form. The final cause is its end, goal, or 
purpose. The moving cause, or what later philosophers termed the efficient cause, is what makes 
 
112 Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.1.1025b19-1026a20-25. I consider only the objects of natural philosophy and 
mathematics. 
113 Aristotle, Physics 1.7.190a21-30, 2.1.193a10-21; Metaphysics 7.11.1036b3-5. 
114 Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.2.1028b30. 
115 Aristotle, Physics 2.3.195a20-30. 
33 
an object grow or decay, change quality, or change locations. To have any knowledge of an 
object means to explain the object’s four causes or to provide a definition of the object. 
What do each of Aristotle’s theoretical sciences study? Natural philosophy or physics 
studies objects of nature, and nature is a “certain source and cause of being moved and of coming 
to rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not incidentally.”116 In other 
words, natural philosophy investigates those objects which contain the source of motion within 
themselves, and it also accounts for the material the objects are made of.117 “The study of 
perceptible beings,” Aristotle says, “is the work of the study of nature.”118 And, as I mentioned 
earlier, like all the other sciences, it includes explanations, articulations, or definitions of the 
objects it studies.119 The science of natural philosophy has several disciplines under it. These 
sciences are called subalternate sciences. They include such disciplines as biology, zoology, 
meteorology, and so on.   
Mathematics, however, studies a distinctive kind of object that results from a special 
work of the mind. To discover a mathematical object, the mind strips away from an independent 
thing its material, its motion, and other properties to reveal its depth, height, length, or number. 
Aristotle calls this activity abstraction. After removing these things, what is left is a 
mathematical object, which is made of what Aristotle calls its intelligible material or matter.120 
 
116 Aristotle, Physics 2.1.192b21-23. For Aristotle, motion included local motion, growth and shrinkage, as well as 
change of quality. 
117 Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.1.1025b20. 
118 Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.11.1037a14. 
119 Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.11.1037a10-20. Why it is important to count the articulations or definitions of an object 
becomes apparent when we discuss mathematics. 
120 Aristotle, Metaphysics 11.3.1061a29-1061b3, 7.11.1036a1-12, 7.11.1037a2-5. Stephen Graukroger discusses two 
types of abstraction needed to reach intelligible matter, and he describes what intelligible matter is and how it relates 
to geometry and arithmetic. Stephen Gaukroger, “Aristotle on Intelligible Matter,” Phronesis 25, no. 2 (1980), 188. 
For further information on intelligible matter in Aristotle see John Thorp, “Intelligible Matter in Aristotle,” The 
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 385 (2010), 1-6. For more on intelligible matter in one of 
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Aristotle writes, “And one sort of material is perceptible, the other intelligible, the perceptible, 
for example, bronze or wood, or any moveable material, while the intelligible is what which is 
present in perceptible things, taken not as perceptible, as for example mathematical things 
are.”121 Therefore, mathematical objects exist in a very particular way. They have a distinct 
ontological status.  
For Aristotle, mathematical objects exist in a distinct relation to material, physical 
objects. As we saw before, mathematical objects are abstracted from physical ones. The material 
and attributes of physical objects are removed by the mind until only the attributes of magnitude 
or multitude remain, such as the length of a table, the number of dogs, or the proportion of two 
sounds. These mathematical attributes derive from the physical object, and they do not exist 
apart from the physical object. In other words, the table, the dogs, and the sounds are separate 
independent things, but the mathematical objects are not separate. They need those other things 
to exist.122  
So how can someone study them when they do not exist as separate things? Aristotle 
says, “the best way to study each thing would be in this manner, if one were to posit as separate 
what is not separate, the very thing that the arithmetician and the geometer do.”123 Aristotle 
provides an example: the geometer may look at a human being, not as a human being but as a 
solid.124 The solid is a geometrical, mathematical object. It does not exist apart from the human 
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121 Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.10.1036a11-12. 
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being, but the geometer supposes that it does in order to talk about it and study it. Aristotle 
insists on locating mathematical objects in this way to avoid supposing a realm of mathematical 
objects that exists apart from the physical universe.125 Aristotle has another way of saying the 
same thing: the physical object is prior to the mathematical one.126 The physical object must 
exist before the mathematical one can.  
Since mathematical objects are posited to exist as separate things, any articulation of 
them in speech gives the impression that they exist before other objects. For example, by saying 
that a triangle is a three-sided figure, it seems as if triangles and three-sided figures exist on their 
own. Aristotle describes this as being “prior in articulation.”127 Summarizing his distinctive view 
on mathematical objects, he states, “…mathematical things are not independent things more than 
bodies are, nor are they prior in being to perceptible things, but only in articulation, nor are they 
capable of being somewhere as separate.”128  
For Aristotle, mathematics and natural philosophy are two different sciences, because 
they study different objects. His favorite illustration for describing the differences is a snub nose. 
The snub nose, as such, exists in a certain material and when thinking of it as a snub nose, the 
material is considered along with its shape or form. For these reasons, the study of the snub nose 
belongs to natural philosophy. But mathematics separates or abstracts the snubness from its 
material and recasts snubness as concavity. Concavity does not include the physical material it 
was abstracted from, even though it cannot exist apart from that material. Aristotle writes, “in 
this way one thinks the mathematical things, which are not separate from material, as though 
 
125 Edward Hussey, “Aristotle on Mathematical Objects,” Aperion 24, no. 4 (1991), 109-10. Aristotle makes this 
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they were separate, whenever one thinks them.”129  
Mathematical objects are prior in articulation but not prior in being. Aristotle insists on 
this view because previous philosophers, such as Pythagoras, thought of mathematical objects as 
prior in being. Indeed, Plato thought that material reality derived from the mathematical realm—
the very opposite of Aristotle.130 The difference in philosophy directly affects musical objects. 
Since Aristotle and many later philosophers subalternate music to mathematics, musical objects 
are akin to mathematical ones. If a certain philosopher takes a more Pythagorean or Platonic 
view, the mathematical nature of a musical object becomes the sole focus of study often at the 
expense of the physical sound, since, in this view, the mathematical is prior ontologically. On the 
other hand, if another philosopher takes a truly Aristotelian view, the mathematical nature of a 
musical object is studied as if it were prior ontologically, but its foundation in physical sound is 
always in the background. Music has one foot in the perceptible realm and another in the 
intelligible. This is reflected by the fact that Aristotle subordinates music to mathematics and 
what subordination means. 
Aristotle differentiates a higher science from its lower one for three reasons. First, the 
lower or subalternate science tends to deal more with the perceptible objects, and the higher one 
with the intelligible objects. Second, the lower science takes its proofs from the higher science. 
The third reason is the central one and relies on the way knowledge about an object is 
demonstrated.131 Aristotle describes two basic types of demonstration based on the relationship 
 
129 Aristotle, De Anima 3.7.431b13-15. For the references to the snub nose to demonstrate the same distinction, see 
Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.1.1025b31-1026a1; 11.7.1064a1-1064b14. 
130 David C. Lindberg, “On the Applicability of Mathematics to Nature: Roger Bacon and His Predecessors,” The 
British Journal for the History of Science 15, no. 1 (1982), 5-7. 
131 For a fuller explanation of these three reasons, see Richard D. McKirahan Jr., “Aristotle’s Subordinate Sciences,” 
The British Journal for the History of Science 11, no. 3 (1978), 201-05. 
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of cause and effect. One type demonstrates that a fact is the case and is called by medieval 
philosophers a quia demonstration. For example, the planets are near because they do not 
twinkle.132 This argument does not tell why the planets are near. It only provides some evidence 
of the fact that they are near. But Aristotle then turns it around and makes a different argument, 
which he calls an argument of the reasoned fact, or what medieval philosophers called a propter 
quid demonstration: planets do not twinkle because they are near. This demonstration provides a 
direct cause for why planets do not twinkle, but it also relies on the previous quia 
demonstration—the fact that they are near. Aristotle uses the quia and propter quid 
demonstrations to differentiate the higher from the lower science. The lower or subalternate 
sciences deal with quia demonstrations, while the higher sciences concern themselves with 
propter quid demonstrations.133 This theory of subalternate sciences, called metabasis, explains 
how music is subalternated to mathematics.134 Music provides the perceptible material with quia 
demonstrations, but mathematics explains the intelligible material with propter quid 
demonstrations.135 Thus, the path of knowledge, or epistemology, proceeds from the perceptible 
to the intelligible, or as Aristotle states it, “the natural road is from what is more familiar and 
clearer to us to what is clearer and better known by nature.”136 But, as we saw above, the path of 
being, or ontology, proceeds from what is prior in being—the physical, perceptible objects—to 
what is only prior in articulation—the intelligible object. For philosophers before Aristotle, such 
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as Pythagoras, the path of ontology went from what is posterior to what is prior, and this 
corresponded directly with the path of knowledge. This difference in philosophy changes the 
place of theoretical or intelligible objects in music theoretical systems. 
Finally, a third type of classification was derived from stoic philosophy, as transmitted by 
Augustine. This taxonomy divides knowledge into three categories: natural, moral, and rational. 
Augustine provided this division thinking that it was Plato’s.137 Although this division plays a 
smaller role in later medieval divisions, its importance lies in the fact that natural (also referred 
to as physics) corresponds to the theoretical branch of Aristotle’s division. In this way, natural 
philosophy could be understood broadly to refer to the theoretical sciences.138  
2.3 Twelfth and Thirteenth Century Divisions of Knowledge 
Having examined the philosophical foundations, I now look at several medieval 
classifications of knowledge or science and how these differentiate one subject from another. 
One of the most influential thinkers to provide a taxonomy of knowledge was Hugh of St 
Victor.139 Hugh (1096-1141) worked at the Abbey of St Victor near Paris and wrote his most 
important treatise, the Didascalicon, in the 1120s.140 He divides philosophy or knowledge into 
theoretical, practical, mechanical, and logical (see Figure 2.1). He places theology, mathematics, 
and physics under theoretical knowledge, providing an explanation for their differences similar 
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to Aristotle’s.141 He puts music, together with the other subjects of the quadrivium, under 
mathematics. For Hugh as for Aristotle, practical knowledge deals with ethics or moral 
philosophy.142 Hugh makes no mention of Aristotle’s third category, productive knowledge, nor 
is it common to find it among medieval divisions. Instead, Hugh adds seven mechanical arts as a 
kind of corollary to the traditional seven liberal arts. Hugh also mentions the stoic division, 
“Physics is sometimes taken broadly to mean the same as theoretical science, and, taking the 
word in this sense, some persons divide philosophy into three parts—physics, ethics, and 
logic.”143 With Hugh’s division, we get a glimpse at how medieval thinkers combined the seven 
liberal arts, the stoic division, and the Aristotelian division into a single diagram. 




141 Hugh of St. Victor, The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor, trans. Jerome Taylor (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1961), 72. 
142 Hugh, Didascalicon, 55.  
143 Hugh, Didascalicon, 71. 
40 
But what about the philosophy supporting Hugh’s division? Writing his book in the 
1120s, Hugh flourished before the full range of Aristotle’s works were rediscovered and 
disseminated. He relies on Boethius for his knowledge of Aristotle. In fact, as Hugh finishes 
describing the division of theoretical sciences, he refers to it as “Boethius’s division of 
theoretical science.”144 When Hugh discusses mathematical objects, he makes no mention of 
their ontological status. Instead, he reveals his ontology as he describes the nature of the soul, 
which progresses from the one, or a monad, into the many. He calls the soul’s highest and purest 
essence “intellectible,” which flows into the intelligible, and finally into the perceptible.145 Thus, 
even though Hugh borrows Aristotle’s division, his ontological understanding is fundamentally 
neo-Platonic. In the Didascalicon, Hugh presents an educational program that trains the mind to 
ascend back up to its highest form.146  
Writing in the middle of the thirteenth century, Arnoul de Provence offers a bewildering 
array of divisions, combining all three traditions and providing a number of alternative 
definitions and classifications.147 He posits that philosophy seeks as its goal to remove human 
defects. From this understanding, he divides philosophy into mechanical and liberal, as seen in 
Figure 2.2. This bifurcation reflects the construction of the human into body and soul: the 
mechanical sciences teach people how to remove what is lacking in respect to the body, the 
 
144 Hugh, Didascalicon, 73. Many more examples of Hugh ascribing Aristotle’s ideas to Boethius could be counted. 
For example, when he defines the word physics, he specifically cites Boethius (63, 71). Hugh borrows Boethius’s 
threefold division of music (69-70). It is clear that Hugh knew Aristotle only through Boethius. In addition, Hugh 
emphasizes Pythagoras’s place in the history of philosophy 
145 Hugh, Didascalicon, 64-65. 
146 Brian FitzGerald shows that Hugh developed an Augustinian program of education. FitzGerald, “Medieval 
Theories of Education,” 576-80. 
147 Joseph Dyer presents a good summary of Arnoul’s work and its dependence on previous authors, ancient and 
contemporary. Dyer, “The Place of Musica,” 55-59. A modern edition of Arnoul’s text, along with several other 
divisions, appear in Claude Lefleur, ed., Quatre Introductions à la Philosophie au XIIIe Siècle: Textes Critiques et 
Étude Historique (Montréal: Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1988). All translations from this source are my own. 
41 
liberal sciences in respect to the soul.148  
Figure 2.2: Arnoul's Division of Knowledge 
 
 
He goes on to enumerate what the mechanical sciences or arts include. Then he turns his 
attention to the liberal sciences. He divides them into speculative and practical: the former 
perfect the mind through understanding, whereas the latter deal with virtue.149 He further 
subdivides speculative knowledge into natural, moral, and rational—a clear nod to the stoic 
division. After going this far, he gives an alternate division of the speculative sciences into 
theology, mathematics, and natural philosophy. Arnoul has combined the stoic division with 
Aristotle’s. When they are so combined, there are two nodes that are both called “natural 
science” or “natural philosophy.” To distinguish them, Arnoul calls the natural philosophy that is 
higher in the diagram natural philosophy broadly construed (large sumpta), and he calls the 
 
148 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 315-16. 
149 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 321. Like Hugh, he also omits Aristotle’s category of productive knowledge. 
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natural philosophy that is lower in the diagram natural philosophy narrowly or properly 
construed (stricte or proprie sumpta).150 Arnoul then maps Aristotle’s division of the theoretical 
sciences under natural philosophy.151  
Just as Hugh and countless others before him, Arnoul places music and the other subjects 
of the quadrivium under mathematics. As he discusses the object of music, he reverses the 
definition of it from number-to-sound to sound-to-number. He starts by saying music is “number 
related to sound or the consonance of numbers” (musica, que est de numero relato ad sonum uel 
de consonantia numerorum).152 In this statement, number is primary, manifesting itself as sound. 
But then he says,  
music is not about discrete quantity related 
to sound, but about consonances and 
proportions in sound as it falls under 
number. And it is better said that it is about 
sound in numbers rather than about 
sounding number.153 
musica non est de quantitate discreta ad 
sonum relata, set de consonantiis et 
proportionibus in sono ut cadit sub 
numero. Et melius dicitur quod est de sono 
in numeris quam de numero sonoro. 
 
In this statement, sound is primary, manifesting itself as number. Yet it is not primary to the 
extent that he moves music to another category. It remains subalternated to mathematics.  
Since Arnoul seems more interested in compiling all he can on a given topic, it is difficult 
to discern exactly what his philosophical foundations are. In his discussion of the object of 
music, he moves away from a Platonic definition and embraces one that privileges, at least to 
some degree, the physical nature of music.154 This pulls him closer to the Aristotelian 
 
150 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 321-23. 
151 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 322-23. Describing the differences among theology, mathematics, and natural 
philosophy, he closely follows Aristotle. 
152 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 326. 
153 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 326-7. 
154 Dyer, “The Place of Musica,” 58-59. Dyer notes the rejection of what could be considered a more Platonic 
definition of music’s object. But just because he distances himself from the Platonic definition does not 
automatically mean he is Aristotelian. 
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understanding. But how he defines the purpose of the liberal arts seems to pull him in another 
direction. He says that the branch of science is called liberal “because it frees mankind from 
earthly cares and raises him to heavenly love” (quia hominem a curis terrenorum liberat et in 
amorem celestium erigit).155 Although we cannot pinpoint Arnoul’s philosophy, one thing is 
clear: he is not as overtly Platonic as Hugh was.  
Arnoul’s conception of knowledge depends in large part on the slightly earlier 
anonymous author of the Accessus philosophorum.156 But although the author of the Accessus 
presents a division of knowledge similar to Arnoul’s, he formulates a supporting philosophy by 
using different terminology than Arnoul. The difference reveals more of the philosophical 
foundations than Arnoul. The author begins at a bird’s eye view by dividing philosophy into 
mechanical and liberal. This division results from a need to accommodate the deficiencies of the 
body and the soul respectively.157 He further slices the category liberal into speculative and 
active.158 Active philosophy is equivalent with moral philosophy since the active is that which 
aims to perfect “the human intellect as far as the virtues” (et ista perficit intellectum humanum 
quo ad uirtutes).159 The author divides speculative into two parts: natural and rational. The author 
then takes a step back to reflect on his division, noting that he has created three parts—natural, 
rational, and active (see Figure 2.3 for the entire division). He claims that each of these parts 
reflects upon being. He writes,  
For there are three parts of being: one 
being exists outside our own work, whose 
Sunt enim tres partes entis, quia quoddam 
ens est preter nostrum opus, cuius scilicet 
 
155 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 316. 
156 Dyer, “The Place of Musica,” 55-56. 
157 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 182. 
158 Arnoul uses the term practica, whereas the author of the Accessus employs activa. Perhaps the latter writer 
depended on sources translated from Arabic, where this term seems to appear more frequently. 
159 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 182. 
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source is nature, and natural philosophy is 
about such being. Another being is from 
our work, and this is twofold according to 
the twofold source that is in us: one is 
reason, the other is the will.160 
principium est natura, et de tali ente est 
naturalis philosophia. Quoddam autem est 
ens a nostro opere, et hoc est duplex 
secundum quod in nobis est duplex 
principium: unum ratio, relictum 
uoluntas. 
 
Rational philosophy springs from reason, and active or moral philosophy results from our will 
and the actions it produces. Almost as an aside, he suggests an alternative division of speculative 
philosophy into theoretical and practical (shown in Figure 2.3 as a tree on the right side of the 
diagram). The author then adds Aristotle’s division under natural philosophy, placing the 
quadrivium under mathematics.  
Figure 2.3: The Division of Knowledge in the Accessus Philosophorum. 
 
 
The tripartite categorization into natural, rational, and active proceeds from the nature of 
the one who knows, while the dual division into theoretical and practical comes about because of 
the objects, the things known or what is knowable, and their causes.161 These objects are 
 
160 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 182. 
161 Lefleur, Quatre Introductions, 184. 
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distinguished both by their being and by their definition. In objects of nature, motion and 
material are combined both in being and in their definition. But in objects of mathematics, 
motion and material are combined in being but are separated in their definition.162 The author, 
therefore, follows Aristotle by separating a thing’s ontological status from its epistemological 
status. 
The anonymous author discusses the subject (or object) of mathematics as a whole and of 
each science in particular. His analysis includes a consideration of each science’s causes. The 
objects of mathematics as a whole are, as we have seen, “quantity or things joined to motion and 
material according to being but separated according to definition” (quantitas siue res coniuncte 
motui et materie secundum esse, abstracte secundum diffinitionem).163 Adding quantity to the 
definition allows him to separate each of the quadrivial sciences from each other using 
Boethius’s denotations. The object of music is “discrete quantity related to something…or 
consonance” (discreta quantitas ad aliquid relata…uel consonantia).164  Indeed, he prefers the 
latter term and offers a clearer definition of music as “consonance constituted according to 
numerical proportions and related to something” (consonantia constituta secundum proportiones 
numeri ad aliquid relati).165 He then considers how sound fits in, and he gives another 
refinement, the one which Arnoul picks up—that music is “about sound in number rather than 
sounding number” (de sono in numeris quam de numero sonoro).166 After defining what music is 
about or its objects, he describes its four causes, once again following Boethius.167 Overall, this 
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anonymous author presents a clearer outline of the philosophy supporting the division of 
knowledge than Arnoul does. Yet both authors accept Aristotle’s division while merging it with 
the stoic division and the quadrivium.  
By the late thirteenth century, Aristotle’s philosophy, his division of knowledge, and his 
definitions of the objects of each science had been disseminated, commented on, and expanded. 
One thinker who understood the philosophy underlying Aristotle’s division of knowledge stands 
out above the rest—St. Thomas Aquinas. For Thomas, each science is distinguished from 
another based upon its subject—what I have described as the objects a science studies—and the 
intellectual operation needed to understand that subject. Indeed, these two aspects are 
inextricably linked and form the basis for defining what a science is, the unity of a science, its 
difference from other sciences, and its method of investigation. He uses the term subject in a 
special sense to mean “that under whose formal perspective all things are studied in that 
science.”168 This formal perspective, as Armand Maurer translates it, or ratio derives both from 
the object or objects under consideration and the manner in which the intellect grasps them. 
According to Maurer, Thomas posits two operations of the intellect involved in the formation of 
the formal perspective: apprehension and judgment. The former deals with what things are or 
their essence. The latter, then, can combine or separate the things perceived in apprehension, and 
it reflects how things exist in reality. For example, through apprehension we can grasp what 
wood is and what hardness is, and through judgment we can state that “wood is hard.” Based 
upon this distinction, there is a twofold manner of abstraction: one resulting from apprehension, 
and the other from judgment. The kind of abstraction that springs from apprehension can 
 
168 Thomas Aquinas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences, trans. and ed. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), xvii, 22. 
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contemplate the natures or essences of things, without saying anything of their existence in 
reality—i.e., it investigates intelligible objects—whereas the kind of abstraction resulting from 
judgment states how things exist in reality (how they really are) and must therefore be true.169  
These processes of the mind differ from each other based on the object under 
investigation. As Thomas says, “So the speculative sciences must be divided according to 
differences between objects of speculation, considered precisely as such.”170 But objects differ 
from each other in respect to the relationship between matter and form—something inherent in 
the object and not in the mind but which demands a distinct intellectual power. For example, 
“Some [objects of speculation] depend on matter both for their being and for their being 
understood, as do those things whose definition contains sensible matter and which, as a 
consequence, cannot be understood without sensible matter.”171 These kinds of objects belong to 
the domain of natural philosophy, which, as Maurer notes, considers things as wholes—both 
form and matter—apart from individuals.172 There are other kinds of objects which, “…although 
dependent upon matter for their being, do not depend upon it for their being understood, because 
sensible matter is not included in their definitions.”173 These are mathematical objects, such as 
number, line, and so on. In a sense, mathematics, through an application of the abstraction 
through apprehension, separates form from matter, and the form that the intellect abstracts is 
only the kind that can exist if its essential nature does not depend on material. Quantity, the 
quintessential mathematical object, is a property fulfilling this requirement.174 Therefore, in 
 
169 Aquinas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences, xvii-xix, 34-41. 
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Thomas’s thought just as in Aristotle’s, mathematics is altogether a distinct science from natural 
philosophy, because each investigates different objects—or in his terms each has distinct 
subjects—and each requires specific operations of the intellect.175  
Thomas and others recognize that some of the lower sciences, the ones lower in the 
diagram, depend on more than one of the higher sciences. For example, music depends on more 
than mathematics to explain its causes. It must also refer to natural philosophy, since its 
definition usually includes sound. Sciences that participate in more than one of the higher 
sciences were called middle sciences (scientiae mediae). How a science is classified as a middle 
science, or indeed how it is classified as a lower science, comes from a theory of subalternation. I 
showed one way Aristotle defined subalternate sciences—through the kind of demonstration 
used, whether quia or propter quid. Lower sciences use quia demonstrations, and higher sciences 
use propter quid demonstrations.176 If music were purely mathematical, there would be no need 
to invoke sound in its definition. But for both Arnoul and the author of the Accessus, sound and 
number wrestle for priority. Sound is subalternated to natural philosophy and number to 
mathematics. Number usually comes out on top. As Jacobus in the early fourteenth century says, 
“since music is primarily subalternated to mathematics rather than physics, more knowledge 
comes from arithmetic than from physics” (et cum musica principalius arithmeticae quam 
physicae subponatur, plura de arithmetica quam de physica sunt scientia).177 For Aristotle and 
 
175 Aquinas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences, 22. Thomas notes that the three speculative sciences all 
examine being but each from a different perspective and writes, “For each science treats of one part of being in a 
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177 Jacobus Leodiensis, Speculum musicae, ed. Roger Bragard, 7 vols. (Rome: American Institute of Musicology, 
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complete or perfect unless they have been instructed in arithmetic. For an overview of Jacobus’s classification, see 
49 
these medieval followers of his, mathematics and natural philosophy are separate sciences and do 
not interact with each other.178 But that was about to change. 
2.4 Fourteenth Century Developments 
In the thirteenth century, two philosophers challenged Aristotle’s assumption that natural 
philosophy and mathematics are separate. Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253) explored light or optics, a 
subject of natural philosophy. He appealed to mathematics to explain the dispersion of light, 
claiming that as light is dispersed, it is multiplied from a point, to a line, to a surface, and finally 
to a solid.179 Roger Bacon (d. 1292) went further by expanding natural philosophy to include any 
subject that applied mathematics to natural objects, an activity for which he is most famous.180 
Few of his contemporaries followed him, since most preferred to stick with Aristotle’s clear 
separation.181 
In the fourteenth century, the application of mathematics to subjects in natural 
philosophy, rooted in Grosseteste’s and Bacon’s work in optics, spread to other subjects. This 
practice was taken up by a group of scholars studying at the University of Oxford, Merton 
College, who became known as the calculatores.182 For Aristotle, mathematics deals with 
quantity. Natural philosophy, by contrast, deals with qualities, such as temperature or motion. 
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The calculatores, breaking Aristotle’s rules of metabasis, attempt to quantify qualities.183 For 
example, Thomas Brandwardine (d. 1349), Walter Burley (d. 1344), Nicole Oresme (d. 1382), 
and others employed proportions in order to quantify motion.184 They could then apply this 
quantitative understanding of qualities directly to physical phenomena.185 In fact, Nicole Oresme 
devised the mean speed theorem in just such a manner.186 These thinkers discovered that 
qualities, like motion or temperature, could be measured with mathematics. They proved that 
mathematics and natural philosophy are not as separate as Aristotle thought. Mathematics can be 
used to answer questions posed by natural philosophy. This method of applying mathematics to 
natural philosophy was quickly adopted by philosophers throughout Europe. In Italy, Padua in 
particular, it was embraced enthusiastically.187  But since this innovative method contradicted 
Aristotle’s theory of subalternation, a new way of relating one science to another was necessary. 
One thinker who presented a new theory of subalternation which could easily 
accommodate the advancements of the Oxford calculatores was William of Ockham.188 William 
(d. 1347), writing his Expositio super octo libros physicorum in the first half of the fourteenth 
century, discusses what knowledge is, what the subject of a science is, and how a science has 
unity. He begins by noting the connection between a habitus—a state or condition—and 
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concludes that “a habitus which is knowledge is a quality in the soul.”189 He then defines 
knowledge along a spectrum: at one end it means a “certain cognition of something true” and at 
the other “an evident cognition of some necessary truth caused by the evident cognition of 
necessary premises and a process of syllogistic reasoning.”190 By introducing the syllogism to 
the definition, he adheres to Aristotle’s meaning of scientific knowledge and points the way 
towards the importance of the conclusion.191 Next, William begins to dismantle the idea that a 
science is numerically one piece of knowledge—in other words, it may not be about a single 
object. He asserts that none of the theoretical sciences is one piece of knowledge. He proves this 
by showing that a person who has knowledge of one of the conclusions of metaphysics could 
also be in error concerning one of the other conclusions. This situation makes no sense if a 
science is numerically one, because it is not the case that the same person could both know and 
not know at the same time and in the same manner. Instead, a science is a “collection of several 
habitūs related according to a certain determinate order.”192 He likens it to a university, which 
has many people but is considered one thing. Science can be the knowledge of a complex of 
conclusions, principles, and other things, all of which stand, at one time or another, as the 
conclusion of a demonstration.193 As a result, “a science which has only a collective unity has 
not just one subject; rather it has different subjects according to its different parts.”194 William 
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bases his understanding of science and its unity around the conclusions of demonstrations—both 
the subject and predicate terms taken together. Therefore, he rejects Thomas’s view that the unity 
of a science results from a particular ratio inherent in the object.195 Although one could certainly 
challenge William’s representation of Thomas’s thought, his point is clear: a science does not 
have a single overarching subject which gives it unity and determines its method. Instead, a 
science can have many different subjects, because a science has many different conclusions. As 
Gordon Leff puts it, there are “as many sciences as there are conclusions or collections of 
conclusions.”196  
As a consequence of this conception of science and its unity, William maintains a 
radically different understanding of subalternation than Thomas. Indeed, Livesey notes that 
whereas for Aristotle subalternation is relatively rare, for William it is rather common.197 
Because a science is organized around a specific ordering of conclusions and not on the nature of 
the object or the psychology of the one who knows, one and the same conclusion could more 
easily belong to two different sciences. This idea opens a wide field of possible connections 
between sciences. For example, one part of a science could be subalternated to another science, 
one part of a science could be subalternated to two or more sciences, different parts of a 
subalternated science could belong under two or more sciences, or one part of a science could be 
subalternated while the other is subalternating.198 Williams’s understanding allows for more 
fluidity among various sciences, and it provides a theoretical basis for what scholars like the 
calculatores were already doing.  
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2.5 Ugolino’s Division of Knowledge 
In book 1 chapter 2 of the Declaratio, Ugolino lays out four arguments to prove that 
music is a science. He provides not only a glimpse of his own division of knowledge but also a 
clear understanding of the relationship between theory and practice. He writes,  
The teaching of many philosophers and of 
as many as imitate their opinions and 
judgments, who shine forth by the 
excellence of the discipline of philosophy, 
has found that music is a science, proved 
by the reasons written below. For, 
according to the evidence of the 
aforementioned philosophers, some of the 
sciences are speculative, others are 
practical. The common school of 
philosophers count music among the 
speculative sciences. The first reason for 
this is as follows: a speculative science is 
one in which quia and propter quid 
demonstratons are made. In music, many 
demonstrations, both quia and propter 
quid, are made, as is evident in Boethius in 
his second book on music, chapter 37, 
namely that the tone cannot be divided into 
equal parts; similarly that the minor 
semitone is greater than three commas by 
smaller than four; likewise that the 
superparticular proportion cannot be 
divided into equal parts…and that unity is 
not a number, as is evident to those who 
look through Boethius’s [book on] music. 
Therefore, music is a science. 
Multorum doctinam philosophorum ac 
quam plurium imitatus auctoritatum 
sententias et rationes, qui philosophicae 
disciplinae nobilitated praefulgent, 
repperi musicam esse scientiam, his 
infrascriptis rationibus approbatam. Nam 
cum scientiarum secundum praefatorum 
documenta philosophorum quaedam sit 
speculativa et quaedam pratica, 
communis scola philosophorum eam 
musicam inter speculativas scientias 
connumerarunt, quorum ratio prima est 
haec: Illa dicitur esse speculativa scientia 
in qua fiunt demonstrationes quia et 
propter quid. Sed in musica multas fiunt 
demonstrationes et quia et propter quid, 
ut patet per Boetium in sua musica libro 
secundo capitulo 37, ut puta quod tonus in 
aequa dividi non possit. Similiter quod 
semitonium minus maius sit tribus 
comatibus minus vero quatuor, item quod 
proportio superparticularis in aequa 
dividi non possit, medio proportionabiliter 
interposito numero secundum Architam, et 
quod unitas non sit numerus, ut patet 
discurrenti musicam Boetii. Igitur musica 
est scientia.  
 
Futher, a science is understood in two ways 
in so far as it relates to the present material: 
in one way as a habitus existing in the 
mind, directing us to examine knowable 
things; in another way as a habitus existing 
in the mind, directing us to work. First, 
music is a habitus which, existing in the 
mind of the musician, directs him to 
examine the knowble things of music 
which relates to musica speculativa [music 
 
Praeterea scientia dupliciter accipitur 
quantum ad praesentem spectat materiam, 
uno modo pro habitu in mente existente 
dirigente nos ad speculandum scibilia, 
alio modo pro habitu in mente existente 
dirigente nos ad operari. Sed musica est 
habitus primus qui existens in mente 
musici dirigit eum ad speculandum 
scibilia musicae quod spectat ad musicam 
speculativam. Est etiam habitus secundus 
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theory]. Second, it is a habitus existing in 
the mind of the musician directing him to 
musical works, which relates to musica 
practica. According to these habitūs, 
someone is said to be a musician, just as by 
the habitus of philosophy one is called a 
philosopher and by the habitus of geometry 
one is called a geometer. Therefore, music 
is a science. 
existens in mente musici dirigens eum ad 
musicalia operari, quod spectat ad 
musicam practicam secudum quos habitus 
quis dicitur musicus, sicut per habitum 
philosophiae quis dicitur philosophus et 
per habitum geometriae quis dicitur 
geometra. Ergo musica est scientia. 
 
But it should be known that the habitus 
directing us to examine knowable things is 
a work of the speculative intellect, but the 
habitus directing us to work is the work of 
the practical intellect, as it will be more 
fully revealed in the preface to the fifth 
book. 
 
Sed est notandum quod habitus dirigens 
nos ad speculandum scibilia est operatio 
intellectus speculativi, sed habitus 
dirigens nos ad opus est operatio 
intellectus practice, sicut in proemio libri 
quinti plenius declaratur. 
 
Further, that is said to be a science which is 
one analogy in which the things which are 
handed down in it are handed down from 
one. And music is proved to be an analogy, 
because all things handed down in music 
are handed down by a man from the work 
of a human body causing sound to come to 
the sense of hearing and as a result good 
consonances and delightful melodies. 
Therefore, music is an analogy and as a 
result a science. 
 
Praeterea illa dicitur esse scientia quae 
est una analogia in qua ea quae traduntur 
in illa propter unum traduntur, sed musica 
est una analogia probatur, quia omnia 
tradita in musica sunt tradit per hominem 
propter operari circa corpus humanum 
causando sensui auditus sonum et per 
consequens bonas consonantias et 
delectabiles melodias. Igitur musica est 
una analogia, et per consequens scientia. 
 
Further, that is said to be a science which is 
subalternated to the science above it and 
whose principles are proved in the higher 
science. But music is subalternated to 
natural philosophy by taking [natural] 
philosophy in general. For in the first book 
of Posterior Analytics, Aristotle says that 
one science is sublaternated to another 
which has its principles proved in the 
higher one to it, as optics is placed under 
geometry. And music has its principles 
proved in natural philosophy by taking it in 
general, therefore it is subalternated to it. 
For music considers time, motion, sound, 
quantity, number, low and high pitches, the 
raising and lowering of pitches, likewise 
 
Praeterea illa dicitur esse scientia quae 
sibi superiori scientiae subalternatur et 
principia sua in ea superiore probantur. 
Sed musica subalternatur philosophiae 
naturali sumendo philosophiam in 
communi, nam primo posteriorum dicit 
Aristoteles quod illa scientia 
subalternatur alteri quae habet principia 
probata in illa sibi superiore, ut 
perspectiva geometriae supponitur. Sed 
musica habet principia sua probata in 
philosophia naturali sumendo eam in 
communi, igitur subalternatur illi. Musica 
enim considerat tempus, motum, sonum, 
quantitatem, numerum, voces graves et 
acutas, intensionem et remissionem 
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their quickness or slowness, the distance of 
one pitch to another. It even considers the 
consonances of pitches according to 
various proportions of one pitch to another, 
considered in their depth and height. Many 
of these things which are presupposed in 
music are proved in natural philosophy. 
Thus, music is a science.  
vocum, similiter earum velocitatem et 
tarditatem, intervallum unius vocis ad 
aliam. Considerat etiam consonantias 
vocum secundum varias proportiones 
unius vocis ad aliam in acuitate et 
gravitate consideratarum, quorum 
omnium multa probata sunt in philosophia 
naturali quae tamen praesupponuntur in 
musica. Igitur musica est scientia. 
 
The fact that music is a science could be 
proved by many more arguments which 
we, for the sake of brevity, will leave to the 
theorist to examine. Similarly, the fact that 
science is taken in many other ways, as is 
demonstrated most fully in the Posterior 
Analytics, we leave to the logicians to 
dispute, since it does not relate to the 
present matter. For us it is enough that 
music, without opposing arguments, is 
proved to be a science.199 
 
Aliis quam pluribus rationibus posset 
probari quod musica est scientia quas 
theorico causa brevitatis dimittimus 
speculandas. Similiter quod aliis quam 
pluribus modis scientia sumitur sicut in 
libro posteriorum plenissime 
demonstratur, qui quoniam ad materiam 
hanc non pertinent logicis disputanda 
committimus. Nobis autem id satis est 
quod musica sine oppositis probatur esse 
scientia. 
 
First, following unidentified philosophers, he divides science into speculative (or 
theoretical) and practical. This division results first from the kinds of demonstrations used: a 
science should include both quia and propter quid demonstrations, and since music uses both, it 
must be a science. He does not state that a lower science often provides quia demonstrations 
while a higher science propter quid. Instead, he simply notes that a science includes both kinds 
of demonstrations, and he gives a few of those demonstrations in the form of conclusions drawn 
from Boethius’s Fundamentals of Music. The language of demonstrations echoes both Aristotle 
and Thomas, who, as I have shown, related one science to another by their types of 
demonstration. In the fourth argument, Ugolino directly cites Aristotle as his source.  
Ugolino’s second argument turns inward, where the distinction between speculative and 
practical reflects the states of mind (habitūs) required for knowledge. One habitus is required for 
 
199 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:18-20. 
56 
speculative thought and therefore musica speculativa. Another is required for practical thought 
and therefore musica practica. Aristotle distinguished between a knowing part of the mind and a 
calculating part, which resulted in the division of knowledge into theoretical and practical. 
Thomas also made a similar distinction by focusing on the mind of the knower and not only on 
the object known. Ugolino follows them but notes that both habitūs are active within the one 
discipline of music. As a consequence, the true musician (musicus) is one who has both habitūs, 
not merely the one directed towards theory. This contrasts with Boethius’s musicus, who is only 
the one who applies “reason and thought” in order to judge music.200 Ugolino, therefore, elevates 
practical music since the true musicus must also possess its habitus. 
Ugolino’s third argument directs our attention to the way music is taught. Music is 
handed down, literally “traditioned,” from one generation to the next by some teacher singing 
“good consonances and delightful melodies.” Since book 1 of the Declaratio deals with 
plainchant, he probably has in mind the chants of the church. But Ugolino is also revealing how 
much he values sounding music as a source of education. Indeed, as I show below, it is an 
indispensable part of the knowledge of music. 
Ugolino’s fourth argument is the most important. When examined closely, it reveals that 
Ugolino’s classification goes beyond those of his predecessors. First, he introduces the topic of 
subalternation and states what was observed in Aristotle: a higher science contains the principles 
or sources and the proofs that are used in a lower science. He states that music’s principles are 
proved in natural philosophy, and so music is subalternated to it. 
Each time Ugolino refers to natural philosophy, he qualifies it by saying that natural 
philosophy is taken “in general.” In the Accessus and in Arnoul’s classification, natural 
 
200 Boethius, The Fundamentals of Music, 51. 
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philosophy could be understood in two ways because of the combination of the stoic and 
Aristotelian divisions of knowledge. When broadly construed (large sumpta), natural philosophy 
was synonymous with Aristotle’s theoretical science. When narrowly construed (stricte sumpta), 
it meant the specific discipline of natural philosophy or physics. Is Ugolino merely reiterating 
that music is a speculative or theoretical science? 
Ugolino continues his argument by listing what the objects of music are, that is, what 
kinds of things it considers: time, motion, sound, quantity, number, low and high pitches, the 
raising and lowering of pitches, the quickness or slowness of pitches, the distance from one pitch 
to another, and the consonance of pitches. About half of these belong to the domain of physics 
and the other half to mathematics. He concludes his arguments by stating that “many of the 
things which are presupposed in music are proved in natural philosophy.” 
Although I consider the objects of music more closely below, a preliminary sketch 
illuminates Ugolino’s argument. Authors writing before Ugolino had classified the object of 
music as numbered sound or as consonance. On the face of it, Ugolino agrees. In book 1 chapter 
4 he states, “For consonance itself is the end of the entire discipline of music, since…everything 
considered in it is attributed to consonance” (Ipsa etenim consonantia totius musicae disciplinae 
finis est quoniam…omnia in ipsa considerate attribuuntur).201 Later, in the same chapter, he 
fleshes out this idea.  
Consonance cannot occur without sound, 
nor is sound made without a striking and 
some percussion, nor does a percussion or 
striking come to be without a preceding 
motion. Therefore, we doubt least of all 
that motion is to be treated in music, since 
if everything stands still and lacks motion, 
no sound at all occurs in music, neither the 
Quae consonantia cum praeter sonum 
fieri non possit, nec praeter pulsum ac 
percussionem quandam sonus reddatur, 
nec percussio atque pulsus absque 
praecedente motu esse contingat. Ideo 
motum in musica supponendum minime 
dubitamus, quoniam si cuncta starent 
motuque carerent, nullus penitus 
 
201 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:22. 
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tone nor the semitone, nor could 
consonance be found in it, nor would the 
sense of hearing be filled with sweet 
melody.202 
haberetur sonus in musica nec tonus nec 
semitonium neque consonantia in ea 
possit reperiri, neque auditus sensus 
dulcedinis modulamine repleretur. 
 
Consonance cannot exist without sound, and sound cannot exist without motion. Since the object 
of music, boiled down to a single entity, is consonance, music must also consider motion and all 
of the attendants to consonance. Those attendants belong to natural philosophy stricte sumpta, 
that is, to physics. This is not to say that Ugolino does not also think of music as mathematical. 
He spends books 4-5 discussing the mathematics behind music. But he connects music to both 
physics and mathematics as no other author had done. This connection could only exist after the 
developments of the fourteenth century. It results from the tightening of the bonds between 
mathematics and natural philosophy. Ugolino was no doubt familiar with these ideas, since they 
were adopted in Italy long before he was born. 
The connection between mathematics and natural philosophy was strong enough that 
some of Ugolino’s contemporaries prefer the stoic division. In 1450 Aeneas Piccolomini, who 
would later become pope Pius II and who was a contemporary of Ugolino, composed the treatise 
The Education of Boys. In this work, he provides a program for educating boys centered on Latin 
literature. During the course of the treatise, Piccolomini summarizes the history of philosophy 
and who, in his opinion, was responsible for its various parts. After mentioning the seven liberal 
arts, he goes on to offer a tripartite division of philosophy. He states, “Philosophers at the 
beginning paid attention only to natural causes, following Thales…” and from this came natural 
philosophy. Socrates introduced moral philosophy, but “with the arrival of the divine Plato’s 
genius, it was decided to add a third part, called ‘rational.’”203  Piccolomini’s threefold division 
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of philosophy, reproducing the stoic scheme, conveniently leaves natural philosophy large 
enough to contain both mathematics and physics. It may not quite be the overarching category of 
natural philosophy that Roger Bacon envisioned, but it avoids putting mathematics and physics 
into two separate places. 
Ugolino’s arguments also reflect Aristotle’s ontology and epistemology. Consonance, 
which belongs in the realm of musica speculativa, cannot exist without sound, which belongs in 
the realm of musica practica. The physical thing, sound in this case, is therefore prior to any 
theoretical explanation or system. Sounding music—musica practica—is therefore essential, 
because musica speculativa is derived from it. Just as Aristotle abstracts mathematical objects 
from physical objects, so musical theory is abstracted from musical practice. The physical object 
remains prior in its being or ontological status to the mathematical object. So, Ugolino states that 
consonance cannot exist without sound. But the mathematical object is often the goal of 
knowledge. In the same way, music theory is the goal of knowledge.  
In the Physics, Aristotle speaks about an epistemological path. He writes, 
…the natural road is from what is more familiar and clearer to us to what is clearer and 
better known by nature; for it is not the same things that are well known to us and well 
known simply. For this reason, it is necessary to lead ourselves forward in this way: from 
what is less clear by nature but clearer to us to what is clearer and better known by 
nature. But the things that are first evident and clearer to use are more-so the ones that are 
jumbled together, but later the elements and beginnings become known to those who 
separate them out from these. Thus, it is necessary to proceed from what is general to 
what is particular, for it is the whole that is better known by perceiving, and what is 
general is a kind of whole since it embraces many things as though they were parts.204 
 
As Aristotle states, knowledge starts with things that are familiar to us. These things are 
perceptible, physical objects. We proceed from there, by “separating them out” or abstraction, to 
things that are more certain because they do not change. In other words, we proceed from 
 
204 Aristotle, Physics 2.1.184a18-184b1. 
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perceptible material via abstraction to intelligible material. Yet for Aristotle, perceptible objects 
are prior in existence to intelligible objects, even though intelligible objects are the goal of 
knowledge. 
In book 5, Ugolino quotes this passage in his own words and uses it as the reason for the 
way he organizes his entire treatise. He writes, 
But according to what Aristotle says in his first 
book on Physics, there is for us a natural path 
from what is more known and more certain to 
us to what is less known and less certain and 
from what is general to what is particular. We 
are taught that in thinking and in learning we 
ought to proceed from the things that are more 
known to us to the things that less known to us, 
for this is the natural order of learning, that 
through the knowledge of what is known we 
may arrive at the knowledge of what is 
unknown, and so we come from what is known 
to us to what is known by nature. Moreover, 
according to nature what is known is more 
confused, and general things, which are 
indistinct, are more confused, which contain in 
themselves their inferiors in potency. The one 
who knows something in general, knows it 
indistinctly. Then knowledge of it is 
distinguished when anything that is contained 
in it potentially is understood in actuality. For 
the one who knows animal does not know that 
it is rational except in potency. For knowing 
something in potency comes before knowing it 
in actuality. And so, we have decided in this 
work to follow this order of Aristotle, from 
what is more known, namely from the practice 
of plainchant, melodied music [counterpoint], 
and measured music, as it is most fully 
established in the first three books—the 
knowledge of practice is more known to us 
than theoretical knowledge—from the 
knowledge of these we are led into a complete 
knowledge of its theory.205 
Sed secundum quod dicit Aristoteles 
primo physicorum innata est nobis via ex 
notioribus et certioribus nobis in 
innotiora et in incertiora et ab 
universalibus in singularia. Docemur 
quod in cognoscendo et discendo debemus 
procedere ab his quae sunt nobis magis 
nota ad ea quae sunt nobis minus nota, 
hic enim discendi naturalis est ordo, ut 
per notorum cognitionem in ignotorum 
deveniatur notitiam, et sic a nobis notis 
venitur in nota naturae. Nota autem 
secundum naturam sunt confusa magis, 
confusa autem magis sunt universalia 
quae indistincta sunt quae in se continent 
sua inferiora in potentia. Qui autem scit 
aliquid in universali scit illud indistincte, 
tunc autem distinguitur eius cognitio 
quando unumquodque eorum quae 
continentur potentialiter in universali actu 
cognoscitur. Qui enim scit animal non scit 
rationale nisi in potentia, prius enim est 
scire aliquid in potentia quam in actu, et 
ideo hunc Aristotelis ordinem sequentes a 
magis notis cepimus hoc opus, scilicet, a 
pratica musicae planae, musicae 
melodiatae, et musicae mensuratae, sicut 
in primis tribus libris plenissime constat, 
cuius praticae notitia magis est nobis 
speculatione nota, ex cuius cognitione in 
eius speculative ducimur perfectam 
notitiam 
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Ugolino contends that musica practica—consisting of plainchant, counterpoint, and 
mensuration—is more known to his readers than musica speculativa. There is a path from 
musical practice via abstraction to musical theory. Ugolino elevates musical practice. Indeed, it 
is essential because theory is abstracted from it, and because we can only arrive at the theoretical 
through what is already known, from practice. Theory is still the goal of learning, but the way he 
gets there is different from previous authors. One need only think of Jacobus of Liège and his 
massive Speculum musicae. He spends five whole books discussing music theory before writing 
two books on musical practice. For Jacobus, practice comes almost as an afterthought, for the 
sake of making his work complete.206  
This close relationship between theory and practice also manifests itself in the fifth book 
of the Declaratio. There, Ugolino discusses the mathematical ratios of intervals. He pairs each 
theoretical definition with its practical one. For example, 
In practice [a diapente] contains three tones 
and one minor semitone. In theory, it is 
said to contain three sesquioctave 
proportions and one minor semitone 
proportion.207 
Practice [diapente] tres continet tonos et 
semitonium unum minus, theorice autem 
tres sexquioctavas proportiones et 
semitonii minoris proportionem dicitur 
continere. 
 
Later in the same chapter, he expresses it differently: 
A diapente exceeds a ditone in practice by 
a semiditone…But in theory, a 
sesquialtera proportion exceeds the 
proportion of a ditone by the proportion of 
a semiditone.208 
Diapente excedit diphtonum practice per 
semidiphtonum…Theorice vero proportio 
sexquialtera proportionem diphtoni excedit 
per semidiphtoni proportionem probatur. 
 
After each pairing, he continues by providing various mathematical demonstrations. These 
 
206 For a discussion of Jacobus’s conception of theory and practice, see George A. Harne, “Unstable Embodiments 
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pairings clearly reveal how Ugolino considers theory to be derived from practice, and although 
theory is the goal of knowledge, that goal can only be reached through practice. Thus, Ugolino 
follows Aristotle: just as Aristotle claimed physical objects are ontologically prior to 
mathematical objects, so for Ugolino practice is prior to theory. Aristotle sees the knowledge of 
theory as the goal of epistemology, and the goal is reached by taking the road of experience and 
observation. Likewise, Ugolino sees music theory as the goal of musical knowledge, and the goal 
is reached through musical practice. Just as experience and observation are indispensable for 
theoretical knowledge, so musical practice is indispensable for musical theory. 
2.6 Ugolino’s Account of the Objects of Music 
In book 5 chapter 1, Ugolino directly addresses what the subject of music is—or, as I 
have been calling it, what the objects of the discipline of music are—and whether sound is its 
subject. He presents the topic using a thoroughly scholastic method: he reviews what previous 
thinkers have stated, divides the topic into several subsections, and examines arguments both for 
and against each proposed point. His views reflect the developments that took place in the 
fourteenth century, particularly the work of William of Ockham. 
Ugolino begins by describing what previous thinkers stated. He evaluates the opinions of 
Pythagoras, Aristoxenus, Empedocles, and Plato, among others. After dismissing their 
conclusions, he begins to tackle the topic himself. He starts by dividing subject into four 
different types: subject in which (subiectum in quo), into which (in quod), of which (de quo), and 
to which (ad quod). To each of these, he gives an alternate name: subject of demonstration 
(subiectum demonstrationis), subject of operation (subiectum operationis), subject of attribution 
(subiectum attributionis), and subject of formation (subiectum informationis). He then provides a 
short definition for each.  
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The subiectum demonstrationis is the 
subject of the conclusion demonstrated by 
the most powerful demonstration or propter 
quid, in which an attribute is demonstrated 
of a subject. The subiectum operationis is 
that about which the knowledge of music 
or the musician works. The subiectum 
attributionis is that to which what has been 
said in music aims and why those things 
are done which are considered in music 
itself. The subiectum informationis is that 
in which the knowledge of music has its 
being, namely the soul.209 
Subiectum demonstrationis est subiectum 
conclusionis demonstratae 
demonstratione potissima seu propter 
quid, in qua demonstratur passio de 
subiecto. Subiectum operationis est illud 
circa quod operatur scientia musicae sive 
musicus. Subiectum attributionis est illud 
ad quod tendunt quae dicta sunt in musica 
et propter quod fact sunt quae 
considerantur in ipsa musica. Subiectum 
informationis est illud in quo habet esse 
ipsa scientia musicae ut anima. 
 
He spends the most time talking about the subiectum demonstrationis—literally the subject of 
the demonstration. After he makes this classification, he offers a definition for what the subject 
of a science is. He notes that it can be understood in three ways: (1) “as one of the extremes of a 
proposition, distinct from the predicate” (pro altero extremorum propositionis distincto contra 
praedicatum); (2) “as that to which something adheres” (pro eo cui aliquid adhaeret) as an 
incidental property or attribute adheres to its subject, and (3) “that about which the totality of 
some science deals” (pro eo circa quod versatur intentio totalis alicuius scientiae).210 He says that 
he will take it in this latter meaning, although the first definition also comes into play.  
Having outlined the meaning of subject and the one he will use, he continues by 
describing six conditions for something to be a subject in the third sense: (1) it should be more 
known to those skilled in the science; (2) through it one can acquire knowledge of other things; 
(3) its attributes are demonstrated; (4) what is covered in music can be reduced to it; (5) that it is 
intelligible, and (6) what is considered in the science is ordered according to it.211 These 
observations provide the background for the remainder of his discussion. Since he is asking 
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whether sound is the subject of music, he briefly outlines several important points: sound is what 
is perceived by the hearing, it is a term, and it is produced by some animal either internally from 
the vocal tract or externally on some instrument.212 
With these preliminaries out of the way, he applies his four types of subject to musica 
mundana, humana, instrumentalis, and music in general (musica in communi), starting first with 
musica instrumentalis, then music in general, and saving the other two for chapters of their own. 
He begins with musica insturmentalis. After talking about sound and the kinds of instruments 
that produce it, he supplies answers for what the subject of each category is. For the subiectum 
demonstrationis of musica instrumentalis, he notes, no single subject fulfills these six conditions. 
He then continues to discuss the subject of music in general, commenting on science as he goes. 
The subiectum informationis of musica 
intrumentalis is the soul, because the subject 
of every habitus and of every science is the 
soul. This is evident because science is a 
habitus of the intellect that acquires 
conclusions and demonstrates them through 
necessary premises. Also, science is about 
universals which are in the soul, and from 
this it is inferred that there can be many 
subjects of a single science. 
Musicae instrumentalis subiectum 
informationis est anima, quia subiectum 
omnium habituum et omnium scientarum 
est anima, patet hoc quia scientia est 
habitus intellectivus conclusionis 
acquisitae et demonstratae per praemissas 
necessarias. Item scientia est de 
universalibus quae sunt in anima, et ex his 
infertur quod unius scientiae plura 
possunt esse subiecta. 
 
Now, however, in reference to determining 
the question as it relates to music taken in 
general, given that it is superior to the other 
kinds of music, we note that since every art 
holds together in reason—by taking art such 
that it is not distinguished from science but 
rather as science and art fall together—
music consists in the ratio of numbers. This 
is evident because it considers consonance 
joined together by due proportion, which 
consists in the ratio of numbers, as is clearly 
evident to those who consider the Musica of 
the blessed Augustine and Boethius.  
 
Nunc autem ad determinationem quaesiti 
pro musica in communi sumpta prout est 
superior ad alias musicas dicimus 
notando quod cum omnis ars in ratione 
contineatur sumendo artem prout non 
distinguitur contra scientiam immo prout 
coincidunt ars et scientia, musica in 
ratione numerorum consistit. Patet hoc 
quia considerat coaptationem et debitam 
consonantiam proportionalem, quae in 
ratione numerorum consistit, ut clare 
patet bene consideranti musicam beati 
Augustini et Boetii. 
 
212 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:91-92. 
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Likewise, it should be noted that science 
considers the properties and attributes of a 
single subject, with which the whole 
purpose of it deals and to which everything 
considered in it is attributed and by which it 
is ordered. These things are evident to those 
who keenly observe the many meanings of 
subjected stated above… 
Item notandum quod scientia est unius 
subiecti proprietates et passiones eius 
considerans, circa quod ipsius tota 
versatur intentio et cui omnia considerata 
in ista scientia attribuuntur et per id 
ordinantur, patent haec subtiliter 
consideranti multiplicem modum dicendi 
subiecti superius declaratum... 
 
We say, therefore, that the consonance of 
the things of musica instrumentalis, which 
consists in the ratio of numbers in due 
proportion, is not an adequate subject of 
music when music is taken in general, 
because music in general, beyond the 
consideration of musica intrumentalis, 
considers musica mundane, humana, and it 
it is considered in them. 
 
Dicimus ergo quod consonantia entium 
musicae instrumentalis in ratione 
numerorum proportionabiliter consistens 
non est subiectum adaequatum musicae 
sumendo musicam in communi, quia ultra 
considerationem musicae instrumentalis 
musica in communi considerat musicam 
mundanam et humanam et considerata in 
eis. 
 
Likewise, the consonance of things 
consisting in the ratio of numbers in due 
proportion and not some single thing is the 
subject of demonstration in the whole of 
music in general, because many other things 
are the subjects of demonstration in all of 
music. This is evident because there are as 
many subjects of demonstration as there are 
demonstrations, and there are many 
demonstrations, therefore there will be 
many subjects. 
 
Item consonantia entium in ratione 
numerorum proportionabiliter consistens 
nec aliquod unum est subiectum 
demonstrationis in tota musica in 
communi, quia multa alia sunt subiecta 
demonstrationis in tota musica. Patet hoc 
quia tot sunt subiecta demonstrationis 
quot sunt demonstrationes, sed 
demonstrationes sunt multae, ergo et 
subiecta erunt multa. 
 
Likewise, being is the subiectum operationis 
in the whole of music in general, by taking 
being in general without restricting it for 
consideration in musica mundana, humana, 
instrumentalis, because music only 
considers consonance and the proper 
combination of things consisting in the ratio 
of numbers in proportion. For this is known 
by taking consonance as the parts combined 
with each other and conveniently disposed 
according to proportions and in this manner 
consonance ought to be taken in all the 
conclusions of the present question. But 
because the present conclusion can be 
objected to, since being is the subiectum 
 
Item ens est subiectum operationis in tota 
musica in communi, sumendo ens in 
communi non contractum pro consideratis 
in musica mundana, humana et 
instrumentali, quia musica non considerat 
nisi consonantiam et debitam 
coaptationem entium in ratione 
numerorum proportionabiliter 
consistentium. Hoc enim notum est 
sumendo consonantiam pro partibus ad 
invicem coaptatis, et convenienter 
dispositis secundum proportiones et isto 
modo debet consonantia sumi in omnibus 
conclusionibus praesentis quaesiti. Sed 
quia praesens conclusio posset cavillari, 
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operationis in other sciences, so it should be 
known that it is not inconvenient that the 
same thing is the subject of diverse science 
understood in different ways. 
cum ens sit subiectum operationis in alia 
scientia, ideo notandum quod non est 
inconveniens idem esse subiectum 
diversarum scientiarum diversimode 
consideratum. 
 
Likewise, being combined according to 
proportioned consonance and consisting in 
the ratio of numbers is the subiectum 
attributionis in the whole of music. This is 
evident because everything considered in 
music is attributed to being in the manner 
stated, and it is even evident to those who 
peruse the preface of Boethius’s Musica. 
 
Item ens coaptatum secundum 
consonantiam proportionatam in ratione 
numerorum consistens est subiectum 
attributionis in tota musica. Patet hoc 
quia omnia considerata in musica 
attribuuntur enti modo praedicto 
contracto et disposito, et patet etiam 
discurrenti proemium musicae Boetii. 
 
Likewise, the soul is the subiectum 
informationis of music because the soul is 
the subject of every habitus and science 
because, as was said, science is a habitus of 
the intellect that acquires conclusions 
through demonstration from necessary 
premises, similarly it [science] is of 
universals which are in the soul.213 
 
Item anima est subiectum informationis 
musicae quia anima est subiectum 
omnium habituum et scientiarum quia, ut 
dictum est, scientia est habitus 
intellectivus conclusiones acquisitae per 
demonstrationem ex praemissis 
necessariis, similiter ipsa est universalium 
quae sunt in anima, ergo, et cetera. 
 
From this passage, Ugolino’s conception of a science begins to emerge. Although 
consonance plays an important role, it is not the only thing that music is about. As a result of 
Ugolino dividing subject into four types, there are at least four subjects for each category of 
music (mundana, humana, and intrumentalis) and for music in general. The subiectum 
informationis for both musica intrumentalis and music in general is the soul or mind. For 
Ugolino as for Thomas, objects affect the mind or soul, and knowledge must include the mind. 
The subiectum operationis is being. In other words, music deals with physical objects that exist 
in the world, not merely with theoretical constructs. The particular kind of being is one which 
combines things according to proportions and which is often referred to simply as consonance. 
The subiectum attributionis is “being combined according to proportioned consonance.” Beings, 
 
213 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:93-94. 
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particularly numbers, in proper proportions are important elements within the discipline of 
music. But by breaking the subject of music into four parts, he nuances the discourse. This is 
most evident in the subjectum demonstrationis (see Figure 2.4 for a diagram of these subjects for 
music in general). 
Figure 2.4: Ugolino's Subjects of Music. 
 
 
The subject of demonstration (subiectum demonstrationis) may be the most important 
category for two reasons. First, for Ugolino, science is defined as the activity of acquiring 
conclusions and demonstrating them. The subject of demonstration, therefore, flows out of and 
feeds directly into Ugolino’s definition of science. And Ugolino, as we saw in the previous 
section, takes an entire chapter just to prove that music is a science. Second, he pays particular 
attention to this category by reiterating the main point: for every science there is no single 
subject of demonstration. Each science will have many subjects. Although it might be tempting 
to think, as the medieval authors considered above did, that consonance is the subject of music, 
Ugolino observes that the “consonance of things” is not adequate as the subject of 
demonstration. Instead, “there are as many subjects of demonstration as there are 
demonstrations.” No science has only one demonstration, so each science has many subjects of 
demonstration. Ugolino repeats his definition of science at the end of the passage quoted above. 
He makes no mention of the form of the object, nor does he refer to the mind of the one who 
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knows. He coordinates the definition of science with the conclusion of a demonstration. In 
addition, in chapter 4 of book 5, Ugolino returns to the question of sound and whether it is a 
subject of or in music.214 He presents ten reasons that sound is not a subject in or of music. For 
each of the ten arguments, he presents ten counterarguments. In the fifth argument, he states that 
since consonance is the subject of music, it is not sound.215 But in the counterarguments he notes 
that consonance without qualification is not the subject of music. He also denies, for the same 
reason, that sound its subject.216   
When Ugolino defines the subject of music in this way, his thinking closely resembles 
the kind of thought expressed by William of Ockham.217 William’s position on the subject of 
demonstration, summarized by Leff, states that there are “as many sciences as there are 
conclusions or collections of conclusions.”218 This summary could have been written by Ugolino 
because of how closely it echoes his wording. Indeed, Ugolino’s position makes sense in a 
system like William’s, where the conclusions of demonstrations form the foundation, and their 
specific ordering establishes unity among different sciences. Ugolino’s view on the subject (or 
subjects) of music points to a familiarity with the philosophical developments of the fourteenth 
century.  
2.7 Conclusions 
Ugolino teaches that a science has more than one subject (or object)—a doctrine clearly 
 
214 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:99. 
215 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:100. 
216 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:101. 
217 Steven Livesey notes that William was not the first to articulate this idea, since Robert Grosseteste, among others 
in the thirteenth century, held similar views. Livesey argues instead that William expressed it more forcefully. 
Livesey, “William of Ockham,” 142-3. 
218 Leff, William of Ockham, 323. 
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dependent on the work of William of Ockham. He does this by dividing subject into four 
different types and by giving the subject of a demonstration an important place. A science has 
many such subjects, and a science, according to Ugolino, is the acquisition and demonstration of 
conclusions. This means that one science could have a subject that is also found in another 
science. It allows one science to interact with another in a number of ways, so that mathematics 
can be freely applied to natural philosophy. Although Thomas recognized scientiae mediae, 
William’s theory on the unity of a science, and by extension Ugolino, goes beyond Thomas. 
Ugolino moves freely between mathematics and physics. Demonstrations can be made about 
consonance that describe it in mathematical terms. At the same time, consonance implies sound, 
and sound cannot be considered without reference to motion—meaning that it belongs to physics 
or natural philosophy. When Ugolino listed the topics music considers, half belonged to 
mathematics and half to physics. Categorizing music as a natural philosophy also builds on the 
work established by the calculatores, who were using mathematics to explain motion, impetus, 
and other physical phenomena. Ugolino’s conception could not have occurred without these 
scholars coming before him. 
Ugolino follows Aristotle’s epistemological outlook. In the Physics, Aristotle defines an 
epistemological order: learning moves from things that are more known to the learner to things 
that are less known to the learner but clearer in their nature. It moves from things that are 
changeable and contingent to things that are unchangeable and universal. It moves from the 
perceptible to the intelligible. Ugolino specifically cites Aristotle as the source for the way he 
structures his treatise. He moves from musica practica to musica theorica, which reverses the 
traditional order of theory treatises. For Ugolino, practice is like the perceptible, the contingent, 
the thing more known to a learner. Theory, then, is like the intelligible, the unchangeable and 
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universal, the thing that is less known to a learner but clearer in its nature. 
Together with Ugolino’s specific Aristotelian epistemology, his Aristotelian ontology has 
profound consequences for the relationship between theory and practice. Aristotle distinguished 
between an object’s status as existing prior to another. For him, physical objects are prior. 
Attributes or properties of physical objects can be abstracted and thought of by themselves. 
These abstracted objects exist as parts of physical objects, but they do not exist prior to the 
physical object. When speaking about mathematics, Aristotle calls the abstracted objects 
intelligible material. Intelligible material derives from physical objects and so is not prior in 
existence. But intelligible objects can be thought of on their own, as if they did have a separate 
existence. They can be defined, spoken about, and their definitions can be written down. As a 
result, Aristotle says they are prior in articulation. Mathematical objects, therefore, are not prior 
in being, but they seem prior when they are talked about, because they are treated as if they were 
separate from physical objects. This position counters Platonic or neo-Platonic thought, which 
sees intelligible material as prior in being and as giving being to the physical, perceptible world 
through participation. Ugolino, taking the Aristotelian view, puts mathematical objects and 
music theory on the same level. He was careful to show that consonance cannot exist without 
sound, which means that sound is prior in being to consonance. Theory, like intelligible material, 
is abstracted from practice. In book 5, a book on mathematical ratios, he connects practice and 
theory, as if they were two sides of the same coin—as if theory is abstracted from practice. In 
practice, a diapente is composed of three tones and a minor semitone. In theory, it is composed 
of the equivalent proportions. When he says “in practice” (practice), he states what follows as a 
practicing musician would know it from the first three books. When he says “in theory” 
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(theorice), what follows is a mathematical expression for the corresponding proportion.219 Thus, 
theory in its being is abstracted from practice, and to learn theory requires knowing practice. The 
ontological and the epistemological fit together like hand and glove.  
By construing musical theory as something abstracted from musical practice, Ugolino 
elevates musical practice. The priority of musical practice shapes his entire treatise. Even though 
the ultimate goal is theoretical knowledge, the path there runs through musical practice. For 
Ugolino that path begins with plainchant and continues with counterpoint. In the next chapter, I 
turn to a distinctive method of teaching counterpoint—the regola del grado. Ugolino is the only 
author to present this practice entirely in Latin. In the third chapter, I explore musica ficta. By 
examining Ugolino’s distinctive musical practices, I show that he sees theory flowing from 
practice. In other words, in the following pages, we see how he works out the ideas presented in 
this chapter.    
 
219 For instance, see Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:145. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COUNTERPOINT IN PRACTICE: CONSONANCE, PERFECTION,  
AND THE REGOLA DEL GRADO 
3.1 Introduction 
In book 2 of his Declaratio, Ugolino offers an extensive and distinctive treatment of two-
voice, note against note counterpoint. He begins the book with a philosophical preface, in which 
he contemplates the nature of freedom and servitude. He argues that music belongs among the 
studies suitable for the free person, because these subjects perfect the intellect.220 After the 
preface, in chapters 1-2, he reviews what counterpoint is and how it should be defined. He begins 
in chapter 1 by saying what counterpoint does and what its purpose is. Often referring to 
counterpoint as “melodied music” (musica melodiata), he states that plainchant is bare or 
unclothed. 
And although we delight in its bareness, 
after it has been clothed with melodies, it 
delights the sense even more. So, in the 
second book we intend to treat of melodied 
music.221 
Et quoniam in ipsa eius nuditate 
delectationem accipimus tamen quia 
melodiis induta delectabilior valde sensu 
percipitur, ideo in hoc secundo de ipsa 
melodiata musica intendimus pertractare. 
 
Plainchant serves as the foundation for counterpoint.222 It is the musica of musica melodiata. 
Counterpoint clothes or decorates it by adding to it another melody. Even though he only 
describes note against note counterpoint in two parts, the act of adding another melody—
“melodying” plainchant—enhances the already existing chant. The chant and its decoration 
together bring delight or pleasure to the hearers. He adds, 
 
220 In other words, music belongs among the liberal arts, not among the mechanical arts. Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:1-3. 
221 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:3.  
222 Indeed, Ugolino says that “counterpoint…presupposes plainchant” (contrapunctus…cantum planam 
praesupponit). Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:8. 
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In fact, at one time we are captivated by the 
sweetness of the diapente, at another we are 
allured by the diapason as the mistress of 
consonances, and we are transfixed by the 
delight of these consonances, struck by their 
surpassing pleasantness.223 
Tunc etenim ab ipsa diapente dulcedine 
rapimur, tunc a diapason consonantiarum 
domina trahimur et ab ipsarum 
delectatione consonantiarum dulcissimo 
ictu percutimur. 
 
Pleasantness or sweetness is the goal or purpose of counterpoint. For these reasons, Ugolino 
gives counterpoint the name musica melodiata, and he is, as far as I can tell, the only author to 
do so.  
In chapter 2, he offers his own definition of counterpoint:  
Counterpoint is the simple indeterminate 
placement of one single note, placed in a 
low or high [range] against another single 
note in any melody.224 
Contrapunctus est simplex unicae solius 
notae in gravi positae vel acuto contra 
aliquam unicam solam notam in cantu 
aliquo intedeterminata positio. 
 
He then analyzes this definition by pointing out its genus, species, and differences. He also 
distinguishes between counterpoint in a broad sense (large sumptus), which consists of many 
notes placed over a single note, and counterpoint in a narrow sense (stricte or proprie sumptus), 
which consists of note against note.225 In the Declaratio, Ugolino deals only with the latter.  
Chapters 3-15 form the foundation of Ugolino’s book. In them, he is the first to present 
entirely in Latin an older Italian tradition of counterpoint called regola del grado (henceforth, 
grado). This tradition is preserved in only four manuscripts: Washington, Library of Congress, 
ML.171.J.6; Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, I. 20 Inf.; Florence, Biblioteca Medicea 
Laurenziana, Redi 71 (f. 24v-28v); and Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Redi 71 (f. 
 
223 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:4. Below, I discuss what he means by dubbing the octave the “mistress of consonances.” 
224 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:4. 
225 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:4. Ugolino’s definition closely echoes that of Prosdocimo, who also describes 
counterpoint in a broad and narrow sense. He states that in the narrow, proper sense, counterpoint “is the placement 
of one single note against some other single note in a melody.” Prosdocimo, Contrapunctus, 28-31. This near exact 
relation has led Jan Herlinger, Prosdocimo’s translator and editor, to posit a great influence of Prosdocimo on 
Ugolino. See note 319 below. 
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48v-59v). I refer to these as W, M, F1, and F2 respectively.226 W, written on paper dating to the 
late fifteenth century, has often been attributed to John Hothby (c. 1430-1487).227 Hothby, an 
Englishman, spent most of his life working in Italy at the cathedral school in Lucca, where he 
became choirmaster in the mid to late 1460s.228 Thus, any resemblances between W and Ugolino 
likely come from Ugolino or a shared source common to both. M, composed on fifteenth century 
paper, begins in Latin but soon switches to Italian. Gilbert Reaney suggests that the writer of M 
was translating the work from Italian, not copying from an unknown Latin source, and that the 
source for M is, in fact, W.229 F1 and F2 come from a single manuscript produced in the early 
fifteenth century. It contains treatises attributed to Johannes de Muris and Jacopo da Bologna. 
The works on mensuration in this manuscript show an influence from France while the 
counterpoint treatises are distinctly Italian, because they offer the theory of the grado.230 In sum, 
M and W clearly come from the period just after Ugolino was writing, while F1 and F2 may be 
either contemporary to Ugolino or written slightly before the Declaratio. Therefore, Ugolino’s 
book on counterpoint represents an important point in the history of this particular theory, since 
it offers a presentation of the grado that, as I shall show later in this chapter, both develops the 
treatment in F1 and F2, and to some extent may influence M and W.  
Although all the manuscripts that preserve the grado theory date from the early to mid-
 
226 W and M appear in two modern editions: Gilbert Reaney, ed. Johannes Hothby: De Arte Contrapuncti 
(Neuhausen-Stuttgart: American Institute of Musicology, 1977), 15-49 and Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado,’" 52-
74. F1 and F2 both appear in Albert Seay, ed. Quatuor Tractatuli Italici De Contrapuncto (Colorado Springs: 
Colorado College Music Press, 1977). For W and M, I depend most frequently on Scattolin’s edition. 
227 Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 28-32; Reaney, Johannes Hothby: De Arte Contrapuncti, 9, 17;  Sigrum 
Heinzelmann, “John Hothby as Innovator: The Solmization System in La Calliopea Legale,” Studi Musicali (2012), 
353. 
228 Benjamin Brand, “A Medieval Scholasticus and Renaissance Choirmaster," 755, 763-71. 
229 Reaney, Johannes Hothby: De Arte Contrapuncti, 10, 22; Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 26-28. 
230 Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, i; Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 24-26. 
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fifteenth century, the theory itself likely originated in the fourteenth century and was learned by 
beginners before they pursued the more widely practiced interval succession.231 The word grado 
(pl. gradi) refers to the distance, step, or grade between the starting note of the tenor’s hexachord 
and the starting note of the counterpoint’s hexachord.232 These could be in various relationships 
to each other, such as the unison, fourth, fifth, or octave. By knowing which hexachord each part 
moved within, students of this practice could figure out which combination would form 
consonances and which would form dissonances, so that they use only consonances in their 
counterpoint.  
The grado manuscripts, like nearly all counterpoint treatises, include as a preliminary 
discussion what intervals are consonances and their division into perfect and imperfect. In this 
respect, Ugolino’s Declaratio is no different, but he offers a fuller account that clearly connects 
the distinction of perfect and imperfect with Aristotelian philosophy. Indeed, David Cohen 
counts five conditions that point to the Aristotelian understanding of imperfection. Cohen’s first 
condition is a general classification of things into perfect or imperfect.233 The most common 
reason for classifying a thing as perfect or imperfect rests in an empirical judgment—its 
“compatibility” with the ear and its progression to the closest consonance. Cohen writes, 
“‘Compatibility,’ it seems, is somehow caused by voice-leading proximity, although how this 
should be the cause remains unclear.”234 In this chapter, I build on Cohen’s work by positing that 
 
231 Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 131; Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 13. 
232 Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 133; Reaney, Johannes Hothby: De Arte Contrapuncti, 11; Scattolin, “La Regola 
Del ‘Grado’,” 14. 
233 David Cohen, “'The Imperfect Seeks Its Perfection': Harmonic Progression, Directed Motion, and Aristotelian 
Physics,” Music Theory Spectrum 23, no. 2 (2001), 146. 
234 Cohen, "The Imperfect Seeks its Perfection," 150. He is discussing Marchetto of Padua, The Lucidarium of 
Marchetto of Padua: A Critical Edition, Translation and Commentary, ed. and trans. Jan Herlinger (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 200-07. 
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Ugolino may offer a clue how one interval is classified as perfect and another imperfect. 
Although Ugolino, like many authors, cites the judgment of the ear (that, for example, one 
interval simply sounds better than another) and emphasizes voice-leading proximity, he also 
refers to the particular structure of an interval for determining perfection. The octave, or 
“mistress of consonances” (consonantiuarum domina) as Ugolino dubs it, is his measure.235 It is 
made up of parts which stand to the whole as proximate causes, and those parts are made of other 
parts which stand to the whole as remote causes, and so it continues. He appeals to this structure 
as he distinguishes perfect from imperfect consonances. With this distinction between perfect 
and imperfect consonances laid out, Ugolino presents certain model progressions he calls 
perfections (perfectiones). Related to the motion from imperfect to perfect consonances, 
perfections most closely resemble what we might think of as cadences. Instructions on 
perfections are not found in the grado manuscripts, but Ugolino nestles it into his own discussion 
before addressing the core of the grado theory. Since Ugolino relies on this distinction for his 
comments on perfection in particular and his understanding of interval relationships and 
counterpoint in general, I undertake a close examination of it in this chapter.  
Chapters 16-24 form an extension of the previous 12 chapters. In the grado practice, as I 
shall show below, both the tenor and the added part remain in a single hexachord. But in chapters 
16-24, Ugolino shows how the added voice, still moving within a single hexachord, can 
harmonize a tenor that moves across several hexachords. Practically, it means that Ugolino 
creates various tables of consonances. Consonance tables prove to be dominant feature of the 
remainder of the book. In chapter 25, he lists seven general rules for counterpoint. These include 
the usual prohibitions against parallel perfect intervals, avoiding the mi-fa tritone, and other 
 
235 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:4. 
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common rules. He spends only one chapter, chapter 26, on the more common practice of interval 
succession. He states these rules in the form of poetic verse.236 In chapter 27, he gives several 
examples of composed counterpoint that put the rules into practice and to which students could 
refer in order to see and hear proper counterpoint in action. Then, in chapters 28-33, he adds 
several consonance tables, listing the possible consonant combinations for each solfege 
syllable.237 Finally, Ugolino ends the book with a single yet significant chapter on musica 
ficta.238  
In this chapter, I focus on Ugolino’s central teaching in chapters 3-15—the regola del 
grado. This teaching distinguishes him from nearly all of his contemporaries, since he is the only 
one to present the theory entirely in Latin. By comparing his treatment of it with that found in 
F1, F2, M, and W, his distinctive contributions become clear. Ugolino does not merely repeat the 
regola del grado practice. Rather, he expands it, shapes it by his understanding of Aristotelian 
philosophy, and develops it. First, I begin by pointing out how Ugolino classifies intervals and 
how he describes the particular category of interval progression that he calls a perfection. I show 
that the language of perfection ties into his Aristotelian outlook. Second, I examine the grado 
theory itself and how he constructs it in relation to the four manuscripts in which it exists, noting 
 
236 For a discussion of the purpose of versification, see Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 138-41. Ugolino’s versified 
rules for interval succession are not exhaustive, and they were probably not meant to be. However, he was criticized 
by Ramos precisely because they were not exhaustive. Ramos de Pareja, Musica Practica, 95, 107, 124, 152. Instead 
of providing a completely thorough treatment of interval succession, such as that by Tinctoris near the end of the 
fifteenth century, Ugolino’s intent is clearly practical. That the rules are in verse makes them easier to memorize, as 
Busse Berger shows. Besides, he only spends one chapter on them, unlike Tinctoris, who devotes much more space 
to them. In addition, the core of Ugolino’s teaching is the regola del grado. Rather than a systematic analysis of all 
contrapuntal possibilities, Ugolino prefers to offer multiple examples and methods of proper counterpoint, which 
students could then use later in practical situations. As long as his readers have the necessary principles, they would 
not need an exhaustive account of every single possibility. 
237 Consonance tables are common in counterpoint treatises and are not a distinctive feature of Ugolino’s work. For 
more on consonances tables, see Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 6-8, 131-50. 
238 I discuss musica ficta in chapter 4. 
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especially his own contributions.  
3.2 Imperfect Consonances and Their Perfection 
In Ugolino’s treatise and in the grado manuscripts, the sequence of topics follows a 
similar path. By pointing out some similarities and differences, a clearer picture of Ugolino’s 
contributions emerges. Although Ugolino changes some terminology, what stands out as 
particularly significant is his classification of consonances, his development of the theme of 
imperfection and perfection, and his explanation for why some intervals are imperfect and others 
perfect. W, M, and F1 start by noting that there are only seven different notes, which they call 
the unison (pari), second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh. All the other notes “proceed” 
(procede) out of the original seven: the octave from the unison, the ninth from the second, and so 
on.239 This explanation reveals several keys to understand the grado texts: they recognize both a 
seven-note diatonic system and octave equivalence.240 This must be kept in mind, especially 
when I examine their method for forming counterpoint. Since the grado tradition relies so 
heavily on the hexachord to form counterpoint, it is easy to forget that the foundation of the 
system is, indeed, the seven-note diatonic scale.241 After considering the origin of notes, the 
grado treatises separate these notes, already thought of as intervals, into three categories based on 
their quality: consonant, dissonant, and discordant. I refer to this as the tripartite division of 
 
239 Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli,  17; Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 52; Reaney, Johannes Hothby: De Arte 
Contrapuncti, 25. The treatises also use ordinal numbers to name the intervals. 
240 Ugolino likewise recognizes the seven-note diatonic scale as the source and foundation for all other notes. This 
becomes especially important in the next chapter of this dissertation, since, as we shall see, some have linked 
Ugolino’s comments on musica ficta with the idea that the hexachord, and not the seven-note diatonic scale, serves 
as the foundation for music. 
241 The grado treatises together with countless other practical manuals from the Middle Ages employ the hexachord 
or system of hexachords to teach music. This has misled some into thinking that the hexachord is the foundation of 
medieval music, which results in conclusions about medieval music theory that is inconsistent with the texts. I take 
up this topic in chapter 4. 
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quality. The consonances consist of the unison and the fifth. Thirds and sixths in general, without 
reference to whether they are major or minor, are referred to as dissonances. Seconds, fourths, 
and sevenths, as well as augmented fourths and diminished fifths are discordant.242  
The grado treatises continue by discussing the structure of each interval from the second 
through the sixth but omitting the seventh.243 They describe how each interval is made up of a 
certain combination of tones and semitones. Besides classifying each interval as a consonance, a 
dissonance, or a discord, they also designate some intervals as major/minor or perfect/imperfect. 
F1 says that thirds can be major or minor, but it also refers to them as perfect and imperfect 
respectively.244 On the other hand, W and M do not call thirds perfect or imperfect, preferring 
instead the terms major and minor.245 M and W, although they consider the fourth a discord, do 
say that it can be used in pieces with three voices, even though they do not deal with 
counterpoint in three voices.246 Augmented fourths and diminished fifths, if they are specifically 
named at all, are called discordant.247  
The discussion of sixths is most interesting. Although at first both W and M categorize 
sixths as dissonant, they also talk about a discordant sixth. The former is a major sixth and the 
latter a minor sixth, although W and M do not use the terms major and minor for sixths even 
though they do for thirds. They treat the dissonant and discordant sixths in separate places: first, 
 
242 Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 52, 57. W and M note that the fourth is used in three-voiced pieces. 
Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 54. Busse Berger cites the tripartite classification of intervals as proof that the 
grado tradition originates in the fourteenth century. Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 131. 
243 Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 53-58; Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, 18-21. 
244 Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, 18. F2 omits any discussion of intervals and interval qualities and begins directly with 
what a grado is. 
245 Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 54. 
246 Scattolin, "La Regola Del 'Grado'," 55. 
247 Scattolin, "La Regola Del 'Grado'," 56-57; Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, 20-21. 
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they discuss the dissonant sixth, interrupt this to speak of fifths, and only then describe 
discordant sixths. In fact, when they return to the topic of sixths, they refer to the dissonant sixth 
(the major sixth) as consonant and then write about the discordant sixth.248 For W and M, the 
minor sixth can only be used if one adds to it the sign of the diesis (what looks like and from 
which our modern sharp sign is derived), just as one would do to correct the discordant fifth.249 
In effect, W and M only allow major sixths to be used. F1 takes a slightly different stance from 
W and M. It speaks of the dissonant sixth and divides it into two types, major and minor or 
perfect and imperfect respectively. It does not entirely forbid the use of minor sixths: if the tenor 
remains on one pitch and the counterpoint moves from a fifth to a minor sixth and back to a fifth, 
then it is acceptable. However, if the sixth moves to an octave, then it must be made major by 
using the sign of the diesis.250 Although it does not use the term discordant for minor sixths and 
allows the minor sixth to be used in counterpoint under one condition, it, like W and M, prefers 
the major sixth in all other circumstances. 
Ugolino follows the same sequence of topics as the grado treatises just discussed, but his 
account is much fuller and more consistent. He distinguishes between the grado tradition of 
classifying intervals (the tripartite division) and a more modern one that views thirds and sixths 
as imperfect consonances. In addition, his account reveals a consistency not only in the 
terminology but also in the philosophical outlook. Like the grado tradition, he begins by 
discussing the seven-note diatonic system and the origin of intervals. He starts by describing the 
human voice (vox) and sound, citing directly Peter of Spain, Boethius, and Aristotle. This leads 
him to the seven diatonic notes (voces). All the other notes are derived (derivantur) and spring 
 
248 Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 56-57. 
249 Scattolin, "La Regola Del 'Grado'," 56-57. 
250 Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, 19-20. 
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naturally (natae, literally born) from them.251 Whereas W, M, and F1 said they “proceed” 
(procede), Ugolino chooses "derive" (derivantur) and "spring naturally" (natae). He could easily 
have selected the verb “proceed” (procedere), since he uses it elsewhere in the Declaratio. 
Instead, he avoids the more theological “proceed” and adopts the more philosophical “derived,” 
which suggests a relation to logic, and “spring naturally,” which implies a connection to nature. 
This reinforces the idea he set forth in book 1 that music belongs to natural philosophy and that 
musical objects are therefore considered as objects of nature.252 After showing that all the other 
notes are derived by octave equivalence from the original seven, he classifies intervals into only 
two categories: consonant and dissonant. I refer to this as the bipartite division. Unlike the grado 
treatises, he does not, at first, speak about discords. For Ugolino, the unison, thirds, fifths, and 
sixths are consonances, but seconds, fourths, and sevenths are dissonances. In order to prove this, 
he cites Boethius’s definitions of consonance and dissonance. After this, he adds the sub-
categories of perfect and imperfect. The fifth, octave, and their compounds are perfect, while 
thirds, sixths, and their compounds are imperfect.253 Imperfect consonances can be further 
divided into major and minor. Unlike F1, perfect and imperfect do not mean the same thing as 
major and minor. Therefore, all the grado manuscripts, including Ugolino’s, follow a similar 
sequence of topics. But Ugolino offers a more consistent account both in terminology and in 
philosophy. Like the authors of the other grado treatises, he considers the seven-note diatonic 
system and octave equivalence as the foundation. But he spins them in a different direction. He 
re-words the relationship between them to emphasize the place of music as a science within 
natural philosophy, and he presents a more consistent view of consonance and dissonance.  
 
251 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:5. 
252 I consider the relationship between Ugolino’s classification of music and natural philosophy in chapter 2. 
253 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:6. 
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Table 3.1: A Comparison of the Language in the Grado Treatises with that of Ugolino.254 
 W M F1 Ugolino (Latin) Ugolino (English) 
Major Third 
La dissonanzia tertia 
è de due spetie, cioè 
maiore e minore. La 
dissonanzia tertia 
maiore è formata de 




Dissonantia tertia est 
duarum spetierum, 
scilicet maioris et 
minoris. Dissonantia 
tertia maior est 
formata duabus tonis 
et tunc talis tertia 
vocatur ditonia… 
La dissonantia terça e di 
due specie, cioe, magna 
et minore, o vogliamo 
dire perfecta et 
imperfecta. La perfecta e 
formata di due tuoni et e 
dicta questa dissonantia 
dituono tralle specie de 
canto. 
Tertia igitur maior 
est et minor; tertia 
maior est quae ex 
duobus tonis dicitur 
esse formata et ista 
diphtonus appellatur. 
Therefore, the third 
is major and minor; 
the major third is 
said to be formed by 
two tones and is 
called a ditone. 
Major Sixth 
La dissonantia sexta 
è formata di quatro 
tuony et uno 
semituono. Come 
che sia anchora una 
altra spetie di sexta, 
de la quale di soto 
ne tractaremo et 
anchora de la quinta 
prohibita. 
La dissonanza sexta 
è formata de quatro 
toni e de uno 
semitono. Come che 
ancora sia un’altra 
spetie de sexta, de la 
quale de soto ne 
tratarò e ancora de la 
quinta prohibita. 
La sexta dissonantia 
ancora sono di due 
specie, cioe, magiore et 
minore overo perfecta et 
imperfecta, et luna et 
laltra sadopera nel 
lcontrapunto…la magiore 
e formata di quatro tuoni 
e uno semituono. Et dicta 
questa sexta tra le specie 
musicali tuono con 
diapente. 
Sexta maior et minor 
est. Sexta maior ex 
quatuor dicitur 
constare tonis ac uno 
minore semitonio et 
haec diapente cum 
tono vocatur. 
The sixth is major 
and minor. The 
major sixth is said to 
consist of four tones 
and one minor 
semitone, and this is 
called “diapente cum 
tono.” 
 
254 Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 54, 56; Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, 18-19; Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:10-11. 
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To see one instance of Ugolino’s terminological clarity in the description of intervals, I 
offer a comparison of the descriptions of thirds and sixths between the grado treatise and 
Ugolino in Table 3.1. Comparing the order and manner in which the grado treatises describe 
intervals (in this case the major third and the major sixth) reveals that Ugolino likely knew either 
these treatises (i.e., F1 and F2) or at least the tradition itself. Where the discussion comes in the 
overall structure of the work, and the language used to define it—all these closely follow the 
grado treatises. Ugolino’s word choice closely matches the three treatises presented in the table 
above. They all describe intervals as combinations of smaller parts. They all use the term 
formata to express the intervallic composition of the given interval. In addition, Ugolino alerts 
his readers to the fact that he is depending on another text or textual tradition by using the word 
dicitur (it is said).255 But there are several differences between Ugolino’s text and that of the 
grado treatises. Although all of them include the name ditone for the third, only F1 provides 
“tuono con diapente” for the sixth. W and M do reference another type of sixth (the minor sixth), 
but they lump it together with the diminished fifth as a discord. F1 goes on to give the intervallic 
make up of the minor sixth, provides one instance in which it can be used, then explains that the 
minor sixth, used outside the one allowable exception, must be raised through the application of 
the diesis before it can be used in counterpoint. Whereas W, M, and F1 present inconsistent 
terminology or approach, Ugolino has regularized the definitions. In the definitions of each 
interval, he includes the intervals they are formed from and their alternative name. He has 
expunged the prohibitions against minor sixths without comment, thereby bringing the tradition 
 
255 For additional proof that Ugolino is depending on these treatises or the grado tradition, compare the way 
Prosdocimo defines the major third: “Maior est tercia illa que in se duos continet tonos.” Prosdocimo, 
Contrapunctus, 44. Although the content is the same, the wording differs. He uses the verb continere instead of 
formare, a difference which also requires Prosdocimo to add in se. This linguistic difference lends credence the idea 
that Ugolino may have depended more on the grado tradition than on Prosdocimo. 
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in line with current practice. Therefore, Ugolino clearly knew the grado tradition. Even if the 
authors of M and W were following Ugolino, they do not do so consistently. Ugolino follows the 
same course of topics and presents the definitions of intervals in a similar manner as the grado 
manuscripts. Both where he sticks close to the tradition and where he modifies or departs from it 
are deliberate choices that offer a glimpse into Ugolino’s distinctive account and disclose his 
goals and audience. 
Another change from the manuscripts that Ugolino makes is his use of the bipartite 
division of interval qualities, as described above. Yet Ugolino’s readers may have been aware 
either of the earlier grado tradition or of the older classification of intervals. Consequently, he 
must address the tripartite division of interval quality that is so prominent in that and older 
traditions. In the following passage, he lays out the differences in nomenclature. 
However, these intervals can be identified by 
another division and although it is not very 
properly suited to them, nevertheless at the 
present time they are allotted their definition 
as a common name, so that what are called 
perfect consonances take the name 
consonance. And what are named imperfect 
consonances, because they do not have the 
full perfection of consonance but are 
disconnected from their perfection, obtain the 
name dissonance. But what were called 
dissonances because of their bitter discord are 
labeled discords, because of their meaning. So 
then, from this perspective, the consonances 
are the unison (by means of its status as 
origin), the fifth, octave, twelfth, fifteenth, 
and nineteenth. The dissonances are the third, 
sixth, tenth, thirteenth, and twentieth. The 
discords are the second, the fourth (for the 
tritone), seventh, eleventh, fourteenth, and 
twenty-first. The discords are completely 
rejected for use in counterpoint.256 
Possunt tamen eae voces alia divisione 
cognosci et licet non ita proprie eis 
competat, diffinitio tamen commune nomen 
ita hodierno tempore sortitae sunt, ut quae 
perfectae consonantiae sunt vocatae 
consonantiae nomen teneant. Quae vero 
imperfectae consonantiae nominantur ex 
quo plenam consonantiae perfectionem non 
habent, sed ab ea perfectione distant 
dissonantiae nomen acquirant. Sed quae ex 
inimica discordia dissonantiae dictae sunt 
ex earum significatione discordantiae 
appellentur. Sunt igitur consonantiae 
secundum hanc considerationem, unisonus 
ratione originis, quinta, octava, duodecima, 
quintadecima, nonadecima; dissonantiae 
sunt tertia, sexta, decima, tertia decima, 
vigesima; discordantiae sunt secunda, 
quarta pro tritono, septima, undecima, 
quartadecima, vigesima prima, quae 
discordantiae a contrapuncti usu penitus 
repelluntur. 
 
256 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:7. 
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Ugolino prefers the bipartite division as the one more closely representing the nature of 
the matter, since he calls the older tripartite one “not very properly suited to [these intervals].” 
Still, he sees nothing really contradictory between them, viewing them as merely naming 
conventions. In fact, he lets the two ways of speaking stand side by side throughout the rest of 
his book, referring to thirds and sixths both as consonances and, in an aside, as dissonances. 
Including both would help readers or teachers explain the older terminology, especially if they 
had any occasion to read or use the older texts.257 Discords receive their name because of the 
way they sound. Dissonances are so called because they are disconnected, or more literally, 
sound apart from their perfection. Perfection, to which he devotes an entire chapter later, refers 
to the perfect consonances that serve as the proper resolution for any third or sixth—any 
imperfect consonances. This contrast with the grado treatises brings to light not only that  
Ugolino’s reforms of the grado tradition are conservative but also that Ugolino’s relies on the 
categories of perfect and imperfect consonances. He even takes an entire chapter to examine 
perfection. How does he define these terms? What is consonance? What makes a consonance 
either perfect or imperfect? What is a perfection? 
Ugolino provides an overview of perfect consonances in chapter 4 and of imperfect 
consonances in chapter 5 of book 2. In his overview, he refers his readers back to book 1, where 
he covers each interval more thoroughly and which he merely summarizes in these two chapters. 
By considering these places and others where he talks about consonance, we learn that Ugolino 
 
257 Recall that Ugolino was most likely writing in the context of the cathedral school in Ferrara. The teachers and 
students may have had more familiarity with or more opportunity to encounter older texts that used the tripartite 
division. Ugolino modernizes without completely setting aside the older tradition. He is a reformer, not a 
revolutionary. However, in a different context, describing the older method may not have been necessary. For 
example, Prosdocimo worked at the University of Padua. His treatise on counterpoint is much shorter than 
Ugolino’s, and it contains far fewer musical examples. Accordingly, Prosdocimo sees no need to talk about the older 
division and only writes about the newer bipartite division. This reveals that Prosdocimo’s audience was probably 
not people who intended to practice counterpoint, whereas Ugolino’s was. See Prosdocimo, Contrapunctus, 39; 
Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 146-47. 
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presents, in true Aristotelian fashion, both a description of consonance and an explanation of it. 
The description of consonance defines how a certain sound is perceived by the sense of hearing. 
Here, he repeats Boethius’s definition of consonance, which states, “consonance is a mixture of 
high and low sound falling pleasantly and uniformly on the ears.”258  The ears, or the sense of 
hearing, are a kind of judge which can determine which intervals are consonant. He appeals to 
the sense of hearing in his description of the fifth, when he says that it is the “sweetest 
consonance of all” (ispa consonantia diapente omnium dulcissima).259 Likewise, the sense of 
hearing also decides which intervals are dissonant. Although Ugolino does not quote Boethius’s 
definition of dissonance in book 1, he clearly alludes to it when he talks about dissonant 
intervals.260 For example, the major seventh, which he names a diapente with ditone, “brings a 
harsh and very unpleasant sonority to the hearing” (asperam inucundissimamque affert auditui 
sonoritatem).261 Boethius uses the very same words in his definition of dissonance: “Dissonance, 
on the other hand, is a harsh and unpleasant percussion of two sounds coming to the ear 
intermingled with each other.”262  
The sense of hearing also helps determine suitable contrapuntal progressions. Some 
consonances (imperfect) move to other consonances (perfect). The motion usually involves both 
voices moving in contrary motion by step to the next closest consonance (e.g., a third to a fifth, 
or a sixth to an octave).263 This motion is described by Marchetto as compatibility, by Ugolino as 
 
258 Boethius, The Fundamentals of Music, 16; Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:29. 
259 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:58. 
260 However, Ugolino does present Boethius’s definition of dissonance in book 2. Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:6 
261 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:65. 
262 Boethius, The Fundamentals of Music, 16. 
263 See, for instance, Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:12. 
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perfection, and by the recent scholar David Cohen as directed motion.264 Cohen notes that 
Marchetto does not identify why an interval or a progression is compatible, only that its 
compatibility is associated with voice leading. Cohen writes, “‘compatibility,’ it seems, is 
somehow caused by voice-leading proximity, although how this should be the case remains 
unclear.”265 The sense of hearing, by perceiving intervals and the motion of one interval to 
another, can distinguish them as consonant or dissonant and can even discern a difference 
between perfect and imperfect consonances. Yet, as Cohen observes, this does not really explain 
why they are so, or how they are so—it does not account for the cause of compatibility nor, by 
extension, the cause of the separation into perfect and imperfect. For that, more than a 
description is necessary: a rational explanation is required. For Ugolino, such an explanation of 
consonance requires an analysis of the object according to Aristotle’s four causes. Indeed, 
Ugolino explicitly recognizes this as he begins discussing intervals in book 1. He says that he 
plans to analyze each interval: 
For then we are said to know and understand 
a thing when we know its causes. This 
happens when we understand the definition 
of some effect through its proximate and 
remote causes and even to its elements 
[smallest parts].266 
Tunc enim rem dicimur scire et 
intelligere cum eius causas novimus. 
Quod fit cum alicuius effectus per 
propinquam atque remotam causam et 
usque ad elementa diffinitionem 
intelligimus. 
 
By reviewing Ugolino’s analysis, I show how he classifies consonances and the reasons for 
distinguishing between perfect and imperfect. Cohen noted that Marchetto and others did not 
 
264 Marchetto, Lucidarium, 208-13; Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:12-15; Cohen, “The Imperfect Seeks Its Perfection,” 139. 
Directed motion should not be confused with Sarah Fuller’s term “directed progression.” Sarah Fuller, “On Sonority 
in Fourteenth-Century Polyphony: Some Preliminary Reflections,” Journal of Music Theory 30 (1986); Sarah Fuller, 
“Tendencies and Resolutions: The Directed Progression is Ars Nova Music,” Journal of Music Theory 36, no. 2 
(1992). Fuller uses the term directed progression to refer to three voice constructions, but Cohen uses “directed 
motion” to refer to two-voice paradigms. However, Fuller’s directed progression clearly grows out of the practice of 
imperfect consonances moving to the closest perfect consonance in two voice structures. 
265 Cohen, “The Imperfect Seeks Its Perfection,” 150. 
266 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:46. 
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answer why compatibility is connected to voice leading. Ugolino’s explanation may offer a 
reason for the link between the two.  
Ugolino, just like the grado treatises, claims that the source of all intervals is the unison: 
“and because the unison is the origin of all notes, so we must state first what a unison is” (et quia 
omnium vocum origo unisonus est, ideo prima quid sit unisonus dicendum est).267 However, the 
unison does not exactly match Boethius’s definition of consonance, a point Ugolino never 
explicitly states, since Boethius requires a high and a low sound. Therefore, the octave stands in 
as the one interval from which others are derived. In fact, Ugolino describes the octave or 
diapason as “the mother of consonances” (consonantiarum mater), “the greatest of consonances” 
(maximam consonantiarum), and “the best of consonances” (consonantiarum optima).268 
Ugolino, like the grado treatises, considers an interval, even the octave, to be made up of smaller 
parts. These parts stand in a certain relationship to the whole. This leads Ugolino to an 
investigation of the formal cause. Consonances “are perfect when their form is perfect, [and their 
form] is composed of the completed parts that compose them” (perfectae sunt quando earum 
forma perfecta est, est ex suis perfectis partibus eam constituentibus est compacta).269 For each 
interval, Ugolino lists the parts they are made of, stated in terms of the number of tones and 
semitones. For example, a fifth is composed of three tones and one minor semitone. When found 
with this arrangement of parts, it is a perfect fifth. But when these parts are lacking, the fifth is 
no longer perfect but imperfect. If a fifth has only two tones and two minor semitones, then it is 
imperfect—what we would describe as a diminished fifth.270 For this narrower sense of perfect 
 
267 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:8. 
268 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:9; Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:46; Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:69. 
269 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:8-9.  
270 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:9. 
89 
and imperfect, each interval taken by itself—at least in this case fifths, octaves, twelfths, and 
fifteenths—can have a perfect or an imperfect form.271 Yet, perfect and imperfect can also be 
used in a broader sense to describe fifths and octaves (and their compounds) as opposed to thirds 
and sixths (and their compounds). To analyze the form in this case, Ugolino measures all 
intervals against the octave, the mother of them all. 
Ugolino divides the octave into its constituent parts, then relates these parts to the whole 
as either proximate or remote causes. He provides a definition of each interval, beginning with a 
tone and continuing to an octave, and compares them with the octave. He offers the following 
summary of his analysis: 
Therefore, desiring to understand the 
greatest of consonances and to have 
knowledge of it, namely the diapason, it is 
necessary to know first its proximate and 
remote causes as well as its elements. The 
proximate causes are said to be those into 
which the diapason is first immediately 
separated, namely, the diapente and 
diatessaron. These are named the immediate 
components of the diapason, since if the 
diapason undergoes division, it is 
determined to be divided first into these two 
[parts] from which it is composed. But the 
remote causes are said to be those which 
compose the proximate causes and cause 
them. Such are ditones and semiditones 
which are recognized as causes or parts of 
the diapente and diatessaron. But the 
elements or most remote causes are said to 
be those which do not undergo further 
division, such as tones, which, although 
they are divided into semitones, 
nevertheless do not tolerate division of 
Volentes igitur maximam consonantiarum 
intelligere et ipsius habere scientiam, 
scilicet, diapason, causas eius propinquas 
atque remotas necnon et elementa 
praecognoscere oportet. Causae autem 
propinquae diapason illae dicuntur in 
quas primo ipsa diapason immediate 
resolvitur, scilicet, diapente et 
diatessaron, quae componentia immediata 
diapason appellantur, quoniam si 
divisionem patiatur diapason in haec duo 
ex quibus componitur primo partiri 
dignoscitur. Causae vero remotae sunt 
quae causarum propinquarum 
compositivae dicuntur et illas efficiunt ut 
sunt diphtoni et semidiphtoni qui diapente 
et diatessaron noscuntur efficientes vel 
ipsorum partes. Sed elementa sive 
remotissimae causae illae dicuntur esse 
quae ulteriorem divisionem non patiuntur, 
sicut toni qui licet in semitonia dividantur 
alterius tamen minoris integrae quantitatis 
sectionem non sustinent. Sed quoniam ut 
 
271 Ugolino does not carry this narrow meaning of perfect and imperfect into his discussion of thirds and sixths. 
Instead, he speaks only of major and minor. However, the narrower definition of perfect and imperfect could be 
what motivates F1 to equate major with perfect and minor with imperfect. And, as we shall see later, for imperfect 
consonances to resolve to perfect ones, there is a strong tendency, both in Ugolino and especially in the grado 
treatises, for them either to be major or to be altered from minor to major. 
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another smaller whole quantity. But, as we 
have said, the components precede the 
composed in nature and in time. Therefore, 
following in the correct order, first we 
intend to treat the tone and its parts as the 
most remote cause or elements of the 
diapason. Second, we [will treat] the ones 
that are composed of tones and their parts 
and so on until we have an understanding of 
the greatest consonance, the diapason, 
through its remote and proximate causes.272 
iam diximus componentia natura et 
tempore antecedunt composita. Idcirco 
recto ordine prosequentes primo de tono 
et eius partibus tamquam de causa 
remotissima seu elemento ipsius diapason 
intendimus pertractare. Secundo de 
compositis ex tonis et eorum partibus et 
sic ultra donec per causas remotas atque 
propinquas ipsius maximae consonantiae 
diapason intelligentiam habeamus. 
 
Here, the octave is the measuring stick in the sense that all of the other intervals are related to it 
by degrees or distance. Fourths and fifths stand in a proximate or close relationship to it. For this 
reason, they are perfect consonances.273 Fourths and fifths are built out of thirds (ditones and 
semiditones). In relation to fourths and fifths, they stand in a close relationship. But in relation to 
the octave, they lie at a remote distance. Consequently, they are imperfect consonances. They 
still fulfill Boethius’s definition of consonance, but in relation to the octave—the fundamental 
unit of measurement in this situation—they do not fully measure up. Thirds are composed of 
even smaller parts, which Ugolino describes as elements, and which include tones and semitones. 
In relation to the octave, these elements stand in the furthest, most remote location. Therefore, 
they are dissonances. They not only fall short of Boethius’s definition of consonance but also fail 
to reach even a close distance to the octave. As a result, they match Boethius’s definition of 
dissonance. Therefore, by measuring all these intervals with the octave, Ugolino associates 
proximate with perfect, remote with imperfect, and most remote with dissonant. Although 
Ugolino never explicitly makes this link, he comes closest to stating it outright in book 2, where 
 
272 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:46-7. 
273 In this scheme, fourths would be classified as perfect consonances. And in fact, Ugolino describes them as 
consonances. Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:53. Yet in book 2, he states that they are dissonances (i.e., they are not used in 
two-voice counterpoint), but they were once regarded as consonances “by the ancients” (ab antiquis). Ugolino, 
Declaratio, 2:6. 
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he summarizes perfect and imperfect intervals. After repeating Boethius’s definition of 
consonance, he adds which intervals he considers consonant:  
Namely the third, fifth, and sixth, but of 
these only one is said to be a perfect 
consonance, specifically the fifth. But the 
rest are said to be imperfect consonances 
because they are distant from the full 
perfection of consonance.274 
Scilicet, tertia, quinta et sexta, sed 
ipsarum una duntaxat dicitur esse 
consonantia perfecta, scilicet, quinta, 
reliquae ver quia a consonantiae plena 
perfectione distant imperfectae dicuntur 
consonantiae. 
 
The spatial metaphor makes the connection apparent. 
Ugolino uses this spatial metaphor to explain intervals throughout his discussion in book 
1, where he writes one chapter on each interval from the tone through the octave (and even a few 
beyond the octave). For example, when he begins the chapter on the tone, he says, 
Therefore, the tone is said to be the first 
and whole interval of all, and it is the most 
remote cause of the greatest consonance.275 
Tonus igitur qui omnium prima et integra 
dicitur esse coniunctio et ipsius maximae 
consonantiae causa remotissima. 
 
He then provides a definition of the tone in such a way that it is divided into unequal parts, the 
major and minor semitone, in keeping with his Boethian and Pythagorean heritage. He follows 
the same practice with the other intervals, always reminding the reader of their relationship to the 
octave before offering a definition of its genus, species, and differences.  
Ugolino does not merely state that some intervals are perfect and others imperfect. 
Instead, he attempts to answer why they are so by analyzing them in relation to a common 
measure, the mother of all intervals, the octave. Because of their distance to the octave, some 
intervals are perfect consonances. Others seem to match Boethius’s definition of consonance but 
do not reach the same relation to the octave, and these are imperfect consonances. Still others are 
even more distant to the octave, and these are dissonant. But two intervals are conspicuously 
 
274 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:6. 
275 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:47. 
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absent from Ugolino’s description above—sixths and sevenths. Although he refrains from 
speaking in terms of a specific cause (e.g., more remote or most remote), he still thinks of them 
in spatial terms either by their distance to the octave or another consonance or by their 
proportion. He thinks of sevenths as a perfect fifth plus either a minor or a major third. About the 
diapente with ditone (major seventh), he uses language both of distance and proportion. He says, 
“it cannot have the value of a consonance because it does not possess a proportion of 
consonances,” (consonantiarum non retinet proportionem…vim consonantiae obtinere non 
potest),276 and it is “especially remote from the agreement of dissonant notes [i.e., imperfect 
consonances]” (a dissonantiarum convenientia vocum permaxime remota sunt).277 All of this 
shows that the major seventh “is neither a consonance nor a dissonance [imperfect consonance], 
but it is allotted the name of discord” (non est ergo haec coniunctio consonantia neque 
dissonantiae, sed discordii nomen sortiri conceditur).278 Even the major seventh is described with 
the language of distance: it is especially far from an imperfect consonance, which makes it a 
discord. Ugolino also hints that proportion plays a role in explaining intervals. Indeed, providing 
the mathematical proportions for intervals is another way of analyzing or explaining their form, 
which he does at length in books 4 and 5.279 Ugolino thinks of sixths as fifths with either a minor 
 
276 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:64. 
277 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:64. 
278 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:65. 
279 Ugolino takes up the entirety of book 4 and much of book 5 to discuss the mathematical proportions of intervals. 
Book 1, which I use here, offers the first layer of Aristotelian analysis. It explains the form of intervals in terms of 
their distance and their intervallic constituents, for example, that the fifth contains three tones and one minor 
semitone. Books 4 and 5 take this and analyze these further into their mathematical proportions, for example, that 
the ratio of the tone is 9:8 and the minor semitone is 256:243. Once he has done this, Ugolino can then show that 
some proportions belong to a certain class, superparticular for instance, and thus further refine his analysis. Since 
Ugolino is Pythagorean, I do not discuss these books. What is more important for my work is to see that he is 
offering an Aristotelian analysis of the form of intervals. In book 1, his language is more practical, and in books 4 
and 5, he covers the same material but in language that is clearly theoretical. His practical language in particular 
helps us see how he divides consonant intervals into perfect or imperfect. 
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third or a major third added on. The major sixth is a diapente with ditone, and he defines it in 
relation to the octave: “We certainly use this interval in counterpoint when it is joined to a 
diapason, where we seek the harmony of the diapason, since it is its perfection” (Hac equidem 
vocum connexione utimur in contrapuncto diapason associata, ubi ipsius harmoniam diapason 
quaerimus quoniam eius perfectio est).280 After saying this, he further describes the sixth and its 
distance from the perfect fifth, imperfect (diminished) fifth, and the fourth. He speaks of the 
sixth by its relationship to the octave. It is used in a progression to the octave, and this helps 
classify it as an imperfect consonance. When this happens—when a major sixth moves to an 
octave—it creates what Ugolino calls a perfection. This is more than just a perfect consonance, 
since it involves the motion of one interval to another. What exactly is a perfection in this sense 
and how, if at all, is it tied to the classification of imperfect and perfect intervals?  
In book 2, Ugolino devotes an entire chapter to perfection. It directly depends on an 
understanding of perfect and imperfect things, and he ties these together with the concept of 
motion. Already in book 1, Ugolino described the major sixth by its motion to the octave. 
Ugolino relies on Aristotelian philosophy to make sense of them. He begins his chapter on 
perfection with the following statement: 
By nature, what is imperfect and 
incomplete, in order to have a perfect form, 
is compelled to move as it tends towards 
what it lacks. When imperfect consonances 
(or dissonances) are imperfect in 
comparison to consonances, and when each 
one does not have its own perfection, the 
imperfect desires to go to it, so that it may 
be established in the essence [being] of a 
consonant perfection. These observations 
are certainly known to those experienced 
and practiced in theory, because if the 
Natura, quod imperfectum est et 
incompletum, ut perfectam habeat formam 
ad id tendens quo deficit moveri 
compellitur, cumque consonantiae 
imperfectae seu dissonantiae praedictae 
consonantium comparatione imperfectae 
sint, et ipsarum perfectionem non habeant 
unaquaeque ut inesse consonantis 
perfectionis constituantur, eam natura 
gliscit adire. Expertis theoricae peritis 
haec indubie nota sunt, quia si vel in 
tertia, sexta vel decima sit vocum positio 
 
280 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:62. 
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intervals form a third or sixth or tenth, no 
rest occurs, but each—so that it may be 
joined to its own perfection—moves as if 
compelled to it. From this arises the fact 
that any song arranged in proportion ends 
on a perfect consonance, although before 
the last end it may sometimes close on 
imperfect consonances or dissonances. But 
because it does not cause rest, however 
well arranged to the listener, a final 
consonance is added as an end.281 
non fit quies, sed quaelibet ut suae 
copuletur perfectioni ad eam coacta 
movetur. Et hinc est quod cantus quilibet 
mensura ordinatus in perfecta 
consonantia finem habet, quamvis ante 
finem ultimum quidam in imperfectis 
consonantiis seu dissonantiis interdum 
habeat terminari in quo quia audientis 
bene disposita auris non quiescit, ultimus 
consonans finis addicitur. 
 
Ugolino’s thorough account refers to what David Cohen calls “directed motion,” an idea 
indebted to Aristotelian natural philosophy.282 Cohen resolves the idea into five distinct 
propositions: (1) separating objects into perfect and imperfect; (2) asserting that what is 
imperfect seeks what is perfect; (3) saying that imperfect things do so precisely because they are 
imperfect; (4) arguing this happens by nature; and (5) showing that each imperfect thing strives 
towards its own perfection.283  
Ugolino fulfills all of Cohen’s five conditions. I showed above that Ugolino classifies 
consonances into perfect and imperfect and how he does so, which accounts for the first 
condition. When he says, “the imperfect desires to go to it [its perfection]” and “it [what is 
imperfect] tends towards what it lacks,” he is clearly asserting Cohen’s second and third 
conditions. Ugolino satisfies the fifth condition at the end of the statement, since the rest of the 
chapter deals precisely with which particular imperfect consonance moves to its own particular 
 
281 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:12. Cohen provides his own translation of this passage. He argues that where Seay has 
“inesse,” the text should more likely read “in esse.” Cohen, “The Imperfect Seeks Its Perfection,” 164. I agree with 
his reading and have translated it accordingly. 
282 “Directed motion” should not be confused with Sarah Fuller’s term “directed progression.” See Fuller, “On 
Sonority on Fourteenth-Century Polyphony,” 36-70; Fuller, “Tendencies and Resolutions,” 229-58. Fuller uses the 
term “directed progression” to refer to three voice constructions, but Cohen uses “directed motion” to refer to two-
voice paradigms. However, Fuller’s directed progression clearly grows out of the practice of imperfect consonances 
moving to the closest perfect consonance in two voice structures. 
283 Cohen, “The Imperfect Seeks Its Perfection,” 146. 
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perfection or perfect consonance.  
Ugolino spends the most time showing in practice how the fifth condition is fulfilled. It 
occurs when an imperfect consonance moves to the closest perfect consonance by using contrary 
motion. This method is sometimes referred to as the closest-approach, and because of its 
connection to Aristotelian philosophy, it was taught by many theorists, including Ugolino’s 
contemporary Prosdocimo.284 According to Ugolino, thirds have two perfections: they can move 
either to a unison or to a fifth. In both cases, the tenor ascends, and the upper voice ascends.285 
When the third moves to the unison, a “sweeter harmony” (dulcior harmonia) can be produced 
by using a minor third. On the other hand, he says that “according to some the major third is 
perfected by the fifth” (secundum quosdam tertia maior a quinta perficitur).286 Thus, although 
thirds in general can progress to a unison or a fifth, it is sweeter when a minor third resolves to a 
unison and a major third to a fifth. The sixth has a “proper perfection” (propria perfectione) and 
an “improper perfection” (impropria perfectione). The former indicates the motion of a sixth to 
an octave and the latter a sixth to a fifth. The former, like the movement of the third to the unison 
or fifth, includes contrary motion. But for the latter, one voice will remain stationary while the 
other moves either down or up.287 Indeed, the fact that the latter resolution does not use contrary 
motion may explain why he calls it improper. He makes no mention here about changing a minor 
sixth to a major one or vice versa. As with the thirds, it is enough for a perfection if a major or 
minor sixth moves to an octave. Changing an interval from minor to major (or major to minor) 
merely colors or sweetens a progression. It does not fundamentally change the type of 
 
284 Prosdocimo, Contrapunctus, 80-84. 
285 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:12. 
286 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:13. 
287 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:13. The improper perfection of the sixth sounds similar to F1’s only use of the minor 
sixth, stated above. 
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progression. Ugolino reserves the discussion of changing the quality of intervals for the chapter 
on musica ficta, which I discuss in chapter 4. He finishes the chapter on perfections by 
considering how to perfect compound thirds and sixths.  
Ugolino also fulfills Cohen’s fourth condition. In fact, nature takes center stage. Nature is 
the first word in Ugolino’s statement, and it is also a guiding principle throughout the rest of his 
discussion. By nature, he claims, an imperfect consonance moves to a perfect consonance. 
Because of their nature, imperfect things in general “desire” (gliscit adire), “are compelled to 
move” (moveri compellitur), and “tend towards” (tendens) their perfection. For Ugolino as for 
Aristotle, nature is linked with motion. Indeed, for Aristotle, one defining characteristic of nature 
is motion.288  
The connection between nature and motion flows from Ugolino’s foundational claim that 
music belongs to natural philosophy.289 For Aristotle, motion encompasses a greater range of 
meaning than it does today. It is closer to what we might categorize as any type of change. For 
example, when we think of motion, we point to an object changing place. Aristotle recognized 
this kind of local motion, but he also considered as other types of motion growth (and shrinkage 
or decay) and changes in quality and quantity. In addition, he distinguishes motion by its source 
as either external or internal. When looking at a statue, it came to be what it is through motion 
but motion external to it, through the work of a sculptor. When looking at an acorn that grows 
into a tree, its source of motion is internal to it. The acorn has a distinct relationship to the oak 
tree. It is an oak tree only in potency: it has the ability to become an oak tree. As it grows, it 
changes its form to become the oak. Whereas the acorn is an oak in potency, the oak is one in 
 
288 Aristotle, Physics 2.1.192b21-22. 
289 I examined this topic more fully in chapter 2. 
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being-at-work or actuality. That is, it is existing as an oak tree without becoming something else. 
In the oak, the acorn has reached its perfection.290  
This outline of Aristotle’s thought illuminates Ugolino’s concept of the motion from an 
imperfect consonance to its own perfection. Ugolino’s statement reinforces his classification of 
music as a part of natural philosophy. The imperfect consonance is like the acorn. It is a perfect 
consonance in potency. As it moves to its own perfection, to its closest perfect consonance, it 
changes form to become a perfect consonance. The perfect consonance, in relation to the 
imperfect one preceding it, is perfect in being-at-work (or actuality). The change of form from 
imperfect to perfect, as well as the movement of the voices from one pitch to another, is motion 
in Aristotle’s use of the term. The source of this motion is in the thing itself, that is, it is in the 
imperfect consonance. According to Ugolino, it is in imperfect things in general and, by 
extension, in the imperfect consonance in particular by nature. Nature, as I noted, is an important 
term in Ugolino’s statement. Most importantly, it is cited as the underlying instigator of the 
motion. According to Aristotle, any object that “has in itself a source of motion” is an object of 
nature, and as a result, it belongs to the study of nature or natural philosophy.291 Ugolino, 
therefore, is asserting that imperfect consonances are natural objects, whose movement to their 
own perfections results from a source within the imperfect consonance itself, by the very fact 
that it is imperfect. Although he may have recognized the role of a composer in writing a 
particular progression or of performers in singing one pitch after another, or indeed of the 
general motion of one pitch proceeding to another, yet his point in this passage is to place music 
squarely within natural philosophy. In other words, his classification of music as part of natural 
 
290 Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.1-10.1045b27-1052a14. 
291 Aristotle, Physics 2.1.192b15. 
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philosophy grows out of his observations on the nature of imperfect consonances and their 
perfections. Thus, his classification of music as a natural philosophy also shapes his language 
about counterpoint. 
Ugolino goes beyond Cohen’s five conditions to argue that perfections are more than 
closest-approach progressions to perfect consonances. They are used at the very end, perhaps of 
a phrase or an entire piece, to bring rest. They are, in this sense, similar to what we might think 
of as cadences. Not every progression from an imperfect consonance to a perfect one falls under 
the category of a perfection. In Ugolino’s own examples of composed counterpoint, which he 
provides later in book 2, he has several instances of tenths moving to fifths, or of a tenth leaping 
into an octave. Although these progressions move from imperfect consonances to perfect ones, 
they do not correspond to any of the progressions Ugolino describes as perfections. In the last 
two decades of the fifteenth century, Johannes Tinctoris offers a definition of perfections. He 
states that it has two meanings, one relating to mensural music and the other to ends of pieces. 
“Perfection,” he writes, “is the recognition of the completion of a whole piece, or any of its 
sections.”292 Tinctoris’s account of perfection matches Ugolino’s comment that perfections are 
added at the end to bring the piece to a satisfying rest.  
I started this section by showing that Ugolino was dependent on the grado treatises for 
the beginning of his book on counterpoint, and, as I show in the next section, he leans on it 
heavily when he teaches about the grado theory itself. However, Ugolino also makes his own 
contributions, even here in the preliminary material. He updates the language on sixths by 
consistently describing them as imperfect consonances, without treating major and minor sixths 
 
292 Johannes Tinctoris, Dictionary of Musical Terms, trans. Carl Parrish (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 
49. 
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differently. He makes no prohibitions against minor sixths. He clearly describes two different 
naming conventions, the bipartite and tripartite divisions of quality. He sets them side by side, 
combining the old with the new but with clarity.   
Ugolino also goes beyond the grado tradition by integrating his classification of intervals 
into the broader narrative of music as a part of natural philosophy. Relying on Aristotle, he offers 
an analysis of the relationship between imperfect and perfect consonances and fulfills Cohen’s 
five conditions. By nature, imperfect things desire perfection, and specific imperfect things seek 
a perfection that is particular to them. Thus, thirds seek unisons and fifths, and sixths seek 
octaves. Seeking and desiring means moving to those perfections, and this motion lives in their 
nature, in the intervals themselves, in the way the intervals are structured. All these intervals are 
measured in relation to a common standard, the octave. Fifths and fourths (although Ugolino 
recognizes the fourth as dissonant in practice) stand in a proximal relationship to the octave. But 
thirds, and by extension sixths, lie in a more remote relation. In this sense, thirds and sixths are 
imperfect and consequently desire or seek the fifth or octave because of their structure. 
Therefore, Ugolino reasons that if imperfect intervals contain within themselves a source of 
motion drawing them to perfect consonances, then they are analogous to natural objects, and 
music must be considered part of natural philosophy. This view of Ugolino sets his theory apart 
from his contemporaries and even from the grado tradition which he is presenting. It allows him 
both to value theory and speculative thought and to elevate practical concerns because they are 
integral to the formation of theoretical thought. With these foundations laid, he proceeds to the 
grado theory itself. 
3.3 The Regola del Grado in Practice 
After fully discussing the distinction between perfect and imperfect consonances, 
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Ugolino arrives at the central teaching of the grado tradition. Something is conspicuously 
missing from his account: he never uses the word gradus. This word was clearly a viable 
translation of the Italian grado, because M uses it in the section that is in Latin.293 Meaning 
degree or step, it refers to the distance between the starting note of the hexachord in the tenor and 
the starting note of the hexachord of the added voice. For example, if two singers were in the 
same hexachord, the relationship between the two is expressed as “grado di pari.” If the one was 
in the natural hexachord and the other was in the hard hexachord above it, the degree is the 
“grado della quinta.” F1, M, and W recognize four degrees (gradi): the unison, fourth, fifth, and 
octave.294 F2 includes the same degrees but adds a degree of the twelfth, which Ugolino does not 
mention.295 F1 arranges them in the order of unison, fifth, fourth, and octave, but W and M list 
them in the order of unison, fourth, fifth and octave. Ugolino describes only four degrees, 
presenting them in the order of unison, fourth, fifth, and octave.  
The mere name gradus or grado does not give any indication of the purpose of calculating 
distances via hexachords. Ugolino deliberately omits the word gradus and replaces it with a 
phrase designating its purpose or definition. For example, chapter 7 is titled “On the 
Consonances and Dissonances of Notes in a Single Hexachord” (De consonatiis et dissonantiis 
notarum in una proprietate).296 And he styles chapter 9, “On the Syllables of the Hexachords 
Whose Starting Notes lie a Fifth Apart” (De vocibus proprietatum quarum principia distant per 
diapente).297 The title of chapter 9 gives the definition for the “grado della quinta,” and that of 
 
293 Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 54. 
294 Scattolin, "La Regola Del 'Grado'," 59-60; Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, 21-24. 
295 Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, 25-31. 
296 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:15. 
297 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:17.  
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chapter 7 provides the underlying reason for teaching this system. The theoretical system serves 
a pedagogical purpose: it is a means of teaching and learning which notes are consonant, so that 
a singer or composer could quickly and accurately create consonant counterpoint. It is a practical 
way of memorizing all the consonances within the gamut.298 So, for each degree, Ugolino lists 
the solfege for each step in one hexachord and each note that is consonant with it in the other. 
For every consonant note, he provides its solfege and the interval it creates. When he names the 
intervals, he does not give the quality of the interval, since he deals more fully with the 
manipulation of quality in the section on musica ficta.299 Thus, when both parts are in the same 
hexachord and one voice is ut, that ut “has two consonances and two dissonances: ut a unison, mi 
a third, sol a fifth, and la a sixth” (duas habet consonantias et duas dissonantias, scilicet, ut 
unisonum, mi tertiam, sol quintam et la sextam).300 “Re has two consonances and one 
dissonance: re a unison, fa a third, and la a fifth.” (Re duas habet consonantias et dissonantiam 
unam, scilicet, re unisonum, fa tertiam et la quintam.)301 He continues cataloging consonances 
for each solfege from ut to la, for all four degrees.  
The language Ugolino uses closely matches F1, while M and W diverge slightly from 
Ugolino. W states, “Et perciò ut in grado di pari ha due consonantie, cioè pari e quinta et due 
dissonantie, cioè terza e sexta; la pari dice ut, la quinta sol, la terza mi, sexta la. Re ha due 
consonantie et una dissonantia…”302 F1 contains the same information but words it slightly 
 
298 Busser Berger is one of the few scholars I know who writes at any length about the regola del grado. Her goal is 
to show how the system was meant to be memorized, and its relation, in general, to memory. Her observations 
vividly reveal how practical the regola del grado was. Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 133-50. 
299 I review Ugolino’s chapter on musica ficta in detail in chapter 4. 
300 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:15. In the same chapter he reminds his readers that for consonance he means perfect 
consonance and for dissonance he means imperfect consonance. 
301 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:15. 
302 Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 60. I have not quoted M, since M closely follows W. 
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differently, “Adunque per grado di pari ut a due consonançe et due dissonançe in questo modo, 
per ut ut che fia pari, mi che fia terça, sol che fia quinta, la che fia sexta.”303 Both state first that 
ut “has” (ha) a number of consonances and dissonances. W says first how many consonances ut 
has before listing them by interval type, then it follows the same pattern for listing dissonances. 
Only after this does it provide the solfege syllables for each. By contrast, F1 states that ut has 
two consonances and dissonances, then lists each interval in the order it appears in the hexachord 
by both solfege and interval type. Ugolino follows the presentation set out by F1.304 In addition, 
Ugolino keeps the distinction between consonance and dissonance, even though, as I showed 
above, he recognizes they mean perfect consonance and imperfect consonance respectively. 
For each grado, Ugolino offers a musical example that shows both the hexachordal step 
and each note consonant with that step (see Example 3.1). W, M, and F1 also provide similar 
musical examples, but F2 lacks any examples. Ugolino’s example for the “grado di pari” is 
nearly identical to the ones found in W and F1 with two small exceptions. First, he always 
arranges the list of consonant options in ascending order from lowest to highest, whereas the 
others write theirs from the given note. Second, he uses the natural hexachord as the starting 
point, but the others use the hard hexachord.  
Example 3.1: The Grado di Pari.305 
 
 
The examples for the degrees of the fifth and the octave are nearly identical among 
 
303 Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, 22. 
304 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:15-16. F2 uses different language to describe each of the gradi and, in this sense, seems to 
be an outlier. 
305 Example II-12 in Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:supplement. 
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Ugolino, W, and F1. For each of these, the lowest part is in the natural hexachord, except for the 
degree of the fourth. For this, Ugolino (and W seems to follow him in this) writes the lowest part 
in the hard hexachord. If Ugolino followed F1 as one of his main exemplars, then he clearly 
diverges from it when notating the example for the degree of the fourth.306 F1 places the lower 
voice in the natural hexachord and the added part in the soft hexachord. So, for ut (C) in the 
natural hexachord, the consonant pitches in the soft hexachord are re (G), mi (a), and sol (c). For 
re (D) in the natural hexachord, the consonant pitches in the soft hexachord are mi (a), fa (b-flat), 
la (d) and ut (F). D to b-flat forms a minor sixth, but both W and F1 deny consonant status to the 
minor sixth and prohibit its use from counterpoint. Consequently, they both need to alter this 
pitch, which they do by adding the sharp sign. For the next step, mi (E) is in the natural 
hexachord, above which both manuscripts place re (g), fa (b-flat), and sol (c). Here fa forms a 
diminished fifth and sol is a minor sixth, so both require alteration, which W and F1 provide. 
Inexplicably, however, F1 also changes the g to g-sharp. There was no prohibition against minor 
thirds, so there is seemingly no reason for making it a major third. But this same phenomenon 
appears again over both sol and la in the natural hexachord: the thirds above sol and la (b-flat and 
c respectively) are raised so that they form major thirds.307 Since they are consistently altered to 
make the thirds major, it is unlikely that it is an error in the text. W does not contain these further 
alterations over sol and la. 
Ugolino avoids these problems. First, as stated earlier, he allows the use of minor sixths, 
making no rule against them or their use in counterpoint. In addition, he places the lowest part in 
 
306 For the text and examples from W and M on the degree of the fourth, see Scattolin, “La Regola Del ‘Grado’,” 61-
62. For the parallel passage in F1, see Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, 23. 
307 Seay, Quatuor Tractatuli, 23. F1 refers to these altered notes as diesata (literally diesis-ed) or remoto, 
presumably because it is removed from where it would be if it were sung without alteration. 
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the hard hexachord instead of the natural hexachord and the added part in the natural hexachord 
instead of the soft. For all the other examples, Ugolino used the natural hexachord for the lowest 
voice. So, he either switched hexachords to avoid the pitfalls found in F1, or he switched for 
some other reason. Yet the same problem (the diminished fifth between mi and fa) exists no 
matter which hexachords are chosen. Thus, it seems likely that Ugolino switched to avoid the 
problems he saw in F1, and W follows him in the switch. Curiously, Ugolino does not add any 
sign in his musical example to change the diminished fifth above mi. Instead, he acknowledges 
the issue in the text by labeling its interval type. He calls it “fa an imperfect fifth” (fa quintam 
imperfectam).308 He avoids using it in his examples of composed counterpoint, and he discusses 
correcting imperfect fifths in the section on musica ficta, even though he does not at this point 
refer the reader there. By listing it together with other, usable consonant intervals, he gives the 
impression that an imperfect fifth is acceptable. But his discussion on musica ficta clarifies the 
point that such “imperfect consonances” should not appear in counterpoint.309  
For each grado, Ugolino tells what hexachords he is using, lists the solfege and the 
intervals they form, as described above, and he provides a musical example for each. The 
language he uses to describe these is clearly echoed in W. Describing the consonant notes in 
each grado takes up one chapter for each step and thus covers chapters 7-10. In chapter 11, 
Ugolino begins a new topic that stretches through chapter 15. All the other grado manuscripts 
omit this, except for W, which most likely follows Ugolino. I first provide an overview of 
Ugolino’s teaching in these chapters and then compare it with that found in W.  
In chapters 7-10, Ugolino has discussed only what the consonances and dissonances in 
 
308 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:17. 
309 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:44. 
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each grado are. In effect, this creates multiple consonance tables, that is, lists of which notes are 
consonant when the tenor and added part are in a given hexachord(s). But in chapters 11-15, he 
shows how consonances are to be arranged to create counterpoint or simple progressions, and 
how the gradi provide a structure for learning these progressions. In chapter 11, he outlines the 
limits of the new topic: 
After demonstrating the consonances and 
dissonances of the hexachords, I must state 
how these consonances and dissonances 
should be arranged in counterpoint 
between the hexachords, and, as was said, 
this kind of counterpoint is the 
arrangement of only one hexachord against 
another without mutation. The notes of one 
hexachord, from ut to la, are arranged in 
various ways. Out of them, tones, 
semitones, ditones, semiditones, 
diatessarons, diapentes, and diapentes with 
tones, both ascending and descending, are 
composed. Thus, according to these 
[melodic] intervals an arrangement of 
counterpoint will be shown, both 
ascending and descending. But first, that 
order of counterpoint must be shown 
which relates to a single hexachord alone. 
By this, the knowledge of any hexachord is 
shown. Second, that order of counterpoint 
will be set down which relates to one 
hexachord with another.310 
Habitis proprietatum demonstrationibus 
circa consonantias et dissonantias, 
declarandum est qualiter inter ipsas 
proprietates habeant dictae consonantiae 
et dissonantiae ordinari in contrapuncto, 
et, ut dictum est, huiusmodi contrapunctus 
est unius tantum proprietatis in alteram 
sine mutatione ordinatus et quia notae 
unius proprietatis, scilicet, ab ut ad la 
diversimode irdinantur, quia ex his 
componuntur toni, semitonia, diphtoni, 
semidiphtoni, diatessaron, diapente et 
diapente cum tono per arsyn et thesyn, 
ideo secundum has coniunctiones ordo 
contrapuncti monstrabitur in arsy et thesy. 
Sed is primo contrapuncti ordo 
monstrandus est qui ad unicam tantum 
proprietatem noscitur pertinere, quo 
notitia uniuscuiusque proprietatis 
ostenditur, secundo is contrapuncti ordo 
ponetur, qui ad proprietatem cum 
proprietate spectare videtur. 
 
Ugolino takes the notes of a single hexachord and arranges them melodically first by 
steps, then thirds, fourths, fifths, and sixths, in both ascending and descending orders.311 He 
 
310 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:18. 
311 For each melodic step in the tenor, Ugolino seems to plan on one example for the ascending form and a second 
example for the descending form. Thus, we should expect ten examples in each grado. Although Ugolino claims that 
he will include examples of the tenor moving in sixths, he does not, in fact, include these in his text. So, we should 
see only eight examples for each tenor interval. Ugolino, however, does not strictly follow this format. In some 
chapters, the descending form is included in the same example as the ascending form. In addition, in chapter 11, he 
writes twice as many examples as we would expect. Despite these inconsistencies in his presentation, his point is 
clear. 
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writes each interval as a two-note unit. For example, when he arranges them by ascending steps, 
he writes ut-re, re-mi, mi-fa, fa-sol, and sol-la. These two note units will form the basis of a 
chant-like voice or tenor.312 For each of the units in the tenor, he adds above it an example of a 
typical contrapuntal progression. Example 3.2 provides his first musical example of this 
technique. The tenor moves by steps from ut to la in the natural hexachord. In this example, the 
upper part also moves only within the natural hexachord. After Ugolino has presented examples 
like it, where both parts move within the same hexachord, he offers examples where the two 
parts are in different hexachords. The relationships between the hexachord of the tenor and of the 
added voice follow the same order as that of the gradi themselves, as outlined above: first, they 
move in the same hexachord, or “grado di pari,” as in Example 3.2. Then, they lie at the distance 
of a fourth, fifth, and finally an octave. Indeed, he devotes one chapter, from 11-14, for each 
grado. It is a natural extension and development of the practice he presents in chapters 7-10. In 
these examples of typical contrapuntal progressions, Ugolino prioritizes contrary motion, 
although some examples do include similar motion. In addition, neither part moves outside its 
own hexachord: there is no mutation.   
Example 3.2: Sample Progressions Using the Regola del Grado.313 
 
 
Once Ugolino has presented typical two-note progressions, he gives a final example in 
 
312 The units are, therefore, not to be read as a continuous melody. Nor do they offer the same kinds of progressions 
that Ugolino earlier described as perfections, since he uses motions other than imperfect to perfect. 
313 Example II-16 in Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:supplement. 
107 
each grado where the tenor moves in one continuous motion, not in two note units, by step up 
from ut to la and back down from la to ut. Over this, he writes an added voice that borrows the 
typical progressions he has previously demonstrated in order to create a single continuous 
counterpoint (Example 3.3). These examples of longer progressions often but not always 
conclude with a perfection. 
Example 3.3: A Longer Progression, Conluding with a Perfection.314 
 
 
After Ugolino has presented typical contrapuntal progressions in each grado in chapters 
11-14, he provides an overview and conclusion in chapter 15. The musical examples in chapter 
15 are worthy of comment. In them, he has what appears to be four parts (see Example 3.4). The 
bottom part is the tenor, which moves within the natural hexachord in two note units by a 
particular interval (by steps in Example 3.4), both ascending and descending. There are four 
examples: in the first, the tenor moves by steps; in the second, by thirds; in the third, by fourths; 
in the last, by fifths. At the end of the fourth example, he adds a section where the tenor moves 
not in two note units but continuously up from ut to la and then down from la to ut, as he had in 
the chapters preceding. In each example, above the tenor, Ugolino adds what looks to be three 
voices, one which moves within the natural hexachord, another in the hard hexachord, and 
another in the natural hexachord an octave above the tenor. They are labeled according to the 
hexachord they are in. Thus, he includes all the gradi except the fourth. Concerning the examples 
 
314 Example II-33 in Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:supplement. 
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in chapter 15, like the one seen in Example 3.4, Anna Maria Busse Berger states, “Chapter 15 
shows the hexachord combinations in four-part counterpoint, thus making it clear to the singer in 
which range to place each part.”315 Busse Berger makes three distinct claims: first, that chapter 
15 shows hexachord combinations; second, that these combinations are in four-voice 
counterpoint; third, that as a result of the first two claims a singer learns how to handle range 
with respect to four-voice counterpoint. I briefly analyze these claims by examining what 
Ugolino says about these examples and by considering them in the broader context both of the 
previous chapters in particular and of Ugolino’s audience and goals in general. 
Example 3.4: A Single Example Containing Several Gradi at Once.316 
 
 
Ugolino states the purpose for the examples in chapter 15:  
We have at present decided to demonstrate 
all the intervals ordered in counterpoint [and] 
gathered into one [example], so that those 
who are desiring [and] learning to make 
progress from these learned demonstrations 
may understand counterpoint, may flee 
discords, may unite concords, and may learn 
the compositions of melodies.317 
Impraesentiarum coniunctiones omnes 
supra seorsum in contrapuncto ordinatas 
in unum collectas decrevimus 
demonstrate, ut cupiens discens proficere 
his demonstratis edocumentis 
contrapunctum intelligat, discordias 
fugiat, concordias uniat, et cantuum 
compositiones addiscat. 
 
315 Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 139. 
316 Example II-56 in Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:supplement. 
317 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:22.  
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He intends to take what he has already covered from chapters 7-14 and combine them into one 
handy compendium that learners, who want to make proper counterpoint, may consult. To 
achieve this, he includes several gradi: the unison, the fifth, and the octave. He states, 
The order of these hexachords in 
counterpoint exists in that the first natural 
hexachord makes counterpoint with itself 
out of its own consonant and dissonant 
intervals, since it sounds well and agrees 
with the pitches of other hexachords after 
discords have been removed. Above this 
natural hexachord, the order of the second 
hard hexachord follows, whose first note is 
known to lie a diapente from the first note 
of the aforementioned natural hexachord. 
Next, so that the perfection of counterpoint 
may be complete out of threes, the order of 
the second natural hexachord is 
demonstrated, which is separated from the 
first natural [hexachord] by the distance of 
a diapason. For by the concordant 
connections of consonant and dissonant 
pitches, a very sweet harmony is presented 
to the soul, and from those of the other 
hexachords lying equally distant, as above, 
a method of counterpoint is understood, as 
is evident to those who understand.318 
Earum autem proprietatum ordo in 
contrapuncto est quod proprietas naturae 
primae secum ex suis consonantibus atque 
dissonantibus vocibus in arsy et thesy 
faciat contrapunctum, quoniam cum 
aliarum vocibus proprietatum semota 
discordia consonet et conveniat. Supra 
hanc autem naturae propriatatem b 
quadri secundi sequitur ratio contrapuncti 
cuius initium a dictae naturae principio 
noscitur per diapente distare, ex inde ut 
contrapuncti perfectio compleatur ex 
tribus naturae secundae contrapuncti 
ratio demonstrator, quae a prima natura 
per diapason distantiam separator. His 
enim concorditer nexis consonantium 
dissonantiumque vocum dulcissima 
animae offertur harmonia, et ex his 
aliarum proprietatem aeque ut supra 
distantium sumitur ratio contrapuncti, ut 
intelligenti patet. 
 
He considers each part separately in relation to the tenor, not as an example of four-
voiced counterpoint. He says that the first hexachord “makes counterpoint” with itself, because 
the tenor and the part written above it are in the same hexachord. He then considers the next 
highest written part, whose starting note lies a fifth from the first note of the hexachord of the 
tenor line. In other words, it is in the grado of the fifth. After this, he compares the highest 
written part with the tenor, which is in the grado of the octave. He never compares all the parts 
together, nor does he state that all the parts make counterpoint together. Instead, he looks at them 
 
318 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:22-23. 
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from their relationship with the tenor. He refers to each line as a “ratio contrapuncti,” that is, as 
an order or method of counterpoint in itself. Therefore, Ugolino is certainly showing hexachordal 
combinations, but he is not describing four-part counterpoint. Indeed, every chapter, both before 
and after this one, deals only with two-voiced counterpoint. It would make no sense to suddenly 
talk about four-voiced counterpoint here and then abandon the subject altogether. In addition, if 
he were writing an example of four-voice counterpoint, the voices should follow the rules he sets 
out for two-voiced counterpoint. But this is not the case. For example, between the first and third 
added parts, parallel octaves abound. And between the middle two parts in the fifth “measure,” 
there are parallel fifths (see Example 3.4). Thus, in this chapter, Ugolino is offering a summary 
of the two-interval progressions he has presented in the preceding chapters. He does so by 
notating them in a single example, so that his readers could have a handy compendium, a quick 
reference. This interpretation agrees with the immediate context as well as his general aim. 
For chapters 1-15, the overall presentation of topics proceeds in a logical and pedagogical 
manner. Ugolino’s readers, by the time they reach chapter 15, would already have learned the 
purpose and definition of counterpoint in chapters 1-2, the classification and types of intervals in 
chapters 3-5, the perfections in chapter 6, and the hexachordal relationships and consonance 
tables of the regola del grado in chapters 7-10. Although they would have this knowledge, they 
would not know how to properly form counterpoint, except for the perfections. Ugolino, 
therefore, directs their attention first to a tenor line. If they wanted to create counterpoint above 
or below some other chant melody, they would need to know the intervals and the hexachord(s) 
that melody uses—a topic treated at length in book 1. Once they knew the motion of the tenor 
line, they could apply the typical contrapuntal progressions that Ugolino gives in chapters 11-14 
and which he summarizes in chapter 15. This means that Ugolino’s text walks readers through 
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the steps from knowing consonances to putting them in a logical and stylistically acceptable 
presentation. Ugolino achieves greater clarity by offering a multiplicity of musical examples. 
The musical examples serve a crucial role in Ugolino’s presentation.  
In chapters 11-15 alone, Ugolino writes 43 musical examples demonstrating typical two-
interval progressions. But for the whole of book 2, he gives a total of 129 musical examples. By 
comparison, F1 has 12, F2 has none, W has 31, and M has 9. Even these manuscripts, aside from 
F2, have more examples than Prosdocimo’s book on counterpoint.319 A contemporary of 
Ugolino, Prsodocimo wrote a short treatise on counterpoint in 1412, which he revised between 
1425-1428.320 It has only one musical example demonstrating musica ficta. Just as Prosdocimo 
wrote few examples, so also he prefers short, memorable rules.321 At least one reason for these 
differences originates in the audiences they were writing for. Prosdocimo worked at the 
university of Padua teaching astronomy and mathematics.322 His readers would need to know 
rules which they could quickly memorize, but they may not have had a need to put those rules to 
 
319 Jan Herlinger claims that Prosdocimo’s work influenced Ugolino, and that “its influence…was extensive and, to 
judge from the similarity in wording, direct.” Herlinger supports this claim by adding an appendix to his translation 
of Prosdocimo which lists the similarities between the two authors. For example, he notes that they both consider 
counterpoint in a wide and narrow sense; that counterpoint presupposes plainchant; that both theorists use the six 
syllables; that consonances are perfect and imperfect; that discords are not used in counterpoint, as well as several 
other points of contact. Prosdocimo, Contrapunctus, 5. The language between the two is indeed similar in the 
definition of counterpoint and their use of counterpoint in both a wide and narrow sense. Yet most of the other 
similarities may more likely result from a shared culture and education. For instance, Herlinger cites their use of the 
six solfege syllables as evidence of direct influence. The six syllables were in use long before Prosdocimo, and they 
were commonly taught to anyone learning music. Besides, Ugolino was clearly a well-educated man, directly citing 
Aristotle, Boethius, and others.  In fact, Lewis Lockwood notes that Ugolino penned a substantial treatise on 
physics. Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara, 79. He would not need to appeal to Prosdocimo for a reference 
to solfege or similar topics that he would have learned in the course of his musical education. Therefore, citing the 
use of the six syllables as an influence from Prosdocimo is not convincing. A similar argument could be used for 
many, but not all, of the other similarities Herlinger points out. Nor does Herlinger address the subjects that Ugolino 
treats that Prosdocimo makes no mention of, such as the regola del grado. It seems likely that Ugolino knew 
Prosdocimo’s work (the definition of counterpoint is the best evidence for that), but the influence may not be as 
direct or extend as far as suggested. 
320 Prosdocimo, Contrapunctus, 8. 
321 Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 146; Prosdocimo, Contrapunctus, 7-8. 
322 Prosdocimo, Contrapunctus, 1. 
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practice.323 Ugolino, however, was writing within the context of the cathedral school in Ferrara. 
His readers would likely have practiced music regularly within the liturgical life of the cathedral. 
They would benefit from the copious musical examples and the frequent lists of consonances.324 
Whatever else they may show, Ugolino’s examples reveal his goal to teach the regola del grado 
clearly and fully. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Ugolino presents the fullest account of the regola del grado. His presentation of it in 
chapters 3-15 forms the foundation for the study and practice of counterpoint presented later in 
the book. He devotes more space to the grado and to its expansions than to the more common 
interval succession theory or to the general rules of counterpoint, each of which receive only one 
chapter. Although it was not the purpose of this chapter to highlight his expansions, chapters 16-
24 as well as 28-33 only make sense after knowing what the grado theory teaches. In the former 
set of chapters, he shows how an upper voice, using only the notes of a single hexachord, can 
harmonize a tenor line that moves across several hexachords. It is like applying the rules of the 
grado in a new context. In the grado theory, students learn what all the consonances are when the 
tenor and the added voice are in one of the various degrees or steps (unison, fourth, fifth, and 
octave). Students must therefore know what hexachord the tenor is in, so that they can harmonize 
without using discords. If students were familiar with the grado theory, then the applications 
Ugolino makes in chapters 16-24 and the catalogs of consonances in chapters 28-33 are fairly 
straightforward. The grado practice gives new meaning to the idea that plainchant presupposes 
 
323 Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 146-50; Prosdocimo, Contrapunctus, 5. 
324 Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 131-46. 
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counterpoint.325 Students would need to know not only what the notes and melodic intervals of 
the chant were but also what hexachord they were in. Equipped with this knowledge, they could 
remember in which degree they could make the most consonances with the tenor and sing or 
write accordingly. The grado theory forms a natural connection to consonance tables. Ugolino 
takes advantage of this opportunity to write out consonance tables in chapters 3-15 but especially 
in chapters 28-33. Consonance tables were common in counterpoint treatises both before and 
after Ugolino.326 The regola del grado forms the practical link to consonances tables and, at least 
in Ugolino’s conception, the foundation of the practice of counterpoint. 
Ugolino actively engages in the grado tradition. This is most evident in how he adapts the 
language and use of the tradition to bring it more in line with contemporary usage. Where the 
grado treatises in general forbid using minor sixths, Ugolino makes no such prohibition. Where 
the grado treatises variously refer to thirds (and sixths) as either major/perfect or 
minor/imperfect, Ugolino calls them only major or minor. Ugolino also updates the language on 
interval classifications while presenting and retaining the older classification. In the old 
terminology, consonances refer only to fifths and octaves, dissonances include thirds and sixths, 
and discords are seconds, sevenths, tritones, and similar intervals. In the newer terminology, 
perfect consonances are fifths and octaves, imperfect consonances are thirds and sixths (which 
can, in addition, be either major or minor), and dissonances are seconds, sevenths, and so on. He 
sets both systems side by side, since he sees them as essentially equivalent. Allowing his readers 
to know both systems equips them to deal with older manuscripts and practices as well as newer 
ones. In Ugolino’s presentation of the grado tradition, we do not see a radical reformer but a 
 
325 See, for example, Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:8; Prosdocimo, Contrapunctus, 32. 
326 Busse Berger, Medieval Music, 133. 
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modernizing conservative. His modernizing, however, is not without consequences. 
In the book on counterpoint, we see Ugolino explaining and building his conception of 
music as a subject within natural philosophy through a close examination of a musical practice. 
To some extent, we observed this in the subtle shift of language. Where the grado manuscripts 
said that one note “proceeds” (procede) from another, Ugolino uses “derives” (derivantur) and 
“springs naturally” (natae). His word choices suggest a connection to logic and especially to 
nature. But we saw the connection to music as a natural philosophy most clearly displayed in his 
categorization of some intervals as perfect or imperfect. Imperfect intervals must move to perfect 
ones in what David Cohen calls directed motion. Directed motion involves five conditions, all of 
which are based in Aristotelian natural philosophy. We saw that Ugolino fulfills all five 
conditions, and, in some sense, goes even further. Ugolino sees the octave as the mother or 
source of all the other intervals: they are related to it as causes that are proximate, remote, or 
most remote. The very structure of intervals as parts of a whole explains why some are perfect 
and others imperfect. The proximate causes correspond to perfect intervals, remote to imperfect, 
and most remote to dissonant intervals. The differences between perfect, imperfect, and 
dissonance lies in the nature of the objects themselves and their structure. In other words, 
Ugolino understands musical objects, in this case intervals, as objects of nature. This reinforces 
Cohen’s fourth condition and ties into Aristotle’s principle that natural objects have a source of 
motion within themselves.327  
Ugolino cannot conceive of music without motion, and motion, in this context, can be 
considered in at least two senses: of the motion needed to produce sound and of the motion 
required inherently by imperfect intervals and expressed through the harmonic progression of an 
 
327 Cohen, “The Imperfect Seeks Its Perfection,” 146; Aristotle, Physics 2.1.192b23-4. 
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imperfect interval to a specific perfect interval, which Ugolino calls a perfection. Both kinds of 
motion fall under consonance, and consonance is what the study of music is about. Ugolino 
argues: 
Music cannot be made apart from sound, 
nor is sound caused apart from a certain 
striking and percussion, nor does 
percussion and striking come to be without 
a preceding motion. Therefore, we doubt 
least of all that motion must be included in 
music, since if everything stood still and 
lacked motion…consonance could not be 
found in it.328 
Quae consonantia cum praeter sonum 
fieri non possit, nex praeter pulsum ac 
percussionem quandam sonus reddatur, 
nec percussio atque pulsus abque 
praecedente motu esse contingat. Ideo 
motum in musica supponendum minime 
dubitamus, quoniam si cuncta starent 
motuque carerent…neque consonantia in 
ea posset reperiri. 
 
His logic is clear: without motion, there could be no sound, and without sound, there could be no 
consonance. Music entails motion, and therefore music is a part of natural philosophy. 
Counterpoint teaches one aspect of that motion—the progression of one interval to another—and 
he considers the intervals themselves as natural objects. He shapes his book on counterpoint to 
conform with this general philosophical principle. The book on counterpoint is a working out of 
the ideas I outlined in chapter 2 that musical practice and musical theory are not in tension with 
one another. Rather, the former leads to the latter. For Ugolino, practice is necessary for anyone 
who wants to come to a knowledge of theory. 
Throughout his book on counterpoint, we see how practical Ugolino is. He offers not 
only many consonance tables, guidelines on hexachordal relationships and the consonances they 
entail, and general rules for proper counterpoint but also 129 musical examples. These are the 
number of examples only in book 2. He also adds musical examples in all of the other books as 
well. The preponderance of musical examples has led some scholars to conclude that Ugolino’s 
 
328 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:22. Ugolino makes a similar argument again in the 13th chapter of book 1, where he even 
quotes Aristotle’s definition of motion, Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:34-5. But he treats this topic most fully in book 5: 
Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:102-3, 108-12. 
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treatise is truly and mainly a practical one, even though it also contains some speculative 
material.329 Albert Seay tried to rectify this assessment by investigating the treatise more closely. 
Seay correctly notes Ugolino’s movement from the practical to the theoretical and the 
Aristotelian path there, even though he ultimately categorizes the Declaratio as more of a 
theoretical work along the lines of Boethius.330 If there were any debate about whether Ugolino’s 
treatise was practical, his book on counterpoint in general and his teaching of grado theory in 
particular should answer that doubt. Yet, as I argued in chapter 2 and as the analysis of the way 
he constructs, or rather reconstructs, the grado theory reveals, this does not mean that the 
practical somehow negates the theoretical nor the theoretical the practical. Instead, the practical 
is a necessary step along a path toward the theoretical. He does view them as hierarchical, but 
not as separable. This conception of theory and practice led Ugolino to produce a full account of 
counterpoint and especially of the regola del grado. It also informs his approach to musica ficta, 
to which I now turn. 
  
 
329 Albert Seay notes that Gerhard Pietzsch ascribed a primarily practical value to Ugolino’s work while placing it in 
the speculum tradition, even though viewing the work as mainly practical seems at odds with the structure of the 
treatise and the value Ugolino places on theory. Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 145, 151; Gerhard Pietzsch, Die 
Klassifikation Der Musik Von Boethius Bis Ugolino Von Orvieto (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1929), 119. In addition, 
Seay shows that the bias of the practical musician Adrien de la Fage led the latter to dismiss Ugolino’s work as 
boring and to describe his ordering as illogical and his Latin as poor. This seems to point to the work as one of 
mainly speculation with little value to practice. Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 113; Adrien de la Fage, Essais De 
Diphthérographie Musicale (Paris: Au Magasin de Musique du Bazar de l’Industrie, 1864), 165. Neither position is 
correct, as I argue in chapter 2, and which is one of the main themes of my dissertation. 
330 Seay, “Ugolino of Orvieto,” 145-52. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MUSICA FICTA 
4.1 Introduction 
Ugolino’s chapter on musica ficta has attracted the greatest attention from modern 
scholars, because he creates a “double hand” (duplex manus).331 The double hand contains not 
only the usual set of seven hexachords beginning on C, F, and G but also another set of seven 
ficta hexachords beginning on different notes. It has been cited by both Margaret Bent and Karol 
Berger as evidence for the role the hexachord plays in the structure of diatonic space.332 
According to Stefano Mengozzi, two opposing roles for the hexachord emerge in the history of 
music theory. In both views, which he calls “foundational” and “soft,” the hexachord competes 
for priority with the seven-note, octave-equivalent scale or gamut. In the foundational view, the 
hexachord shapes diatonic space instead of the seven-note scale. In the soft view, the hexachord 
merely sits on top of the scale, but the scale has priority over the hexachord.333 If Mengozzi’s 
categories form two poles with a spectrum of positions lying between them, I can place Bent’s 
and Berger’s views on that spectrum to see how close they lie to Ugolino’s. Although Ugolino’s 
double hand has received much scholarly scrutiny, it is only one facet of his chapter on musica 
ficta. Therefore, I examine his entire chapter on musica ficta as well as his comments on musica 
ficta in the Tractatus monochordi appended to the Declaratio. This examination reveals not only 
his conception of musica ficta and the role of the hexachord in the structure of diatonic space but 
also, more broadly, the relationship between practice and theory. 
 
331 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:48-50. I refer to the “Guidonian” hand as simply “hand” or “musical hand,” since it was 
not invented by Guido. 
332 Bent, Counterpoint, Composition, and Musica Ficta, 7-8, 88; Berger, Musica Ficta, 64. 
333 Mengozzi, The Renaissance Reform, 8-11, 104-09. 
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4.2 Musica Ficta: The Basics 
Ugolino begins the chapter on musica ficta by using a practical example to describe the 
conditions that led to its invention or discovery. He then tells how he derives ficta hexachords 
and offers a succinct definition of musica ficta. Sometimes, even when all the intervals are 
correctly performed, imperfect consonances arise. To correct these false relations, “a certain 
music was invented by musical philosophers which is named ficta” (inventa est a philosophis 
musicis musica quaedam, quae ficta vocabulo nuncupatur).334 It is called “ficta” because “such 
music is put in a place where it does not exist by itself” (talis musica in eo loco ponitur ubi per se 
non est).335 He supports this idea with an example. Suppose a tenor ascends a tone from A-B (re-
mi), and an upper voice descends from A-F (la-fa). The result is an imperfect fifth, and it can be 
corrected by making a mi where there was no mi before, namely, instead of singing F-fa, the 
upper voice sounds an F-mi, resulting in what we would call an F-sharp. Since the syllables must 
come from some hexachord, the mi on F comes from a hexachord that begins on D.336 With 
these practical illustrations in hand, Ugolino sums them up in a tightly worded definition:  
Musica ficta is the necessary placement of 
some syllable in a place where it does not 
exist by itself for the purpose of perfecting 
a consonance.337 
Musica ficta est alicuius vocis in loco ubi 
per se non est ad consonantiae 
perfectionum necessaria positio 
 
From this definition, he draws three conclusions that form the basis of the following discussion: 
(1) musica ficta “is placed where it is not found at all by itself” (ubi ponitur, ibi per se penitus 
non invenitur); (2) musica ficta “is admitted in order to perfect an imperfect consonance” 
 
334 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:44. 
335 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:44. What this means more specifically is discussed below. 
336 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:45. 
337 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:45. I am reading perfectionem in place of perfectionum. 
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(permittitur ut imperfectae consonantiae perficiantur); (3) musica ficta is not used at all “unless 
as a compelling necessity” (nisi necessitate cogente).338 
Ugolino cites perfection as the reason for using musica ficta, and he uses this term in a 
broad sense. Most authors who write about ficta appeal to two distinct reasons to use it: for the 
sake of necessity (causa necessitatis) and for the sake of beauty (causa pulchritudinis). These 
concepts, interpreted variously by different scholars, could refer either to harmonic or melodic 
concerns or to both.339 In fact, in the Tractatus monochordi, Ugolino himself cites two reasons 
for using musica ficta: for “perfecting imperfect consonances and dissonances” (imperfectarum 
consonantiarum et dissonantiarum perfectio) and for “a sweeter sounding harmony” (dulcioris 
resonantia harmoniae).340 Yet, as we saw in chapter 3, perfection can mean either correcting 
fifths and octaves (or their compounds) so that they form perfect consonances or moving an 
imperfect consonance to its closest perfect consonance. Ugolino uses it in both senses, but he 
begins with the first. Anytime two singers would sing B and F together, no matter what octave, 
some correction is necessary.341 Likewise, he notes that if the upper voice is singing in the soft 
hexachord and produces a B-flat (fa) against an E (mi) in the lower voice, the lower voice must 
correct the imperfection and sing a fa, creating what we would call an E-flat and which syllable 
 
338 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:45. 
339 Margaret Bent, “Musica Recta and Musica Ficta,” Musica Disciplina 26 (1972), 78-79; Counterpoint, 
Composition, and Musica Ficta, 66-67, 79-81; Berger, Musica Ficta, 94, 116, 122-123. The fact that a melody 
moves by a smaller step to the next note is a byproduct of correcting a fifth or octave or altering an imperfect 
consonance so that it moves more smoothly to its nearest perfect consonance. 
340 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:238.  
341 It is curious that he never mentions simply using B-flat, which would be musica recta. He never explains why this 
is so, but I would venture to guess a few reasons: first, it may be that he considers the tenor line fixed and therefore 
unalterable. This may be unlikely since he includes an example where the lower part alters an E so that it no longer 
forms a dissonance with B-flat, but he may have considered the upper part a fixed or unalterable part in that case. 
Second, he does base his system on the Greater Perfect System, which does not contain B-flat; thus, B-flat and any 
other altered note share the same status, and he could have chosen either. Or third, he merely wanted to use an 
altered F for the purpose of demonstration, to show that musica ficta requires hexachords on each D. 
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would come from a hexachord starting on B-flat.342 For the same reasons any fifth or octave that 
would be imperfect must be so corrected using musica ficta. This corresponds to the use of 
musica ficta for the sake of necessity (causa necessitatis), even though Ugolino does not use this 
term. He offers several examples where this would occur in the gamut.  
According to Ugolino, musica ficta can also be applied to imperfect consonances, such as 
sixths or thirds. He also calls this perfection, although he distinguishes between lowering and 
raising notes. But before he gets there, he discusses the use of the signs. Ugolino recognizes two 
signs for musica ficta (hard and soft or round b, corresponding to our sharp/natural and flat 
respectively) and what they mean. He equates each sign with a solfege syllable. Whenever one 
sees a hard b, one should sing mi; whenever one sees a soft b, one should sing fa.343 This 
observation leads him to articulate the mi contra fa rule, which he demonstrated clearly in the 
previous section, when he discussed perfecting fifths and octaves. His comments on signs and 
the mi contra fa rule serve as an interlude before he addresses the second use of musica ficta. 
Musica ficta can also be applied for perfection in a second sense—that is, for making 
sixths closer to octaves and thirds closer to fifths or unisons, or, as Ugolino says, for “coloring 
imperfect consonances or dissonances” (in consonantiis imperfectis sive dissonantiis 
colorandis).344 Coloration usually referred to the application of musica ficta to imperfect 
consonances, and this use is considered to fall under the heading of causa pulchritudinis as 
opposed to causa necessitatis.345 Indeed, Bent speaks about this use of ficta as ornamental and 
 
342 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:45. 
343 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:46. 
344 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:47.  
345 Berger, Musica Ficta, 122-54. 
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therefore not necessary.346 Ugolino finds two reasons for using ficta in this way: “for the sake of 
having a sweeter harmony and for the sake of a closer approach to a perfection” (causa 
harmoniae dulcioris habendae, et causa propinquioris perfectionis acquirendae).347 He is equally 
concerned with harmony as he is with melody. The sweeter harmony describes the vertical 
intervals, and the closer approach describes the movement of a single voice from one note to the 
next. This, in turn, may be done in one of two ways: by altering an interval either to make it 
major or to make it minor. If a sixth progresses to an octave or a third to a fifth, one could alter 
them to make them major. Or, if a third moves to a unison, one could make it minor to sweeten 
the progression. Berger calls the former the strict version of the rule and the latter the relaxed 
version.348  
To understand Ugolino’s application of musica ficta, I review his commentary on two 
representative examples (Example 4.1).349  
Example 4.1: Two Representative Examples of Musica Ficta.350 
 
 
Ugolino says that the first square b (at the end of II-128) means that F is sung as mi, making the 
progression a major sixth to an octave. The major sixth moves more directly to its perfection (the 
octave) and helps clarify its closing or cadential nature. He observes that the first soft b (in II-
 
346 Bent, “Musica Recta and Musica Ficta,” 96; Bent, Counterpoint, Composition, and Musica Ficta, 85. 
347 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:47. 
348 Berger, Musica Ficta, 122-25. 
349 This paragraph summarizes Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:47-48. 
350 Examples II-128 and II-129 in Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:supplement. 
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128) is placed not to perfect an imperfect consonance but to color it. Still, the now minor sixth 
will, in fact, move to its perfection more closely, thus adhering to Ugolino’s second reason.351 
He cites a similar reason for using an E-flat in the second example (II-129). By doing so, he 
distinguishes between perfecting and coloring. In this case, he uses the term color to refer to 
lowering notes to make them minor and perfection to make them major. He uses perfection and 
coloration as two different actions, even though in other places he employs the terms 
interchangeably. I examine this problem more closely later. What his commentary shows is that 
the alterations occur on imperfect intervals that subsequently move to perfect ones. Musica ficta 
is applied in order to make the cadential progression sweeter: the harmonies are closer to their 
intended goal, and as a result, the melodies move by smaller intervals. 
4.3 The Duplex Manus 
After Ugolino offers the definition of ficta, lays down several reasons for its use, and 
includes some musical examples with commentary, he adds two musical hand diagrams, that is, 
diagrams that contain a list of letters as well as the hexachords that stretch across those letters in 
the form of syllables. In fact, each diagram includes a double musical hand (duplex manus): each 
diagram contains the seven hexachords in the traditional hand—the notes of musica recta—but 
also seven ficta hexachords. He does not separate the recta hexachords from the ficta hexachords. 
Instead, he mixes them together in a single list. He introduces the first diagram (Figure 4.1) thus: 
Therefore, we have learned from the 
preceding [discussion] of musica ficta the 
necessary perfection of consonances and 
the coloration of dissonances, which 
produce beautiful harmonies. And because 
this music is called ficta, since it is placed 
or formed in a place where it does not exist 
Cognovimus ergo ex praemissis musicae 
fictae necessitatem consonantiarum 
perfectionem ac dissonantiarum 
colorationem, harmoniarum amoenitatem 
producentem, et quia haec musica ex eo 
dicitur ficta, quia ibi ponitur seu fingitur 
ubi per se non est, ideo duplicem manum 
 
351 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:47-8. 
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by itself, so we invent a double hand where 
all the syllables of musica ficta are placed 
in order. For the first hand has its 
beginning on F directly under gamma…352 
invenimus, ubi omnes rectae musicae 
atque fictae voces ordinatae ponuntur, 
prima namque manus sub [Gamma] 
immediate initium habet in F… 
 
Figure 4.1: Ugolino's First Duplex Manus Diagram.353 
 
 
And he introduces the second diagram (Figure 4.2) thus:  
We invent another hand of musica ficta and 
recta lying a fifth lower than gamma and 
beginning on C, lying a little lower than the 
first [hand]…354 
Aliam fictae musicae manum atque rectae 
invenimus a [Gamma] inferius per 
diapente distantem, et in C incipientem a 




352 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:48. 
353 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:49. 
354 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:50.  
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Figure 4.2: Ugolino's Second Duplex Manus Diagram.355 
 
 
In the first diagram (Figure 4.1) the ficta hexachords begin on F below Gamma (which 
provides a low B-flat), as well as on B, D, E, and their octaves. It contains the seven recta 
hexachords and seven ficta hexachords. In the second diagram (Figure 4.2), ficta hexachords 
begin on C, D, and F below Gamma, plus all the Bs and Ds above Gamma. Altogether, the 
second example includes the seven recta hexachords plus another seven ficta hexachords. He 
describes the second example as lying a fifth below the first, counting it from the Gamma down 
 
355 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:50. 
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to the low C. The second example does not contain the ficta hexachords on E that are found in 
the first. In addition, neither include hexachords starting on A. Indeed, Ugolino himself notes 
that ut can occur on every letter except E and A, even though his first hand shows an ut on E, but 
his second hand does not.356  
Why did Ugolino add the ficta hexachords that he did? With seven recta hexachords and 
seven ficta hexachords in each diagram, he creates a balance between recta and ficta. This 
symmetry, however, comes at the expense of consistency. Because of the lower range in Figure 
4.2, he has to omit the hexachords on E so that it still has only seven ficta hexachords. In 
addition, he seems to have added the specific ficta hexachords he did by observing which 
intervals require alternation. In other words, he derives his hexachords from practical 
considerations. Since an altered note means changing a syllable, the new syllable implies a 
hexachord beginning on a different pitch. For example, B-flat requires a lower E-flat for a 
perfect fifth, which means a singer would sing fa on E instead of mi, and thus the new fa implies 
an ut on B-flat. In addition to correcting diminished fifths and octaves, cadential progressions 
also require alteration. If two parts proceed from A/f to G/g, the f would be altered from fa to mi, 
so that the progression moves from a major sixth to an octave. If the f is now solmized as mi, ut 
would be located on D. He follows the same procedure to find the other altered notes and their 
respective hexachords. One curious omission is one that Ugolino himself notes—the ut on A 
which would include a C-sharp and would be used for cadential progressions to D. What does 
Ugolino have to say about that? He does not deny that there can be a ficta hexachord that begins 
on A. In fact, in the discussion following the diagrams, he uses a model progression from E/c to 
D/d to show how the c should be altered. This discussion reveals some of the underlying 
 
356 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:50. 
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assumptions built into his diagrams.  
Ugolino begins by appealing to the invention by the ancients of the two signs, round b 
and square b.357 He reminds his readers of the meaning of the signs: the round b “signified the 
syllable fa” (fa vocem significabat) and the square b “announced the syllable mi” (mi vocem 
annuntiabat).358 Indeed, he seems to correlate, even stronger than earlier, coloration with making 
intervals minor and perfection with making them major. Consequently, he gives an example of 
each. One point common to both examples is the fact that ficta means adding a major semitone.  
Therefore, the two aforementioned signs 
[round b and square b] were invented first 
for coloring consonances, so that from 
these colored consonances a sweeter 
harmony may be produced, which happens 
when a major consonance is reduced to a 
minor [one]. Second, these signs were 
invented so that imperfect consonances 
may be led to their perfection and major 
[ones] by means of signs of this kind.359 
Inventa sunt ergo praedicta signa primo 
pro consonatiis colorandis, ut ex ipsa 
consonantia colorata dulcior proveniat 
harmonia, quod fit quando maior 
consonantia ad minoritatem reducitur. 
Secundo ipsa signa sunt inventa uta 
consonantiae imperfectae huiusmodi 
mediantibus signis ad earum perfectionem 
maioritatemque ducantur. 
 
He offers an example of coloration: if two parts progress from G/b to A/a, then the b, which is a 
ditone or major third, ought to be a semiditone or minor third. The alteration occurs by adding 
the round b (or flat) sign. The b, which would have been solmized as mi, is now solmized as fa, 
since the sign indicates fa. Fa would then descend to mi, and every fa to mi signifies a minor 
semitone.360 The upper voice’s progression was altered from a tone (b-a) to a minor semitone (b-
 
357  Ugolino seems to have a high opinion of the ancients in regard to musica ficta. He states, “The ancients, who had 
a true knowledge of this musica ficta—the truth of which remains wholly unknown to modern singers—invented 
two signs in the truth or fiction of this kind of music, either for coloring consonances or for leading them to a major 
or a minor [interval]…” (Antiqui autem huius fictae musicae veram cognitionem habentes quorum veritas modernis 
cantoribus penitus ignota manet in suae musicae veritate seu fictione, sive pro colorandis consonatiis sive pro eis ad 
maioritatem vel minoritatem reducendis duo signa…invenerunt…). Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:50-1. 
358 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:51. He had already introduced the signs a few pages earlier.  
359 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:51. 
360 Ugolino states this rule himself, “from mi to fa is always a minor semitone” (a mi ad fa semper sit semitonium 
minus). Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:52. 
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flat to a). In terms of the harmony, a ditone was made into a semiditone, and the former exceeds 
the latter by a major semitone. Likewise, melodically, the tone exceeds the minor semitone by 
the distance of a major semitone.361  
Ugolino also offers an example of perfection by using the progression E/c to D/d. Since 
this forms a cadential progression or perfection, the sixth must be major. How does this 
happen?362 He contrasts how the ancients would have done it with how the moderns do it. The 
ancients would have added the square b sign to the c. This would make what was fa sol (c-d) mi-
fa (c-sharp-d). He notes that both the mi and the fa are ficta notes, even though the d-fa sounds 
the same as its recta counterpart d-sol. However, the distance from the recta fa (c) and the ficta 
mi (c-sharp) is a major semitone. So, by adding a major semitone, what was a minor sixth (three 
tones and two minor semitones) is now a proper major sixth (four tones and one minor 
semitone).363 The ancients reason either from the melodic progression (what was a tone becomes 
a minor semitone, and the tone exceeds the minor semitone by a major semitone) or from the 
harmonic progression (a minor sixth is altered to a major sixth, and the major sixth exceeds the 
minor by a major semitone). They focus on the difference, in this case, between c and c-sharp, 
but they do not fit this within a larger picture.   
In contrast to the ancient’s way of talking about the matter, Ugolino offers an alternative 
proof to show that the square b sign makes the interval a major sixth. Ugolino’s method relies on 
 
361 Ugolino states, “the tone exceeds the minor semitone by a major semitone (tonus autem excedit semitonium 
minus per semitonium maius). Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:51. 
362 Of course, it is possible to alter the E and so make the sixth major without the addition of any new hexachord or 
note that is not already found in his duplex manus. But Ugolino does not do this. Instead, he advocates altering the c, 
which means there would be a hexachord on A. If he allows for a hexachord on A even though he does not add one 
to his duplex manus diagram, then his diagrams are not exhaustive. 
363 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:52. 
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the knowledge of solfege syllables and hexachords.364  
That sixth is said to be major which is said 
to be composed of four tones and one 
minor semitone, but the sixth that is 
minor—namely from low mi to high fa— 
is composed of four tones and one minor 
semitone through the application of a ficta 
syllable, therefore it is major. The major 
[premise] is self-evident and the minor 
[premise] is proved. For mi, which is 
placed on C through ficta, and fa which is 
placed through ficta on D have their own 
beginning and foundation, that is ut, on the 
second A. Hence, through musica ficta we 
sing on A ut, on B re, on C mi, and so on. 
Therefore, from the first E to the second C 
is, through musica ficta, a major sixth and 
perfect since it has four tones and only one 
minor semitone, as is evident to those who 
know.365 
Illa sexta dicitur esse maior, quae ex 
quatuor tonis et uno semitonio minore 
dicitur esse composita, sed illa sexta quae 
est minor, scilicet, a mi gravi ad fa acutum 
per appositionem fictae vocis mi est 
composita ex quatuor tonis et uno minore 
semitonio, igitur est maior. Maior est per 
se nota et minor probatur, nam mi quod 
ficte ponitur in C et fa quod ficte ponitur 
in D suum initium et fundamentum, 
scilicet, ut, habent in A secundo. Unde per 
hanc fictam musicam in A dicimus ut, in 
B[sqb] re, in C mi, et cetera. Igitur ab E 
primo ad C secundum per hanc fictam 
musicam est sexta maior et perfecta 
habens quatuor tonos et unum tantum 
semitonium minus, ut patet intelligenti. 
 
This explanation relies on several assumptions, some of which are explored more fully below. 
First, there is a background scale or gamut represented by letters. The letters generally 
correspond to a specific intervallic distance but not perfectly so. For example, B-C could be a 
tone or a semitone, depending on whether it is a hard or soft B. Second, solfege syllables are 
placed on the letters and directly correspond to intervallic distances. So, for instance, mi-fa is 
always a minor semitone, and all the other adjacent syllables represent tones. The typical 
combinations of letter and syllable form musica recta, the starting point from which to determine 
any alteration. Third, musica ficta breaks this pattern of letter and syllable slightly because it 
places a syllable where there was none. It puts a fa or mi on a letter where it was not found in 
musica recta. It reveals that the letters are, at first glance, slightly more ambiguous than first 
 
364 Thus, Ugolino does not come to a different conclusion than the ancients. Rather, he suggests a different way of 
getting there. 
365 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:52.  
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imagined, since, for example, E could be fa instead of mi (or la). Yet, the syllables help 
understand the exact intervallic composition, since they indicate tones and semitones. Fourth, 
large intervals are composites of smaller intervals. Ugolino describes the major sixth as 
composed of four tones and one minor semitone, and the other intervals can be calculated in a 
similar manner.  
Knowing these assumptions helps understand Ugolino’s point that singers can use the 
syllables, even ones from ficta hexachords, to calculate composite intervals. In so doing, he also 
shows that even though he does not include a ficta hexachord on A, one is clearly needed for a 
cadential progression on D. E-C is composed of two minor semitones and three tones. If every 
step in the gamut is composed either of a tone or a minor semitone (as they are in musica recta, 
the foundation from which to reckon alterations), E-F and B-C are two minor semitones, F-G is a 
tone, G-A a second tone, and A-B is a third. But since the progression from E/c to D/d requires a 
major sixth, a change is necessary. How exactly does a ficta hexachord on A prove that E-C-
sharp—using a ficta mi on C—is composed of the proper intervals that make a major sixth? 
Ugolino appeals to the hexachord and its place in the scale to make the calculation a bit easier. In 
any hexachord, re to mi is a tone, and he has already stated that the ficta d-fa sounds the same as 
the recta d-sol. This leaves us with E-F as one minor semitone, F-G is a tone, G-A another tone 
(all these lie outside the ficta hexachord in question), ficta A-ut to B-re a third tone, and ficta B-
re to C-mi a fourth tone. Ugolino takes advantage of the broader scale and the whole ficta 
hexachord instead of just analyzing the specific harmony or melodic progression to understand 
the intervallic structure involved. Even though Ugolino’s diagrams do not include a ficta 
hexachord starting on A, he explicitly argues there is one, since it is needed for the progression 
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E/c to D/d.366 Because Ugolino explicitly allows a ficta hexachord on A, his double hand 
diagrams are not completely exhaustive.367 In addition, he places pedagogical value on the 
solfege syllables: they imply specific intervals (tones and semitones), and singers can use them 
to calculate intervals and even add syllables where there were none before in order to create the 
correct major sixth (or other interval).  
Ugolino’s analysis reveals some advantages of using ficta hexachords: they help 
musicians who are already intimately familiar with hexachords to sing the proper intervals. They 
are used for practical purposes. Since musica ficta is the addition of a new mi or fa, and since 
every syllable must come from some hexachord, the ficta hexachords are derived from usage. 
They result from the need for coloration and perfection. The double hand diagrams account for 
some of the most common ficta notes, such as F-sharp, G-sharp, E-flat, even though he leaves 
out a hexachord on A, which would account for C-sharp. Ugolino’s hand diagrams are 
distinctive, and they have been the subject of a debate between Margaret Bent and Karol Berger. 
4.4 The Scale, the Hexachord, and the Hand 
The debate over Ugolino’s hand diagrams comes in the middle of an argument about 
partial signatures, but to fully comprehend it, I begin by examining Bent’s position on the scale 
and the hexachord. She develops her position by comparing and contrasting letter names with 
hexachords. Letters started as names for line segments of different lengths plotted on a 
monochord and representing pitches or intervals in a scale. For example, in Boethius’s division 
of the monochord, the whole string is marked as the line segment AB, half of the string (which 
 
366 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:53. 
367 This despite the fact that Margaret Bent claims that they are exhaustive. Bent, “Musica Recta and Musica Ficta,” 
83. 
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would produce an octave) as AD, and so forth.368 In Boethius’s use, letters are not organized into 
steps (D is an octave above A instead of four steps above it), and they do not reflect octave 
equivalency. However, in the eleventh century, Pseudo-Odo and Guido arranged the letters in 
sequence, so that they would correspond with the steps of the diatonic scale and would also 
reflect octave equivalency.369 Even though after Guido consecutive letters were often used to 
designate consecutive pitches in the scale, Bent considers letter names to be too imprecise, too 
inconsistent with practice to provide a full understanding of the diatonic tone system. She 
acknowledges two different meanings for letter names: points on a monochord and “names for 
moveable steps within adjacent areas of the gamut.”370 Neither meaning provides enough 
information to define the tone system. As points on the monochord, the letters do represent 
distances derived by proportions, but they are arbitrarily assigned, could vary from author to 
author, and do not exactly correspond to what musicians were singing, as they do today.371 As 
names for moveable steps, the letters “stand for steps on a ladder (scala), notated as graphically 
equidistant lines and spaces on the staff, a visual model of the ladder.”372 There are at least two 
ways of moving from A to C, through either B-natural or B-flat. And although this letter notation 
often reflected practice, it is too easily misunderstood by modern performers.373 If letters cannot 
be used in this way, what then can performers rely on to discover the intervallic structure of the 
tone system? 
 
368  Boethius, The Fundamentals of Music, 128. 
369 For a review of Pseudo-Odo’s contribution in particular, see Charles M Atkinson, The Critical Nexus: Tone-
System, Mode, and Notation in Early Medieval Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 211-20. 
370 Margaret Bent, “Diatonic Ficta,” Early Music History 4 (1984), 3. 
371 Bent, “Diatonic Ficta,” 4-6. 
372 Bent, “Diatonic Ficta,” 7. 
373 Bent, “Diatonic Ficta,” 7. However, Stefano Mengozzi has clearly documented instances in which musicians did 
in fact use letters for singing. Mengozzi, The Renaissance Reform, 44-81. 
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Bent sees the hexachord as the central means by which to understand the intervallic 
content of the diatonic tone system and to define the unknown distances between the rungs of the 
ladder. She writes, “the interval relationships among the several rungs on the ladder were 
articulated only by superimposing on it a network of overlapping hexachords or hexachord 
segments.”374 She recognizes that the hexachords are indeed superimposed on something that 
already exists, but she claims that the hexachords articulate the interval relationships. They 
articulate it in the sense that they allow singers a vehicle for singing them. But she seems to 
mean more: that before the addition of the hexachords, the letters by themselves were not enough 
for understanding the intervallic distances between steps in the gamut. She even states that a step 
in the gamut is “a letter that awaits hexachordal definition.”375 The steps of the gamut are thus 
defined relatively. There was no absolute pitch that they were measured against. Their specific 
pitch depended on the length of the monochord string. Or, as Bent says, the points on the 
monochord only represent relationships.376 According to Bent, the tone system, as defined by 
letter names and monochord tuning, is a rather nebulous collection of steps which possess no 
definition. The hexachords provide only some clarity for musicians, but even they are relative 
according to Bent. She says the hexachords “provide a functional context for semitone 
locations…but they do not in themselves determine what the sounds will be.”377 Therefore, Bent 
argues that although hexachords help musicians understand the intervallic content of the tone 
system (in particular where the semitones occur), pitch is ultimately determined by context, since 
 
374 Bent, “Diatonic Ficta,” 8. 
375 Bent, Counterpoint, Composition, and Musica Ficta, 22. 
376 Bent, “Diatonic Ficta,” 4. 
377 Bent, “Diatonic Ficta,” 8. 
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both hexachords and letter names are understood relatively.378 This relativism informs her view 
of musica ficta, and it has provoked scholarly response. 
Karol Berger directly addresses Bent’s relativism in his own book on musica ficta. He 
states that Bent describes a situation in which pitch is “radically relative.”379 Her position 
compels him to posit a weak and a strong view of relative pitch. Bent’s is the strong one, and the 
weak one claims that “a system of steps used by musicians is independent of an absolute pitch-
standard, that is, that it is in no way affected by being tuned higher or lower in relation to such a 
standard.”380 To counter Bent’s claims, Berger uses the conjunction of letter and solmization. If 
musicians only solmized based on the immediate context, and if a piece ended on a G solmized 
as fa, musicians could indeed recognize that as different from a G at the beginning of a piece if it 
was solmized as G sol.381 Bent answers this argument by citing pieces without clefs, making 
letter notation an impossibility.382 Berger surveys a wide swath of treatises where theorists 
discuss tuning to see just how far musica ficta could go. With the limits of musica ficta as a 
premise, he concludes that if steps are so relative, how could theorists even talk about the limits 
of musica ficta?383 Although Bent does not directly address this point, she does get at the crux of 
the issue: Berger takes “the conventional view that there was then (as now) a fixed repertory of 
pitches from which deviations are measured,” and she does not.384 
How Bent understands and talks about musica ficta (and therefore Ugolino’s diagrams) 
 
378 For her emphasis on hexachords or solmization as a key to semitone placement, see Bent, Counterpoint, 
Composition, and Musica Ficta, 7. 
379 Berger, Musica Ficta, 44. 
380 Berger, Musica Ficta, 44. 
381 Berger, Musica Ficta, 45-46. 
382 Bent, Counterpoint, Composition, and Musica Ficta, 9, 22-23. 
383 Berger, Musica Ficta, 47-48. 
384 Bent, Counterpoint, Composition, and Musica Ficta, 21. 
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depends on her view of the relative nature of the letters and hexachords. She states that during 
the fourteenth century, as chromaticism was used more widely, practical musicians would need 
to make sense of the new pitches. She claims that they derived these pitches by transposing the 
usual hexachords to places where they were not found before, so that each chromatic pitch has a 
foundation in a transposed hexachord, termed coniuncta: “All chromatic notes so derived have 
their basis in ficta hexachords; the hexachord is created for the semitone step, mi-fa.”385 Bent 
cites a passage from the Berkeley manuscript as evidence. In this passage, the author instructs 
readers how to sing the proper solfege syllables and how to mutate from one hexachord to 
another, “unless by chance some unusual song should turn up, which some call—but wrongly—
musica falsa, others musica ficta; still others name it—and rightly—coniunctae.”386 The author 
continues by describing what coniunctae are. “It is like a connection by the aforesaid regular 
properties [natural, hard, and soft hexachords]. And so, these coniunctae were invented so that a 
song formerly called irregular could be brought into regularity by them in some manner. For a 
coniuncta is the attribute, realized in actual singing, of permitting one to make a semitone out of 
a tone and conversely. Or rather, a coniuncta is the mental transposition of any property or 
hexachord from its own location to another location above or below.”387 Bent implies the 
coniunctae were transposed to derive the new pitches, and she even calls Ugolino’s ficta 
diagrams transpositions.388 But the Berkeley author refers to transposition as a mental act, not so 
 
385 Bent, “Musica Recta and Musica Ficta,” 80. (italics original). The term coniuncta is related to the Greek 
synemmenon: the synemmenon or conjunct tetrachord could stand in the place of the diezeugmenon or disjunct one, 
thereby creating B-flat in the former but B-natural in the latter. See also Mengozzi, The Renaissance Reform of 
Medieval Music Theory, 96. 
386 The Berkeley Manuscript, trans. Oliver B. Ellsworth (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 50-51.  
387 The Berkeley Manuscript, 51-53. 
388 Bent, Counterpoint, Composition, and Musica Ficta, 8-9. I have already shown, however, that they are not 
derived from transposition, nor does Ugolino talk about or appeal to transposition in his discussion of them, except 
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much to derive the pitches as to sing them properly. The transposition occurs in the minds of the 
singers for a practical purpose: they simply move a hexachord to a place it does not regularly 
occur in order to perform the music with the proper tones and semitones. This does not 
necessarily mean that they are derived from transposition, and Ugolino does not derive them 
from transposition, even though his account of ficta hexachords sounds very similar to this 
anonymous author. The Berkeley author states that this transposition happens in the mind: the 
sounding pitches are not logically or mathematically derived from transposition.389 
Both Bent and Berger appeal to Ugolino over an argument about partial signatures. Bent 
argues that if a B-flat appears in the signature, this limits the singers to two recta hexachords, the 
ones on F and C. And if there are two flats in the signature, it further reduces them to one. She 
concludes that signatures “define the limits of musica recta.”390 Bent then carries this argument 
forward first by noting that the recta hexachords—the ones beginning on C, F, and G—express a 
“set of relationships.” She surmises that if signatures relate not to keys but to hexachords, then a 
flat in the signature shifts the set of relationships by a fifth (or fourth). If this is true, then a 
hexachord, in this case one starting on B-flat, which would have been a ficta hexachord without 
the signature, now becomes a recta hexachord with the signature. Bent’s thesis hinges on the idea 
of transposition. “Ficta involves the transposition of isolated hexachords for the purpose of 
creating chromatic notes, but transposition of recta implies that the whole structure is shifted, 
together with its built-in rules for applying accidentals.”391 In other words, under a signature with 
 
for the fact that the second diagram was lower than the first by a fifth. But even there, there are differences that 
prevent it from being an exact transposition. 
389 Stefano Mengozzi argues that musicians viewed the hexachord as a virtual segment, which means it does not 
derive anything. Instead, it is superimposed on a structure that already exists. Stefano Mengozzi, “Virtual Segments: 
The Hexachordal System in the Late Middle Ages,” The Journal of Musicology 23, no. 3 (2006), 426-67. 
390 Bent, “Musica Recta and Musica Ficta,” 98. 
391 Bent, “Musica Recta and Musica Ficta,” 98. 
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one flat, an E-flat would be considered a recta and not a ficta note. Bent adduces Ugolino’s 
double hand diagrams to support these claims about transposition.392 Although Karol Berger 
disagrees with Bent’s strong relative position, he also sees these diagrams as indicating 
transposition, even trying to show exactly how each one is consistently transposed or how the 
whole system is transposed.393  
In her careful definition of the hexachord in its relation to the scale, Bent sees the 
hexachord as playing a structural role, since it helps define the relatively unknown steps of a 
scale. She takes a middle position between what Stefano Mengozzi calls a “foundational” and a 
“soft” view of the hexachord. In the foundational view, the hexachord is the ultimate model for 
the tone system instead of the octave-equivalent, seven-note scale. The hexachord and not the 
diatonic scale defines musical space.394 In the soft view, the hexachord is merely laid on top of 
the tone system, but ultimately it is the seven-note pattern that structures diatonic musical space. 
In this view, musical material can still be “ordered” according to the hexachord, but the material 
itself is not hexachordal.395 Berger takes a view closer to the soft view. But where does Ugolino 
stand? 
Ugolino introduces the tone system in book 1. The order in which he presents the 
material indicates that he prioritizes the intervallic structure above the hexachordal arrangement. 
In other words, the hexachords reflect the intervals already established in the system. He 
compares and contrasts the Greek and the Latin “hands,” beginning with the Greek. Following 
Boethius closely, he begins with the four strings of the tetrachord, noting the tuning with terms 
 
392 Bent, “Musica Recta and Musica Ficta,” 99; Bent, Counterpoint, Composition, and Musica Ficta, 7-10, 88. 
393 Berger, Musica Ficta, 64-65. 
394 Mengozzi, The Renaissance Reform, 9. 
395 Mengozzi, The Renaissance Reform, 12. 
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like diapason, tone, and diatessaron: 
We read that in the beginning music was 
simple and consisted only of four strings. 
From the first to the fourth string sounded 
the consonance of a diapason.396 
Legimus in principio musicam simplicem 
fuisse et quatuor duntaxat cordis constare, 
cuius corda prima ad quartam diapason 
consonantiam resonabat. 
 
He, like Boethius, goes on to show how more strings were added, and he provides both the Greek 
names of the strings and the names for the intervals. After he has catalogued all of the strings, he 
describes the intervals they form, finally adding the following diagram.397  
Figure 4.3: Ugolino's Tone System.398 
 
 
396 Ugolino, “Declaratio,” 1:32; cf. Boethius, The Fundamentals of Music, 29-40. 
397 This diagram is the first in his treatise. It presents the Greek Greater Perfect System or systema teleion (see 
Atkinson, The Critical Nexus, 11 n. 27. ). In addition, it clearly derives from Boethius, The Fundamentals of Music, 
39. But to Boethius’s diagram Ugolino adds letter names, in stepwise order and repeating at the octave, as well as 
the intervallic distances, both each consecutive interval (such as tone and semitone) and larger intervals (such as 
diatessaron, diapente, and so forth). 
398 Example I-1 in Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:supplement. 
138 
Ugolino does not address the specific ratios of these intervals in book 1, because he 
intends his work to progress from what is more known to the readers (the practical) to what is 
less known (the theoretical). Indeed, Ugolino makes this practical and theoretical distinction 
himself in book 5. Concerning the octave he states:  
In practice, the diapason is composed of a 
diapente and a diatesseron, as was said in 
the first book. But in theory, it is composed 
of their proportions.399 
Componitur autem diapason practice ex 
diapente et diatesseron, sicut in primo 
dictum est, theorice vero ex eorum 
proportionibus. 
 
And these proportions are the same as they were for Boethius. Ugolino writes,  
The proportion of the diapente is written as 
a sesquialtera 3 and 2. The proportion of 
the diatessaron added to it is placed under 
it, and they stand thus: 3-2 4-3. Let 3 be 
multiplied by 4 and the product will be 12. 
Further, let 2 be multiplied by 3 and 
produce 6. Between 12 and 6 is the duple 
proportion…therefore, just as in practice 
the diapason is composed of a diatessaron 
and a diapente, so its proportion is 
composed of their proportions, which has 
been demonstrated.400 
Scribatur proportio diapente sexquialtera 
3 et 2, cui subordinetur proportio 
diatessaron adiungenda, et stent sic: 3-2 
4-3, et multiplicetur adiungendo 3 per 4 
et productum erit 12. Postea multiplicetur 
2 per 3 et producetur 6, sed inter 12 et 6 
est proportio dupla…Igitur sicut diapason 
pratice ex diatessaron et diapente 
componitur, sic eius proportio ex eorum 
proportionibus connectitur, quod erat 
demonstrandum. 
 
It is clear that he understands these intervals by their Pythagorean ratios. Practice uses names like 
diapente and diatessaron, but theory spells out the specific proportions. Therefore, in his tone 
system, Ugolino sees the intervals in the scale as fixed, not in the sense that they have some 
absolute pitch frequency, but in the sense that the intervallic distances between pitches remain 
constant.401 Furthermore, these intervals are, at first, described in practice, and then they are 
explained through their proportions in theory. But what about the hexachords? 
Ugolino introduces hexachords or syllables only after he has set out the tone system. He 
 
399 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:172. 
400 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:172. 
401 In this case, therefore, Berger’s conception seems closer to Ugolino’s than Bent’s. 
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first mentions syllables to explain the Greek hand. Of the twenty-five notes of the Greater Perfect 
System he says, 
We sing [lit. pronounce] these twenty-five 
simple pitches, which comprise a 
bisdiapason, in this manner: re, mi, fa, sol, 
la, mi, fa, sol, la, re, mi, fa, sol, la, mi, fa, 
sol, la. These pitches or notes are signified 
in our custom by the hard and natural 
properties [hexachords].402 
Has autem XV voces simplices 
bisdiapason continentes hoc modo 
pronuntiamus, scilicet; re, mi, fa, sol, la 
mi, fa, sol, la re, mi, fa, sol, la mi, fa, sol, 
la, quae voces seu notae more nostro per 
proprietates [sqb] quadri et naturae 
significantur. 
 
He continues the analogy by yoking the letters and syllables, so that the proslambanomenos is A-
re and so on. He concludes the chapter by making the rather absurd claim that the Greeks 
discovered or invented the five syllables (voces) re, mi, fa, sol, and la.403 It seems absurd because 
Guido was the first to use the syllables in the eleventh century. But in the minds of Ugolino’s 
readers, the syllables were so tightly bound to specific intervallic distances that Ugolino 
attempted to make the Greek Greater Perfect System more understandable by invoking 
solmization syllables. His readers were probably already familiar with the syllables and 
hexachords since he can cite them here even before he has formally introduced them. By 
describing the sequence of intervals in the Greater Perfect System as a series of solfege syllables, 
Ugolino joins intervals and solfege together, so that re-mi-fa-sol-la always mean the same as 
tone-(minor) semitone-tone-tone respectively.  
In the next few chapters, Ugolino sets out the Latin hand and discusses its solmization 
syllables and hexachords. His discussion reveals the way in which he conceptualizes diatonic 
tonal space. He sees the Latin hand as an outgrowth of the Greater Perfect System. He starts by 
noting the addition to the Greater Perfect System of G2 called gamma. But the tension between 
 
402 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:26. 
403 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:26. 
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the seven letters and the six syllables begins to surface. He uses the fact of octave equivalency as 
a reason for adding gamma: the Greeks had seven letters, A-G, which repeat but which do not 
make a full octave. By adding another G, a full octave is produced.404 Since there are seven 
letters and the gamut extends from G2-E5, there are twenty-five notes. These are placed on 
twenty joints of the hand—B-natural and B-flat share the same spot. These spots he calls seats, 
places, or abodes (sedes)—the place where these notes or pitches live. Since there are six 
syllables that begin on three different places, one letter may have one to three syllables where the 
hexachords overlap. He refers to the syllables as notes (notae) and there are forty-two. The 
syllables come out of two properties (the natural and hard hexachords) that are repeated five 
times, while the B-flats come out of a third property (the round b property or soft hexachord) 
which is placed between (interponi) the others two times.405 This description appears before he 
has formally introduced the hexachords. Ugolino starts from the seven repeated letters, which 
create twenty places (sedes). These sedes accommodate several different syllables, which he 
calls both syllables (voces) and  notes (notae). Because of this there are forty-two notes. The 
hand is the collection of sedes and voces, or the combination of letter and syllable. But we learn 
more about the sedes from the following discussion. 
In chapter 12 of book 1, Ugolino counts how many intervals are within the hand. He goes 
through each interval in turn, beginning with the tone and continuing with the minor semitone, 
third, minor third, fourth, tritone, fifth, diminished fifth, major sixth, minor sixth, major and 
minor seventh, octave, diminished octave, eleventh, twelfth, and fifteenth. He calculates all these 
intervals from their sedes, not from the voces. In other words, he calculates them from the letter 
 
404 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:27. 
405 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:28. 
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names, not from syllables. He begins by listing the total number of each type found in the gamut 
and then gives the letters for each one. For example, he states, “The fifth occurs fifteen times, 
from gamma to D, from A to E” (Diapente quintumdecimum numerum tenet, scilicet, a 
[Gamma] ad D, ab A ad E) and so on.406 Counting intervals from the letters makes sense only if 
those letters have at least a relatively fixed position in the system. Except for B-natural and B-
flat, which share the same place, the distances between all the other letters or sedes are measured 
in tones and semitones, and their intervals can be calculated without reference to the solmization 
syllables or the hexachords. But Ugolino’s conception of the hexachord and the relationship 
between them and the seven letters emerges in his discussion of the hexachord and its meaning. 
Ugolino addresses the hexachord directly in chapters 13-15 of book 1. He sees the natural 
hexachord, the one starting on C, as the primary hexachord. He begins by clarifying the 
difference between proprietas (hexachord, property) and proprium (property, proper). Proprium 
describes something that is incidental to a thing’s essence or being: it can be predicated of a 
thing, but it cannot point to (indicat) a thing’s essence.  It cannot tell what makes a thing what it 
is. Proprietas, on the other hand, can be predicated of a thing, and it also points to what the 
essence of a thing is. For example, in the proposition “humans are rational,” rational is 
something that can be predicated of humans, but it also points out the distinguishing mark of 
what it is to be human. Hence, it is a proprietas or property of human.407 For these reasons, “in 
ancient times, there was one property of music that revealed its essential measure, which in fact 
is called natural, which is the same thing as the natural property [natural hexachord]” (sola 
temporibus igitur primitivis fuit musicae proprietas eius essentialem modum ostendens, quae 
 
406 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:33.  
407 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:34-5. 
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natura merito nuncupatur, quae idem est quod naturalis proprietas).408 The natural property of 
music—the natural hexachord—is indispensable for understanding what music is, just as rational 
is indispensable for understanding what a human is. Ugolino is closely following Guido. Guido 
only referred to one hexachord before talking about other ways to sing melodies, and the other 
hexachords were added later by other theorists.409 
Ugolino distinguishes between the natural hexachord or property on the one hand and the 
soft and hard hexachords on the other. He considers the natural hexachord the central one, a key 
to understanding music. But the other two are merely accidental in the Aristotelian sense of the 
term: they are incidental to understanding music. They originated from the need to soften the 
discord of the tritone between B and F. 
There are three properties which are called 
natural, soft B, and hard B. The first, the 
natural—because it tells the essential 
measure of plainchant and demonstrates its 
essence—is called an essential property. 
But the other two, soft B and hard B, out of 
which arises discord from their softness 
and hardness, are called an accidental 
measure because they are accidental to 
music, nor do they show its essence.410 
Sunt ergo proprietates tres quae dictae 
sunt naturae et B mollis atque [sqb] duri 
quarum prima, scilicet, naturae, eo quod 
plani cantus modum dicit essentialem et 
eius esse demonstrat dicitur proprietas 
essentialis. Aliae vero duae, scilicet, B 
mollis et [sqb] quadri, quarum discordia 
ex asperitate mollitieque consurgit, quae 
musicae accidentia cum sint modum 
accidentalem dicunt nec essentiam eius 
ostendunt. 
 
The natural property is indispensable because it reveals an essential measure of plainchant. This 
comment reveals that here Ugolino’s priority is to understand plainchant. The natural hexachord 
is not an essential measure of music in general but of plainchant in particular. The others were 
added later and are merely accidental to plainchant. Indeed, in books 4 and 5, which he devotes 
 
408 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:35.  
409 Stefano Mengozzi, “‘Si Quis Manus Non Habeat’: Charting Non-Hexachordal Musical Practices in the Age of 
Solmisation,” Early Music History 26 (2007), 182; Mengozzi, The Renaissance Reform, 82. 
410 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:36.  
143 
entirely to expounding intervals, he refers constantly to numbers and proportions but only to 
syllables once.411 Even later in book 1, where he laboriously describes each interval, he always 
uses letters but only sometimes refers to syllables.412  
At this point, Ugolino finally offers a definition of property: “a property, essential or 
accidental, is an acceptance [or reception] of syllables arranged in a high or low register…” 
(proprietas est essentialis seu accidentalis vocum in acuto vel gravi ordinatarum acceptio…).413 
For the syllables to be accepted or received somewhere, a place or places must already exist. 
Those places are the letter names or sedes already set out in the previous chapters. He goes on to 
note that the properties require what he calls variation because they cannot span an octave. And 
his comments on this topic reveal another curious fact about the properties. He writes,  
It is necessary that the properties be varied 
in turn. From their variation in ascent, the 
complete [order] of the authentic tones is 
discovered, and from their arrangement in 
descent the order of complete plagal tones 
is shown.414 
Oportet proprietates praedictas ad 
invicem variari, ex quarum variatione per 
arsyn autenticorum tonorum perfectio 
invenitur, et plagalium per thesyn 
perfectionis ordo monstratur. 
 
After saying this, he tells how there is a property that begins on every C, F, and G. There is a 
connection between the use of hexachords and the understanding of modes, but he does not 
elaborate any further on this point nor does he refer to it later.    
To sum up, Ugolino uses the Greek Greater Perfect System as his foundation. He follows 
Boethius by tracing the history of the system as starting with four strings and steadily gaining 
more over time. He describes these strings using their Greek names, Latin letters, and interval 
 
411 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:49-50. 
412 See, for example, Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:162-163. 
413 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:36.  
414 Ugolino, Declaratio, 1:37. 
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sizes. Later, he defines these intervals using proportions. He sees the Latin scale as an extension 
of the Greek one. To the scale, he adds the syllables and the set of seven hexachords, divided 
into three types (natural, hard, and soft). The letters are the seats (sedes) which receive the 
syllables (voces). This combination of sedes and voces is the musical hand, or, in other words, 
musica recta. The natural hexachord is essential for plainchant, but the other two are accidental, 
growing out of the need to distinguish B-natural and B-flat. The solfege syllables themselves 
come out of hexachords. Syllables cannot exist without a corresponding hexachord that it comes 
from. When he discusses intervals, he sometimes uses syllables but mostly uses letters. 
For Ugolino, the scale, not hexachords, come first. The scale is not exactly an 
undefinable set of steps on a ladder. Instead, the steps are defined as either tones or (minor) 
semitones, which are further clarified as particular mathematical ratios. The steps or letters are 
the places that receive syllables and hexachordal designation. The syllables, used for practical 
purposes, correspond to specific intervallic distances. For example, re-mi is always a tone while 
mi-fa is always a minor semitone. The set of letters and syllables delineates musica recta but 
helps make sense of musica ficta. Ugolino defined musica ficta as “the necessary placement of 
some syllable in a place where it does not exist by itself for the purpose of perfecting 
consonances” (est alicuius vocis in loco ubi per se non est ad consonantiae perfectionum 
necessaria positio).415 In musica recta, each syllable has a particular place: a syllable is always 
associated with a certain letter or set of letters. These, in turn, always match the intervals 
designated by the letters. But in musica ficta, a syllable is placed on a letter where it was not 
found in musica recta. For example, a mi is placed on an F. Since syllables correspond to 
intervals, mi to fa on F to G is no longer a tone but a minor semitone. Since what should be a 
 
415 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:45.  
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tone in musica recta is now a minor semitone in musica ficta, the difference between a tone and 
minor semitone is a major semitone. This is why Ugolino argues that musica ficta involves the 
addition of a major semitone. But does the fact that a mi on F mean that the letters were, in fact, 
flexible? The F-mi is feigned, a fiction created for some necessity. It does not mean that the 
system of musica recta is undefined and merely awaiting hexachordal definition. Instead, it 
means that the system was an incomplete picture. We get a glimpse of the fuller system in the 
chapter on musica ficta, but Ugolino approaches it from the perspective of musical practice. The 
practice of singing F-mi points to notes outside the system of musica recta—to a new or different 
sedes. This system needs a theoretical explanation. For this, we must look outside the Declaratio 
to the small treatise attached an appendix to it—the Tractatus monochordi. 
4.5 The Tractatus monochordi 
Ugolino’s Tractatus is divided into two parts: the first, in chapters 1-7, offers various 
divisions of the monochord according to musica recta. The second, in chapters 8-10, takes the 
recta division as its base and creates a division according to musica ficta. Indeed, Ugolino 
distinguishes these two parts himself. 
The division of the monochord is two-fold: 
one in which the monochord is divided 
according to recta musica through tones, 
minor semitones, diatessaron, diapente, 
and diapason; the other in which every 
tone, arranged according to recta musica, is 
divided into major and minor semitones. 
This division of tones is called not recta 
but ficta musica.416 
Duplex est monochordi divisio, altera qua 
secundum rectam musicam per tonos, 
semitonia minora, diatessaron, diapente et 
diapason monochordum dividitur, altera 
qua omnes toni secundum rectam 
musicam dispositi in maiora atque minora 
semitonia dividuntur, quorum tonorum 




416 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:230-231. See also, Andrew Hughes, “Ugolino: The Monochord and Musica Ficta,” 
Musica Disciplina 23 (1969), 22. 
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The division according to musica ficta springs from that of musica recta. In musica recta each 
tone is in the proportion 9:8, and Ugolino staunchly maintains the Pythagorean position that this 
interval cannot be divided evenly.417 In Pythagorean theory, there are two kinds of semitones—
major and minor—and the distance between them is the comma. So, for each tone of musica 
recta, there could be two different semitones. Therefore, Ugolino charts two different divisions, 
one to find the minor semitones, and the other to find the major ones. His ficta divisions grow 
out of the observation from practice that sometimes intervals need to be altered either to avoid 
imperfect fifths or octaves or to create cadential progressions. 
Figure 4.4: The Ficta Division with Minor Semitones above a Given Note418 
 
 
Since he is calculating these intervals from proportions, it is easiest to begin with minor 
semitones because some of them are already present in musica recta. In fact, only minor 
semitones are present in musica recta. In demonstrating this first division (Figure 4.4), he uses 
 
417 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:231. By maintaining the unequal division of the tone, Ugolino is contradicting Marchetto 
of Padua. 
418 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:241. 
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letters names beyond G to stand for points on the monochord.419 
The first step is to find B-flat, and from there he can divide into 3 against 2 to find the 
perfect fifth below B-flat—E-flat (or letter I in Figure 4.4). Letter I is a minor semitone above D. 
He divides the string from letter I in half and derives a note an octave higher, letter K. Using the 
same process of finding either a perfect fifth or an octave, he locates A-flat, D-flat, and G-flat (L 
and Q, M and N, and O and P respectively).420 Since minor intervals are perfected (made major) 
by adding major semitones, this first division is insufficient for truly perfecting imperfect 
intervals, that is, for making cadential progressions from major thirds to fifths or from major 
sixths to octaves.421 So why even include this division? It is useful for creating perfect fifths or 
octaves and for coloring dissonances, that is, making major intervals minor in progressions like a 
minor third to unison or a minor sixth to a fifth. In fact, he states that the minor semitone is just 
what is needed for coloring dissonances.422 This division points out Ugolino’s contrast between 
perfecting, on one hand, and coloring, on the other. To color a dissonance means to lower it and 
make it minor or imperfect. Indeed, he associates major with perfect and minor with imperfect. 
He writes, “in counterpoint consonances and dissonances ought to be perfect and major and not 
minor and imperfect” (consonantiae et dissonantiae in contrapuncto debent esse perfectae et 
maiores et non minores et imperfectae).423 That is why he can say, “For coloring dissonances—
for which a minor semitone is necessary—this division of the monochord is perfect…” (Sed ad 
dissonantias colorandas in qua semitoniorum minoritas est necessaria haec monochordi divisio 
 
419 Here Ugolino combines the two definitions for letter names described by Bent, “Diatonic Ficta,” 3. 
420 Ugolino never refers to altered notes as A-flat or F-sharp and so forth. Instead, he consistently describes them by 
the letter names on his diagrams. I refer to them in the former manner only for the sake of clarity. 
421 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:244. 
422 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:244. 
423 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:51. 
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perfecta est…) Ugolino uses coloration and perfection both in a wide and a narrow sense. In the 
wide sense, they refer to the same thing—altering a note to achieve some musical goal. But in 
the narrow sense, coloration means using minor semitones or making an interval minor or 
smaller; perfection means using a major semitone or making an interval major or larger. This 
distinction was apparent in the chapter on counterpoint examined above, but he clarifies the idea 
in the Tractatus. Since he needs to explain how intervals are made larger, he needs another 
monochord division, and that is what he does next. 
In the first division, he started from B-flat, but in the second division (Figure 4.5), he 
starts from B-natural. In the first division, he used fifths and octaves to find the new notes. In this 
division, he tunes in fourths, fifths, and octaves. Using this method of calculation, he produces 
C-sharp, D-sharp, F-sharp, and G-sharp (T and N, Y and Z, S and 7, and V and 9 respectively).  
Figure 4.5: The Ficta Division with Minor Semitones below a Given Note424 
 
 
This division is “perfect for perfecting consonances or dissonances” (ad consonantias vel 
dissonantias perficiendas perfecta est).425 He uses perfecting here to mean correcting impure 
fifths and octaves, as well as in the narrower sense of making major. This division allows for 
major thirds and sixths to contain the correct (i.e., Pythagorean) number of tones and semitones. 
 
424 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:246. 
425 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:247.  
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But this second division cannot accommodate every circumstance. If a third progresses to a 
unison or a sixth to a fifth, then minor intervals are needed—the upper note needs to be lowered 
by a major semitone, which then lies a minor semitone away from its resolution. This does not 
occur with this division. In other words, this division cannot properly be used for coloration.426 
Ugolino sums up the matter succinctly:  
So then, the first ficta division of the 
monochord is imperfect for perfection and 
perfect for coloration. But the second 
[division] is perfect for perfection but is 
imperfect for coloration.427 
Prima igitur monochordi ficta divisio ad 
perfectionem est imperfecta et ad 
colorationem perfecta. Haec autem 
secunda ad perfectionem perfecta, sed ad 
colorationem redditur imperfecta. 
 
These two different ways of tuning the intervals between a tone are each useful in their own way. 
But a practicing musician ends up using both.  
Ugolino solves the problem by combining both tunings into one system (Figure 4.6). The 
combined system creates an octave divided into seventeen different notes. 
Figure 4.6: Both Ficta Divisions Combined428 
 
 
The foundation for Figure 4.6 is the system of musica recta, indicated by the usual letter names. 
For each step or tone of musica recta, there are two semitones each separated by a comma. To 
these notes, Ugolino assigns letters past G, and some even receive special symbols or numbers. 
 
426 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:247. 
427 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:249.  
428 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:251. 
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For example, between C and D there are two notes. The first, labeled M, is a minor semitone 
above C. The next is letter T, which is a major semitone above C, a comma above M, and a 
minor semitone below D. Ugolino was, by no means, the first to lay out a seventeen-note octave. 
He seems to have closely followed Prosdocimo, although not slavishly.429 And others, such as 
John Hothby and Franchino Gafori, were indebted to him.430 
By plotting the notes of musica ficta on a monochord, Ugolino reveals several keys to 
understanding his conception of musica ficta, and, as a result, the relationship between the scale, 
the hand, and the hexachord. First, musica recta is a fixed set of relationships. The relationships 
are observed in practice through a study of plainchant, and they are defined in theory through 
mathematical proportions. For example, D to E is a tone and that tone is defined as a 9:8 ratio. 
Second, the syllables, and by extension the hexachords, are overlayed on this system. Each letter 
or place receives a syllable, and since there are only six syllables, some letters will receive more 
than one. Yet these syllables correspond to intervals. In other words, re to mi always indicates a 
tone, and mi to fa always marks a minor semitone.  
This serves plainchant quite well, but when new melodies are added above a chant or a 
given melody, two problems arise. One problem is the tritone (as well as imperfect octaves), 
whether between a low B and the F above it, or between E and B-flat. That is, these fifths contain 
an incorrect number of intervals, three tones instead of three tones and one minor semitone. 
Since counterpoint demands consonant intervals, these need to be made consonant. In practice, 
this happens by altering the added voice so that the correct interval is formed. The alteration is 
 
429 Berger, Musica Ficta, 33; Mark Lindley, “Pythagorean Intonation and the Rise of the Triad,” Royal Musical 
Association Research Chronicle 16 (1980), 22-26. 
430 Heinzelmann, “John Hothby as Innovator,” 355; Lindley, “Pythagorean Intonation,” 26; Berger, Musica Ficta, 
33-37. 
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described as adding a mi or a fa in a place where there was none before. Melodically, this creates 
a minor semitone to the next note. Harmonically, it adds a major semitone so that the interval can 
be formed by the correct number of tones and minor semitones. 
A second problem is the intervals needed for a cadential progression, and this comes in 
two forms. A third progressing to a unison needs to be minor. When a major interval needs to be 
lowered and made minor, Ugolino refers to this as coloration. On the other hand, a sixth 
progressing to an octave needs to be major. When a minor interval needs to be raised and made 
major, Ugolino calls this perfection. Coloration requires a note to descend by a minor semitone 
to its resolution. In practice, this happens when a singer needs to add a fa where there was none 
before. In theory, this is explained by dividing the monochord from B-flat, which is a minor 
semitone above A and solmized as fa (Figure 4.4). This division also helps correct imperfect 
fifths and octaves. But it will not do for perfections. Perfection requires a note to ascend by a 
minor semitone. In practice, this happens when mi is added where it is not normally found. In 
theory, it is explained by dividing the monochord from B-natural (Figure 4.5). These two 
problems are also referred to by Ugolino as perfection in the broadest sense of the term. This is 
why he states in his definition that the purpose of musica ficta is perfection. Since both divisions 
are necessary, he combines them into one where the octave is divided into seventeen different 
notes (Figure 4.6).  
At first glance, it seemed as if the letters of musica recta are flexible or undefined, as 
Bent has depicted them. Instead, the new divisions show that musica recta by itself is incomplete. 
What Ugolino describes only imprecisely in practice as, for example, an F-mi (that is, a mi on a 
letter where it did not occur before), he explains more precisely in theory as a place between 
letters in a more elaborate division of the monochord. That mi does indeed have its own place, 
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but that place is between two letters of musica recta. Still, Ugolino has no convenient way to 
describe this place. His mix of letters, symbols, and numbers is too cumbersome, and he does not 
simply say, for instance, “F-sharp” or “E-flat.” With Ugolino’s system of seventeen notes per 
octave, he can maintain Pythagorean tuning for each interval, even the altered ones.431 
4.6 Conclusions 
Ugolino defines musica ficta based on an observation of practical needs. He notes that 
even when the right notes are sung, they do not always form consonances. Musica ficta was 
invented to resolve this problem. He then relates a particular example that includes the B/F 
tritone. This tritone can be corrected by singing an F-mi instead of the usual F-fa, raising the note 
from where it would be.432 From these brief practical problems, he offers a concise definition of 
musica ficta. The rest of the chapter expands on this definition. From it, we learn several 
important takeaways. 
The purpose of musica ficta is perfection. Perfection is broadly taken to mean two things. 
It is the correction of impure fifths and octaves to perfect ones. It is also the alteration of thirds 
and sixths so that they resolve even more smoothly to the closest perfect consonance. Ugolino 
also calls these perfections, and they are used as cadential progressions. This kind of perfection 
happens in two ways. If a third progresses to a union or a sixth to a fifth, they should be made 
minor by lowering the added voice. But if a third moves to a fifth or a sixth to an octave, they 
should be made major by raising the added voice.433 The former Ugolino calls coloration; the 
 
431 It is not my purpose here to address the issue of tuning or the inherent problems of Pythagorean tuning. But the 
prominence of musica ficta points out how important this issue would become towards the end of the fifteenth 
century and during the sixteenth. 
432 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:44-45. 
433 None of Ugolino’s examples show the lower, chant voice being altered. He always changes the added voice, even 
when it would be easier to change the lower voice and avoid musica ficta by using a B-flat. 
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latter perfection, although he sometimes uses coloration or perfection to refer to both. Ugolino’s 
broad definition of perfection, which covers all these changes, encompasses the two traditional 
categories cited as the purpose for ficta: causa necessitatis and causa pulchritudinis.  
For Ugolino a change according to musica ficta is necessary. It is necessary because of its 
purpose, in order to create perfect fifths and octaves or to make a cadential progression. Indeed, 
he writes, “we do not use musica ficta unless as an altogether compelling necessity” (musica 
ficta nisi necessiatate cogente penitus non utamur).434 In other words, alterations are made for a 
reason based on the musical context. They are not applied arbitrarily. 
Musica ficta means putting a solfege syllable in a place where it did not exist before. The 
place refers to the letters of the gamut, which represent the steps of the scale. Each step received 
several syllables, since hexachords, constructed in six-note segments, must stretch out over the 
scale, constructed in seven-note segments. The letters and solfege together form the musical 
hand. Ugolino points out that adding a syllable where there was none before means adding a 
major semitone, which will then resolve to the next note by a minor semitone. Ugolino thinks of 
syllables as tied to a hexachord. If a new, ficta syllable is added, it must come from some new, 
ficta hexachord. 
Based on these observations, Ugolino creates two diagrams, in each of which he gathers 
together seven ficta hexachords and displays them along side of the seven recta hexachords. The 
interpretation of these diagrams tests the understanding of the role of the scale and the hexachord 
in the structure of diatonic space. Both Margaret Bent and Karol Berger speak about these ficta 
hexachords as if they were transpositions of recta hexachords. Indeed, Berger tried to show how 
the whole system of ficta hexachords is a transposition of the system of recta hexachords. 
 
434 Ugolino, Declaratio, 2:45. 
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However, these descriptions fail because they do not take into account how Ugolino talks about 
them. He derives them based upon the necessity of perfection, in terms both of correcting fifths 
and octaves and of altering thirds and sixths for cadential progressions. For example, since a 
major sixth is required for the cadential progression A/f to G/g, the f must be raised through 
ficta. This will create an F-mi. Since syllables come from hexachords, this F-mi must come from 
a hexachord starting on D. He derives the other ficta hexachords in a similar manner. He never 
cites transposition as the reason for deriving ficta hexachords, and he could have done so, since 
he states that his second diagram is essentially a transposition of the first down a fifth.435 He 
includes only seven ficta hexachords probably because there are only seven recta hexachords. 
However, this does not mean that his diagrams are exhaustive. In fact, he admits a hexachord on 
A even though he does not include it in his diagrams.  
Bent sees the letters as only imprecise markers of a scale, while the syllables give more 
definition to them. Ugolino does associate syllables with precise intervallic distances—precise in 
respect to the proportions but not to the pitch frequency. Accordingly, all adjacent syllables, 
except mi-fa, are tones with the proportion 9:8. Mi-fa always indicates a minor semitone. But 
unlike Bent, Ugolino posits that the letters also indicate clear proportions, and the syllables 
correspond to these. This holds true for musica recta. Musica ficta, on the contrary, changes 
these relations. That is why it is called ficta: it adds a note where there was none before. But it 
does this in a systematic way, by adding major semitones either above or below a given note. 
This does not mean the original letters were imprecise. Instead, it means that they do not present 
 
435 Although he may view the ficta hexachords as transpositions of recta hexachords, he does not take the system of 
recta hexachords and transpose them all at once by a single interval.  
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the whole picture. Ugolino explains this more elaborately in the Tractatus, appended to the 
Declaratio. 
In the Tractatus, Ugolino sets out two different divisions of the monochord according to 
musica ficta. These divisions correspond to the usages he first outlined in book 2 of the 
Declaratio: in one division, he calculates the notes that lie a minor semitone above a given note. 
This division is used for coloration, that is, for making major intervals minor. In the second 
division, he does the opposite and finds the notes that lie a minor semitone below a given note. 
This division is used for perfection, that is, for making minor intervals major. He calculates these 
divisions mathematically using Pythagorean tuning, and he names each new place with either a 
letter name beyond G or a number or symbol. He does not simply call them by their letter name 
with the addition of a square or round b. Since both divisions are necessary for performing 
musica ficta, he combines them into one diagram that divides the octave into seventeen notes. 
This theoretical explanation of musica ficta is a consequence of the practical observations and 
needs found in book 2.  
Ugolino presents two accounts of musica ficta—a practical one in book 2 and a 
theoretical one in the Tractatus. The relationship between practice and theory reflects the 
philosophy outlined in chapter 2. In practice, musica ficta looks at what a singer would need to 
do both to avoid impure fifths and octaves and to create cadential progressions. This practice is 
described from the perspective of a singer—adding a mi or fa where there was none before. The 
notes that arise from this process are collected into a diagram (the double hand) that reflects 
usage (even though it does not provide an exhaustive list, as Ugolino admits) and that parallels 
the already familiar hand diagram for musica recta. In the theoretical examination of musica ficta 
in the Tractatus, Ugolino takes these data from practice and explains them through Pythagorean 
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theory. In theory, musica ficta means there is a seventeen-note octave, where each tone is divided 
unevenly, containing a major and a minor semitone separated by a comma. All these distances 
are calculated mathematically and demonstrated on a monochord. Each ficta syllable does have 
its own place. Therefore, practice and theory are united. Although the goal is indeed theory, the 
path there is through practice, since theory is contained within practice. Indeed, as Ugolino 
reiterates throughout the treatise, he adopts Aristotle’s position that “in learning and in teaching 
we ought to proceed from things that are better known to us to those that are less known to us.” 
(in cognoscendo et discendo debemus procedere ab his quae sunt nobis magis nota ad ea quae 
sunt nobis minus nota.)436 And since “the knowledge of practice is more known to us than the 
knowledge of theory” (cuius praticae notitia magis est nobis speculatione nota), musica ficta is 
one step on the path to theoretical knowledge.437 
  
 
436 Ugolino, Declaratio, 3:87; Aristotle, Physics 1.1.184a18-19. 





In his Declaratio, Ugolino places music as a discipline under natural philosophy instead 
of under mathematics. This placement and the philosophical foundation that supports it shapes 
his entire treatise. In particular, aligning music with natural philosophy affects the way practice 
relates to theory by elevating practice and making it essential for an understanding of theory. In 
chapter 2, I showed how Aristotle differentiates natural philosophy and mathematics. Natural 
philosophy studies objects of nature, while mathematics examines certain attributes of these 
objects. The objects of nature are visible, physical things that have a source of motion within 
themselves. Mathematical objects are attributes or properties that belong to natural objects. They 
are abstracted and considered independently from their objects. For example, a snub-nose is an 
object of nature, but its shape, concavity, is an object of mathematics. Because mathematical 
objects are abstracted from objects of nature, the existence of physical objects is prior to that of 
mathematical objects. According to Aristotle, the path of knowledge proceeds from the physical 
to the mathematical. Knowledge of material reality is indispensable for theoretical knowledge.  
In chapter 2, I also examined how medieval philsophers categorized music. By placing 
music under mathematics, medieval philosophers considered the objects of music to be primarily 
mathematical in nature. However, thinkers in the fourteenth century like Thomas Bradwardine 
and Walter Burley began closing the gap between mathematics and natural philosophy.This, in 
turn, led William of Ockham to posit a different method to relate one science to another based on 
the collection of conclusions the sciences demonstrate. Williams’s method allows natural 
philosophy and mathematics to work together more comfortably. Building on these 
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developments and philosophical foundations, Ugolino places music under natural philosophy. 
Music belongs there because its demonstrations call on both natural philosophy and 
mathematics. Musical practice supplies the objects of music. They are analogous to the objects of 
nature. The objects of music theory, akin to mathematical objects, are abstracted from musical 
practice and explained by using mathematics. Most importantly, therefore, for Ugolino, the 
knowledge of musical practice is indispensable for music-theoretical knowledge. As a result, 
Ugolino organizes his treatise to begin with three books on musical practice, and he concludes 
with two books on musical theory. The close connection between theory and practice elevates 
musical practice. 
In chapter 3, I investigated the distinctive practice of the regola del grado. This practice, 
documented in only four manuscripts, is a method for teaching how to create proper note-
against-note counterpoint. I showed how Ugolino adapts, expands, and updates this tradition. He 
offers a clear presentation on classifying perfect and imperfect intervals. He bases his analysis of 
perfection on musical practice: thirds move to fifths or unisons and sixths move to octaves. With 
this observation in hand, he uses the octave as the measure to explain why some intervals are 
perfect and others imperfect. In addition, intervals involve motion (a topic of natural philosophy) 
in two respects: first, the intervals are sounds and sound requires motion; second, the movement 
of one interval to another involves motion. In other words, Ugolino treats intervals as objects of 
nature. By doing so, he reinforces the notion that music is part of natural philosophy, all while 
presenting a practical guide on forming counterpoint.  
In chapter 4, I showed how Ugolino treats musica ficta. He views the notes of musica 
recta, outlined in book 1, as fixed intervallic relationships (without reference to a particular pitch 
frequency). However, in the course of making counterpoint, the notes of musica recta create 
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conflicts: they can still form a tritone, an interval not allowed in note-against-note counterpoint, 
and they cannot accommodate the notes required to perform cadential progressions (or 
perfections). For these reasons, musica ficta is necessary. I showed that Ugolino determines 
which notes he needs based on usage. For example, for a cadential progression to G, an F-sharp 
is needed. Ugolino always considers notes as belonging to a hexachord. So, F-sharp must belong 
to a hexachord that begins on D. In this way, he finds several other ficta hexachords and sets 
them out in a diagram—the double hand (duplex manus) diagrams. In the Tractatus monochordi, 
Ugolino takes these observations from musical practice and theorizes a scale that includes all the 
notes for both musica recta and musica ficta. The result is a scale with a seventeen-note octave. 
To reach this scale, however, Ugolino begins with musical practice and usage, and then explains 
the scale through mathematical calculation. The theory is based in the musical practice, since 
theoretical objects are abstracted from practice. In this way, Ugolino can create a treatise that is 
both valuable for its practical applications, allowing musicians to learn what they need, as well 
as theoretical, expanding the intellects of his readers.  
5.2 Future Research 
In this dissertation, I have only examined certain facets from book 2 of Ugolino’s 
Declaratio that distinctly reflect his theoretical perspectives. However, the entire treatise remains 
to be examined. Book 1 presents many opportunities for invesitagation. Towards the end of book 
1, Ugolino includes a large sampling of liturgical chants. These chants could be used to gain a 
more precise knowledge of the state of liturgical music. Book 3 offers a long, elaborate 
commentary on rhythmic theory, certainly useful for interpreting rhythmic notation of music 
from the period. Book 5, with its explorations of speculative topics, may include material that 
helps understand the development of both philosophical and humanist thought in the first half of 
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the century. Indeed, early fifteenth century music theory remains under-explored. The largest 
treatise on music theory from the first half of the fifteenth century, Ugolino’s Declaratio is an 
invaluable resource. 
Even book 2 of the Declaratio could be further studied. For example, how might 
Ugolino’s comments on counterpoint aid the analysis of music from the early fifteenth century? 
Further research needs to be done on the extensions he makes to the regola del grado theory. 
More research could be done to compare Ugolino’s division of the monochord in the Tractatus 
monochordi with those of his contemporaries, inclusing Prosdocimo. In short, Ugolino’s treatise 
is very large, and the period in which it was written was pivotal in the history both of music 
theory and of western Europe. For these reasons, his work, and those of his contemporaries, 
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